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"[A] well-schooled [person] is one who searches for that degree
of precision in each kind of study which the nature of the subject at
hand admits ... -
In 1976, the Supreme Court formally abandoned its longstanding
position that commercial speech categorically falls outside the realm
of First Amendment protection.2 Over the course of more than two
dozen decisions since then, the Court has not spelled out exactly what
constitutes commercial speech and thus receives the "limited measure
of protection"' to which that expression is entitled. Rather, the Court
has recited various descriptions, indicia, and disclaimers without set-
tling upon a precise and comprehensive definition.4 The absence of a
clearer demarcation between commercial and noncommercial expres-
sion is routinely denounced by commentators and occasionally within
the Court itself.5 Some critics advocate alternative formulas to the
Court's allegedly fumbling efforts to delineate the ambit of commer-
cial speech.6 Others assert that no principled distinction exists be-
1. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics 5 (Martin Ostwald trans., Macmillan Publ'g Co.
1962).
2. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
3. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
4. See infta Part II.A (surveying the Court's evolving definition of commercial speech).
5. See infra Part II.B (surveying criticisms of the commercial speech definition).
6. See infra notes 231-236 and accompanying text (reviewing different definitions pro-
posed to expand or narrow the Court's definition); Part III.F (evaluating the effectiveness
of the standard set out in United States v. O'Byien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
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tween commercial expression and other types, so that the entire
enterprise is inherently futile.7
This Article contends that judicial reluctance to embrace a set of
all-encompassing criteria for commercial speech represents a healthy
pragmatism, not jurisprudential failure. Specifically, this Article seeks
to show that freedom of expression has not suffered as a result of an
indeterminate or overly expansive conception of commercial speech.
The Court has developed a flexible but coherent method of identify-
ifig commercial speech commensurate with the complexity of the sub-
ject and the needs of a still-evolving First Amendment doctrine. While
the Court has sometimes tolerated undue regulation of speech in
commercial contexts, these lapses can generally be ascribed to exces-
sive substantive deference to state regulation. rather than improper
designation of the nature of the restricted expression.
Admittedly, still greater clarity and protection might be achieved
by eradicating the commercial speech category altogether; under such
a regime, speech connected with commercial transactions would
stand on the same plane as political and other types of expression that
enjoy full-blown First Amendment protection. However, the Court
has demonstrated scant inclination to take this step. More impor-
tantly, this Article argues that the Court's current framework can ac-
commodate the protection sought by all but the most zealous
champions of expression plausibly denominated as commercial
speech. At the same time, preservation of commercial speech as a
discrete category fosters a more helpful body of precedent than ad
hoc treatment of each issue as presenting a wholly new set of
problems.
Part I provides an overview of modern commercial speech doc-
trine and the scholarly reaction that it has provoked. Part II canvasses
more specifically the Court's efforts to draw the bounds of commer-
cial speech and reviews criticism of those efforts. Part III undertakes
to show that theoretical deficiencies arising from the lack of a firmer
test for characterizing speech as commercial dissipate upon closer in-
spection. Conversely, Part IV, endorsing Professor Schauer's rejection
of the view that "a distinction that cannot be sharply drawn cannot be
drawn at all,"8 argues for the affirmative value of this imperfectly de-
fined category of expression.
7. See infra note 216 (surveying commentators who argue that it is impossible to distin-
guish commercial from noncommercial speech).
8. Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U.
CIN. L. REv. 1181, 1189 (1988).
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I. A SHORT HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH9
The Court's decisions addressing the protection afforded com-
mercial speech can be roughly grouped into three periods. In 1976,
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc."° launched a fairly brief flourish of decisions emphatically re-
jecting governmental attempts to suppress accurate commercial infor-
mation. The Court's opinion in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission11 in 1980 signaled the advent of a more am-
biguous phase, during which the Court lurched between the anti-pa-
ternalistic impulse of Virginia Pharmacy and greater tolerance of
restrictions on commercial speech. Finally, the current decade has
been marked by a revived if not quite unswerving commitment to the
original philosophy of Virginia Pharmacy.'
2
A. Early Vigor
Virginia Pharmacy's robust protection of commercial speech deci-
sively shed the long-eroded doctrine of Valentine v. Chrestensen."3 In a
"casual, almost offhand"' 4 ruling, Chrestensen had pronounced "purely
commercial advertising" ineligible for First Amendment considera-
tion.' 5 Subsequent decisions, however, acknowledged that the com-
9. The literature abounds with more extended accounts. For a comprehensive survey
of articles on commercial speech from 1976-1980, see Michael Feldman, Bibliography,
Survey of the Literature: Commercial Speech and Commercial Speakers, 2 CARDozo L. REv. 659
(1981). For a sampling of more recent summaries, see JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1065-89 (5th ed. 1995); John C. Coots, Note, A Missed
Opportunity to Definitively Apply the Central Hudson Test: Fane v. Edenfield, 26 CREIGHTON
L. REv. 1155, 1160-82 (1993); EdwardJ. McAndrew, Note, City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, Inc.: Elevating the Value of Commercial Speech?, 43 CATH. U. L. REv. 1247, 1252-71
(1994); PeterJ. Tarsney, Note, Regulation of Environmental Marketing: Reassessing the Supreme
Court's Protection of Commercial Speech, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 533, 539-62 (1994). All of the
above discussions predate the Supreme Court's decision in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). For a helpful analysis of that decision, see Sean P. Costello,
Comment, Strange Brew: The State of Commercial Speech Jurisprudence Before and After 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 47 CASE W. Res. L. REV. 681 (1997).
10. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
11. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
12. See infra Part I.C (discussing the Court's decisions in the 1990s).
13. 316 U.S. 52 (1942), overruled by Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
14. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
15. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. at 54. Chrestensen had violated a municipal ban on distribu-
tion of advertising material in the streets by disseminating handbills that publicized his
exhibit of a retired United States Navy submarine. Id at 53. Upholding enforcement of
the ban in Chrestensen, id. at 55, the Court followed suit in subsequent decisions. See Breard
v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641-45 (1951) (denying First Amendment protection to door-
to-door solicitations of magazine subscriptions), overruled by Village of Schaumburg v. Citi-
zens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632 & n.7 (1980); Martin v. City of Struthers,
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mercial aspect of the sale of periodicals did not nullify First
Amendment protection of their contents,' 6 declared that a newspa-
per's receipt of payment for publishing a public affairs advertisement
did not diminish the First Amendment guarantee for that publica-
tion,17 and indicated that a city's power to prohibit want ads in sex-
designated columns flowed from the illegal discrimination promoted
by such advertisements rather than the wholesale irrelevance of First
Amendment values to commercial expression."i One term prior to
Virginia Pharmacy, the Court explicitly recognized that First Amend-
ment interests must be taken into account in assessing the validity of
governmental restrictions on commercial advertising.'
9
Virginia Pharmacy emphatically affirmed the potency of those in-
terests. In striking down Virginia's ban on advertising the prices of
prescription drugs, the Court linked communication of the sup-
pressed information to a variety of First Amendment concerns. First
was the ability of consumers to fulfill themselves2" by utilizing the
comparative pricing data made available by the Court's ruling. 2 ' The
Court speculated that the elderly and others threatened by financial
319 U.S. 141, 142 n.1 (1943) (invalidating a ban on door-to-door solicitation as applied to a
Jehovah's Witness, and noting that the ban was "not directed solely at commercial advertis-
ing"); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 110-11 (1943) (quoting Chrestensen for the
proposition that states may prohibit the use of the streets to distribute "purely commercial
leaflets").
16. Breard, 341 U.S. at 642 ("[T]he fact that periodicals are sold does not put them
beyond the protection of the First Amendment.").
17. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) ("[W]e hold that if the
allegedly libelous statements would otherwise be constitutionally protected from the pres-
ent judgment, they do not forfeit that protection because they were published in the form
of a paid advertisement.").
18. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389
(1973).
19. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826, 829 (1975) (invalidating the application of a
state statute that prohibited encouraging abortions to an advertisement of out-of-state
abortion services); see Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial
Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 429 (1971) (providing an oft-
cited review of the development of the commercial speech doctrine through 1971); Ron-
ald D. Rotunda, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1080,
1084-1101 (tracing the development of the commercial speech doctrine through Bigelow
and Virginia Pharmacy).
20. Self-fulfillment or self-realization has attained considerable stature as a principal
purpose of freedom of expression. See David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law:
Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 62 (1974) (arguing that
First Amendment protection of the "central human capacity" to communicate in various
ways and on different levels "nurtures and sustains the self-respect of the mature person");
infra notes 148-149 (noting commentary on the theory of self-realization).
21. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 756-57, 757 n.15 (1976). The stake of listeners as well as speakers in free speech
is a prominent motif of Virginia Pharmacy; see, e.g., icL at 756 (noting that First Amendment
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drain from prohibitive drug prices could benefit from "the alleviation
of physical pain or the enjoyment of basic necessities."22 In addition,
the Court tied the accessibility of commercial information to the issue
of public decisionmaking, often thought to lie at the heart of the First
Amendment, by arguing that the free flow of commercial information
helps citizens to make informed decisions about the extent to which
America's predominantly free market economy should be regulated
or altered.23
Finally, and most fundamentally, the Court invoked the First
Amendment's bedrock presumption in favor of the salutary nature of
free expression. In a passage reminiscent of Holmes's call for a "free
trade in ideas '24 and Brandeis's admonition against succumbing to
fear as a reason for stifling expression,2 the Court rejected Virginia's
contention that drug price advertising could trigger distorted percep-
tions and misguided conduct.26 Virginia had raised the specter that
unrestrained advertising would generate a downward spiral in the
pharmaceutical profession, as consumers chased the cheapest rather
than best pharmacists, pharmacist-customer relationships unraveled,
and the pharmacist's status was degraded "to that of a mere retailer."27
While not dismissing these concerns as implausible, the Court bluntly
cast them as premised on the "advantages of [citizens] being kept in
ignorance."2' The First Amendment, said the Court, did not counte-
"protection [is] afforded ... to the communication, to its source and to its recipients
both").
22. Id. at 764.
23. Id at 765 (citing ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948)). Meiklejohn's thesis that the First Amendment's central meaning is
to safeguard discussion of matters relating to self-government, MEIKLEJOHN, supra, at 22-27,
has enjoyed strong support on the Court. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976)
(per curiam) (noting that the First Amendment affords broadest protection to "discussion
of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates[, which] are integral to the
operation of the system of government established by our Constitution"); Mills v. Alabama,
384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose
of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.");
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) ("Criticism of government is at the very center of
the constitutionally protected area of free discussion."). For the view that this principle
militates against substantial First Amendment protection of commercial speech, see infra
notes 150-155 and accompanying text.
24. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). In this
famous passage, Holmes also asserts "that the best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." Id.
25. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
26. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 769-70.
27. Id. at 768.
28. Id. at 769.
[VOL. 58:55
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
nance "this highly paternalistic approach."29 Instead, it embodied a
constitutional judgment that "the dangers of suppressing informa-
tion" outweigh "the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available."3"
Still, the Court declined to extend unqualified First Amendment
protection to commercial speech.3 ' The Court singled out two attrib-
utes of commercial speech that justify subjecting it to greater regula-
tion than would be tolerated with respect to other modes of
expression. First, the relative "objectivity" of commercial speech and
advertisers' familiarity with their product or service support an expec-
tation that commercial speakers can verify the truth of their
message.3 2 Second, the "hardiness" of commercial speech, based on
the dependence of commercial profits on advertising, reduces the
possibility that it will be discouraged by regulation reasonably
designed to insure that "the flow of truthful and legitimate commer-
cial information is unimpaired." 3
The immediate progeny of Virginia Pharmacy continued to sound
that decision's "anti-paternalistic" 4 theme. In Linmark Associates, Inc.
v. Township of Willingboro,35 the Court struck down an ordinance for-
bidding residents to display "For Sale" or "Sold" signs.3 6 The ban was
aimed at "stem [ming] ... the flight of white homeowners from a ra-
cially integrated community."" While approving the aim of promot-
ing racially integrated housing, the Court condemned this means
because it restricted certain messages based on apprehension "that
they will cause those receiving the information to act upon it." 8 As in
Virginia Pharmacy, the state could not bar the dissemination of accu-
rate information out of fear that its recipients would react
"'irrationally."' 3 9
Perhaps even more telling was the Court's willingness to overturn
the legal profession's longstanding taboo on advertising in popular
29. Id. at 770.
30. Id.
31. Id. ("[W]e of course do not hold that it can never be regulated in any way. Some
forms of commercial speech regulation are surely permissible.").
32. Id. at 772 n.24.
33. Id.
34. See Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IowA L. REv.
589, 612 (1996) (noting that "[s]ubsequent decisions have adhered to the anti-paternalism
model originally adopted in Virginia Board').
35. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
36. Id. at 86, 97.
37. Id. at 86.
38. Id. at 94.
39. Id. at 96.
1999]
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media. In Bates v. State Bar," the Court ruled that a state through its
bar could not prohibit attorneys' advertising about the price of rou-
tine legal services."1 As in Linmark, the State's justification was rooted
largely in the feared impact of the proscribed message."2 However,
while the town in Linmark was concerned with the socially destructive
behavior that "For Sale" signs might spark, not their accuracy,4 3 the
State argued in Bates that advertising of legal services inherently con-
veys distorted information.4" Specifically, the State asserted that such
advertising is inevitably misleading because the exact mix of legal serv-
ices required varies among clients, and that the type of advertising at
issue in Bates did not contain all of the information relevant to the
selection of an attorney. 5
In essence, the Bates Court viewed the State's theory as depen-
dent on demeaning premises about the intelligence and decisionmak-
ing capacity of those whom the State would shield from truthful
information. The Court assumed that clients could determine the
general type of services that they needed"6 and that they were not
prone to simplistic fallacies about the nature of advertising. 7 More
broadly, the Court again expressed its skepticism of justifications for
suppressing truthful information "based on the benefits of public
ignorance.""8
During the same term, the Court also rejected a state's attempt to
restrict commercial speech thought to overwhelm the public's sensi-
bilities rather than its intellect. In Carey v. Population Services Interna-
tional,"9 the Court struck down a blanket ban on the advertisement or
display of contraceptives.5 0 The Court regarded as inadequate under
the First Amendment the justification that advertisements of contra-
40. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
41. Id. at 384.
42. Id. at 368-79 (suggesting that attorney advertising would undermine the profes-
sion's reputation, its focus on service to clients, its ability to secure client trust, and the
effective administration ofjustice).
43. Linmark, 431 U.S. at 94-96 (noting that the township banned "For Sale" signs be-
cause of their effect, and that such signs communicated matters of fact).
44. Bates, 433 U.S. at 372-75.
45. Id at 372. The state also argued that the lack of standardization of legal services
renders fee schedules meaningless. Id. at 372-73. The Court responded that variations in
the delivery of legal services did not make advertising misleading as long as the attorney
performed the specified work at the advertised price. Id.
46. Id. at 374.
47. See id. at 375 (expressing suspicion that the argument that advertising's incomplete
information misleads the public "rests on an underestimation of the public").
48. Id.
49. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
50. Id. at 700-02.
[VOL. 58:55
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
ceptive products would prove "offensive and embarrassing" to those
exposed to them. 1
In the two subsequent terms, the Court upheld a pair of restric-
tions on commercial speech; neither decision, however, inevitably re-
pudiated the anti-paternalistic heart of Virginia Pharmacy." Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n5 sustained Ohio's limitations on the ability of its
attorneys to solicit clients in person. 4 Although the Court referred to
commercial speech's "subordinate position in the scale of First
Amendment values," 5 the opinion principally emphasized the dan-
gers of intimidation and other forms of "'vexatious conduct"' peculiar
to in-person solicitation,56 as well as Ohralik's own egregious con-
duct.57 Similarly, in approving a prohibition on practicing optometry
under a trade name, the Court in Friedman v. Rogers58 dwelt on the
distinctive capacity of trade names to project a misleading impression
of the character of the practice represented.59 Optometrists were still
free to advertise in other ways the same information that was imper-
fectly conveyed through this label.6" Accordingly, the 7-2 majority
that included Justices Stevens and Brennan 61 perceived the ban as
simply implementing Virginia Pharmacy's principle that a state may re-
51. Id. at 701.
52. But see Jonathan Weinberg, Note, Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech, 82
COLUM. L. REv. 720, 727-28 (1982) (arguing that these two decisions "signalled a retreat"
from protection of commercial speech).
53. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
54. Id. at 467-68.
55. Id. at 456.
56. Id. at 462 (quoting Brief for Appellant at 25).
57. See id. at 463 ("[T]he appropriate focus is on appellant's conduct."); id. at 467
(noting that Ohralik "approached two young accident victims at a time when they were
especially incapable of making informed judgments or of assessing and protecting their
own interests"); id. at 470 (Marshall, J., concurring) (describing the Court's holding as
limited to circumstances "presenting substantial dangers of harm ... independent of the
solicitation itself').
58. 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
59. Id. at 12-15.
60. Id. at 16 (noting that the statute regulating the practice of optometry does not
prohibit advertising of the factual information, such as service prices, imparted by trade
names).
61. Justices Stevens and Brennan may fairly be regarded as staunch advocates of strong
First Amendment protection of commercial speech. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.) ("The First Amendment
directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for
what the government perceives to be their own good.") (emphasis added); Posadas de
Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 351 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that government regulation of the "dissemination of nonmisleading com-
mercial speech relating to legal activities, for fear that recipients will act on the
information provided ... should be subject to strict judicial scrutiny") (emphasis added).
1999]
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quire that commercial information "'appear in such a form.., as [is]
necessary to prevent its being deceptive. '62
B. The Ambivalent Eighties
The 1980s witnessed a step back from the principle that truthful,
nonmisleading commercial speech enjoys full-blown First Amend-
ment protection. A less stringent standard of scrutiny for restrictions
on commercial speech appeared, and, in some decisions at least, the
Court tacitly discarded Virginia Pharmacy's censure of paternalistic ra-
tionales. In other cases during this period, however, a pronounced
anti-paternalistic strain persisted, especially in response to the bar's
continuing efforts to limit lawyers' advertising.
1. Retrenchment.-Three decisions spanning the eighties-Cen-
tral Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,63 Posadas de
Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,64 and Board of Trustees
of the State University of New York v. Fox 55-represent downward arcs in
the decade's unsteady trajectory of commercial speech protection.66
In its split between a result consistent with Virginia Pharmacy and lan-
guage suggesting an approach more deferential to state regulation,
Central Hudson particularly captures the Court's oscillating course.
The Court struck down a state's blanket ban on advertising by an elec-
tric utility to promote the use of electricity.67 In the Court's view, the
regulation suppressed more speech than necessary to further the
State's interest in energy conservation.68
62. Friedman, 440 U.S. at 16 (alteration in original) (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976)).
63. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
64. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
65. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
66. A fourth holding, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality
opinion), discussed infra text accompanying notes 309-313, also represents a decline in
protection. This plurality opinion, however, has uncertain precedential significance. See
id. at 569 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing the Court's treatment of an ordinance
regulating outdoor advertising as "a virtual Tower of Babel, from which no definitive prin-
ciples can be clearly drawn"). Another case in which a restriction was upheld, San Francisco
Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 541 (1987), shed little
light on divisions within the Court over the sort of treatment to be accorded commercial
speech. See infra text accompanying notes 318-326 for a discussion of this case.
67. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 571.
68. Id. at 569-72. For example, the utility might advertise energy-efficient devices
whose use would not undermine the State's goal. Id. at 570. Also, less restrictive alterna-
tives, such as requiring inclusion of additional information about the efficiency of the ser-
vice being advertised, might serve the State's purpose equally well. Id. at 570-71.
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While champions of commercial speech could take comfort in
Central Hudson's holding, the broader framework announced by the
opinion contained more ominous implications. The Court promul-
gated a four-part test whose final and typically crucial criterion was
that the restriction on commercial speech be "no[ ] more extensive
than is necessary to serve [the State's] interest."69 Although this re-
quirement denotes stringent scrutiny in the context of non-commer-
cial speech,70 it assumed more tolerant overtones in the context of the
Central Hudson standard.71 By suggesting its approval of more pre-
cisely tailored restrictions on promotional advertising,72 the Court in-
dicated that truthful information could sometimes be suppressed to
dampen demand for a lawful product. 73 Justice Blackmun protested
this apparent departure from Virginia Pharmacy's principle that gov-
ernment may not bar dissemination of such information in order to
manipulate consumers' behavior.74
While Central Hudson marked an uncertain degree of decline in
judicial solicitude for commercial speech, the Court's protection un-
doubtedly reached its nadir in Posadas. This decision sustained Puerto
Rico's restriction of advertisements for casino gambling-a legal activ-
ity in the commonwealth-aimed at Puerto Rican residents. 75 The
Court first found that the prohibition passed a notably relaxed version
of the Central Hudson test.7 6 In particular, any rigor that might be
69. Id. at 566. The first three prongs required that the speech "concern lawful activity
and not be misleading" to qualify for protection, that "the asserted governmental interest
[be] substantial," and that "the regulation directly advance[ ] the governmental interest."
Id
70. See, e.g., Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (re-
quiring restrictions on sexually explicit telephone messages to "be carefully tailored to
achieve [the government's] ends"); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786
(1978) (requiring restrictions on exposition of ideas by corporations to be "'closely drawn
to avoid unnecessary abridgement'" (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per
curiam))).
71. See Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)
(interpreting Central Hudson's requirement that a regulation not be more extensive than
necessary to serve a state interest as requiring a "reasonable fit" between the regulation and
the interest, rather than the least restrictive means).
72. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 570 (implying that a more limited restriction on the
content of promotional advertising that served the State's interest in conserving energy
might be permissible).
73. Id. at 574 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("I seriously doubt whether suppression of
information concerning the availability and price of a legally offered product is ever a
permissible way for the State to 'dampen' demand for or use of the product.").
74. Id. at 576-77.
75. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 348 (1986).
76. See id. at 340-44 (describing the last two steps of the Central Hudson test as "in-
volv[ing] a consideration of the 'fit' between the legislature's ends and the means chosen
to accomplish those ends").
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read into the requirement that restrictions on commercial speech be
no more extensive than necessary proved chimerical. The Posadas
rendition of this criterion bowed to both the legislature and paternal-
ism, as the Court deferred to Puerto Rico's judgment that suppressing
advertisements for casino gambling was a more effective means of di-
verting residents from the risks of this activity than generating addi-
tional speech to discourage it.7 7
In addition, the opinion contained logic that threatened to evis-
cerate the commercial speech doctrine itself. While Virginia Pharmacy
viewed direct regulation of commercial activity as a constitutional al-
ternative to suppressing speech about it,78 Posadas reasoned that the
one subsumed the other. Under this principle, the "greater power" to
prohibit completely an activity like casino gambling entails the "lesser
power" to forbid advertising of that activity.79 Thus, only advertising
about activities or products that themselves enjoyed constitutional
protection would be immune to sweeping regulation. 0
By the end of the decade, the Court had reared back from
Posadas's implications of wholesale deference to state regulation of
commercial speech."1 Still, the Court was willing to uphold restric-
tions of even truthful commercial speech that were plausibly designed
to further a valid interest. In Fox, the Court refused to invalidate a
university's rule prohibiting commercial enterprises from operating in
campus facilities as a per se violation of the Central Hudson test. 2 At
the heart of the opinion lay the Court's reformulation of the fourth
prong of the Central Hudson standard. Declaring that it was aligning
its formal standard with earlier results, the Court declined to require
that government restrict no more commercial speech than strictly
necessary to achieve its purpose.8 3 Instead, there need only be a "'fit'
between.., ends and the means... that is not necessarily perfect, but
reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition
77. Id. at 344.
78. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (noting that the State is "free to require whatever professional stan-
dards it wishes of its pharmacists").
79. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345-46.
80. Id at 345 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 700-02 (1977) (con-
traceptives); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818-29 (1975) (abortions)).
81. Compare id. at 344 (leaving it solely "up to the legislature" to determine whether less
restrictive means can effectively achieve the same end) with Board of Trustees of the State
Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (requiring that the legislature's choice of
regulation be reasonable).
82. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480.
83. Id at 476-80.
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but one whose scope is 'in proportion to the interest served."' 84 In
other words, the means to achieve the legislative objective would have
to be "narrowly tailored" rather than "the least restrictive. '"85
2. Enclaves of Protection.--Decisions during the eighties did not
invariably point to a weakening of the Court's protection of commer-
cial speech. Perhaps ironically, the bar's chronic resistance to lawyer
advertising provided the principal vehicle by which the Court ex-
pressed adherence to the anti-paternalistic spirit of Virginia Phar-
macy.86 The Court repeatedly struck down restrictions explicitly or
tacitly premised on low estimates of potential clients' capacity to grasp
accurate information about attorneys' practices and credentials. In In
re RM.J.,87 a unanimous Court overturned the enforcement of rules
forbidding an attorney from listing areas of practice in a manner not
conforming to a bar committee's prescribed language and from list-
ing the courts in which he was admitted to practice.8" The State failed
to meet its burden of demonstrating that provision of this information
was likely to mislead the public.89 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Coun-
sel' ° ruled that a state could not prevent an attorney from soliciting
business by running nondeceptive newspaper advertisements aimed at
possible victims of an allegedly defective product.9 ' The advertise-
ment at issue in Zauderer also contained a picture of the device;92 the
Court rejected the State's argument that illustrations inherently pose
intolerable "risks that the public will be misled, manipulated, or con-
fused."9 Finally, Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n?4 extended Zauderer's
protection to targeted direct-mail solicitation of potential clients.9 5
84. Id. at 480 (quotations and citations omitted).
85. Id.
86. Another decision, Bolgerv. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60,75 (1983), struck
down a prohibition on mailing unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives. However,
the case reveals more about the Court's approach to distinguishing commercial from non-
commercial speech than about its treatment of expression assigned to the latter category.
See infra text accompanying notes 197-205 (describing the combination of factors leading
the Court to classify the pamphlets in Bolger as commercial speech).
87. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
88. Id. at 204-07. The Court also rejected a limitation on the circulation of professional
announcement cards. Id. at 206.
89. Id. at 205-06.
90. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
91. Id. at 647.
92. Id. at 630.
93. Id. at 648. The Court did uphold disciplinary action for violation of a disclosure
provision requiring the advertisement to note that clients might be liable for litigation
costs even if their lawsuits were unsuccessful. Id. at 650-53.
94. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
95. Id. at 472-78.
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While recognizing that individualized review of such letters could pro-
duce a greater burden for authorities than a blanket ban, the Court
invoked Zauderer's "'faith that the free flow of commercial informa-
tion is valuable enough to justify imposing on would-be regulators the
costs of distinguishing the truthful from the false, the helpful from
the misleading, and the harmless from the harmful."'9 6
C. Nineties Resurgence
On the whole, the 1990s have thus far proved an era of relative
invigoration of the commercial speech doctrine. Six of the decade's
first eight decisions squarely raising the issue have thwarted govern-
ment efforts to suppress the communication of truthful, nonmislead-
ing commercial information;97 even the other two may be reasonably
regarded as special cases if not outright aberrations.98 In handing
down these generally protective decisions, the Court has also dis-
tanced itself from some of the deferential notions of the preceding
phase.
1. Restrictions on Professional Solicitation.-For the most part, the
Court has continued to look askance at attempts to stifle advertising
and other solicitation by professionals. Peel v. Attorney Registration &
Disciplinary Commission99 held that a state could not categorically bar
attorneys from publicizing their certification in civil trial advocacy by
the National Board of Trial Advocacy and similar specializations.' 00
Justice Stevens's plurality opinion expressly rejected the State's "pater-
nalistic assumption" that recipients of Peel's letterhead were incapa-
ble of grasping that certification by a private organization did not
amount to state imprimatur."' Similarly, in Ibanez v. Florida Depart-
ment of Business & Professional Regulation, Board of Accountancy,1" 2 the
Court upheld the right of an accountant recognized as a "Certified
Financial Planner" by a private board to advertise this designation.1 0 3
96. Id. at 478 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 646).
97. See infra notes 99-107, 114-120, 128-140.
98. See infra notes 108-113, 121-125.
99. 496 U.S. 91 (1990) (plurality opinion).
100. Id. at 110. A majority of the Court appeared to endorse a requirement of sufficient
disclosure to make such information not misleading. See id. at 116 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that the attorney's publication was potentially misleading so that a state
constitutionally may require a disclaimer); id at 118 (White, J., dissenting) (same).
101. Pee, 496 U.S. at 105 & n.13.
102. 512 U.S. 136 (1994).
103. Id. at 138-39. The Court also overturned disciplinary action against Ibanez for
truthfully advertising her status as a certified public accountant, id. at 143-44; she was li-
censed by the same state agency that sought to censure her, id. at 138.
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Again, the Court refused to indulge unsupported assumptions that
potential clients would be led astray by hypothetical misconstructions
of a truthfully reported credential.'" 4 In Edenfield v. Fane,' 5 the Court
even qualified its approval of Ohralik's ban on in-person solicitation."a 6
The Court found the dynamics of the accounting profession suffi-
ciently different from lawyer-client relations to invalidate a prohibi-
tion on certified public accountants' approaching potential business
clients.1
0 7
A conspicuous exception to this line of cases was the Court's deci-
sion in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.'°8 to sustain enforcement of a
prohibition on personal injury lawyers' sending targeted direct-mail
solicitations within thirty days of an accident.10 9 However, the deci-
sion appears to create a narrow precedent. The Court, limiting its
holding to "the circumstances presented,""0 emphasized the special
state interest in shielding "bereaved or injured individuals" from a
"willful or knowing affront to or invasion of [their] tranquility.""'
justice O'Connor's opinion thus sought to distinguish the ban from
invalid commercial speech restrictions "motivated primarily by pater-
nalism.""' 2 In light of the Court's broader protective tendency, this
5-4 decision will probably turn out to be a rare and ephemeral victory
injustice O'Connor's generally unsuccessful campaign to reverse the
course upon which the Court embarked in Bates.
13
2. Discovery Network and Edge: Split Decisions.-More indica-
tive of the direction of most recent commercial speech cases was the
104. Id at 144-46.
105. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
106. Id. at 765-67.
107. Id. at 774-76 (distinguishing between in-person solicitation by accountants and law-
yers based on their professional training, characteristics of the recipient of the solicitation,
and the atmosphere in which the solicitation is conducted).
108. 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
109. Id. at 635.
110. Id. at 620.
111. Id at 630.
112. Id. at 631 n.2.
113. See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 778 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "the States have the broader authority to prohibit commercial speech that,
albeit not directly harmful to the listener, is inconsistent with the speaker's membership in
a learned profession and therefore damaging to the profession and society at large"); Peel
v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 119 (1990) (plurality opin-
ion) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that states should have "considerable latitude" to
enact regulations "designed to ensure a reliable and ethical profession"); Shapero v. Ken-
tucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 488-91 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that re-
stricting lawyer advertising serves to instill ethical standards in the legal profession where
other methods have failed).
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invalidation of a restrictive ordinance in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, Inc." 4 The ordinance had prohibited the distribution of
"commercial" publications through freestanding newsracks located on
public property." 5 Infusing Fox's standard of scrutiny with teeth, the
Court determined that the city had failed to demonstrate a "'reason-
able fit"' between the prohibition and its asserted interests in safety
and aesthetics." 6 Since the larger number of newsracks containing
non-commercial publications created harms of the same nature and
arguably greater magnitude, the selective ban foundered on its blatant
underinclusiveness." 7 The Court expressly rejected Cincinnati's as-
sertion that the intrinsic "'low value"' of commercial speech was suffi-
cient ground for less favorable treatment of newsracks dispensing
"'commercial handbills.""'" Noting the absence of peculiarly "com-
mercial harms" arising from the banned newsracks," 9 Discovery Net-
work appeared to impose on government the burden of showing that
restrictions aimed at commercial speech are justified in order to pre-
vent distinctively commercial harms. 12°
That same term, the Court in United States v. Edge Broadcasting
Co.'2' upheld federal legislation barring broadcasters licensed in
nonlottery states from airing lottery advertisements. 122 While Edge
was licensed in North Carolina, a nonlottery state, over ninety percent
of its audience lived in Virginia, which did sponsor a lottery.' 21 Still,
the Court found an adequate "fit" under Central Hudson and Fox be-
tween the ban and the federal interest in supporting the antigambling
policy of states like North Carolina. 24 The opinion explicitly relied
on the rationale in Posadas that government may restrict the advertis-
ing of gambling to reduce demand. 125
114. 507 U.S. 410, 430-31 (1993).
115. Id. at 413.
116. Id. at 417 (quoting Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,
480 (1989)).
117. See id. at 417-18, 425-26 (noting that more dispensing devices were devoted to news-
papers than handbills and that the devices had the same general appearance whether dis-
pensing newspapers or handbills).
118. Id. at 428.
119. Id. at 426.
120. Cf Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591, 630-35 (1982)
(arguing that commercial and noncommercial speech deserve comparable constitutional
guarantees because protection of both serves the value of self-realization).
121. 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
122. Id. at 436.
123. Id. at 423.
124. Id. at 429-30.
125. Id at 434.
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On the surface, it is difficult to reconcile the Court's opinion in
Edge, which is avowedly paternalistic toward citizens and deferential to
state regulation, with its opinion a few months earlier in Discovery Net-
work, which was more protective of commercial speech. However, an
unusual confluence of forces probably accounts for the apparent in-
congruity. First, the Court has long tolerated greater restrictions on
broadcasting than on other media.126 Moreover, Posadas and Edge to-
gether suggest the Court's sympathy toward states' efforts to diminish
the "vice" of gambling. Finally, the Court may have been eager to
endorse a species of cooperative federalism.
121
3. Price Advertising for Alcoholic Beverages.-Two recent invalida-
tions of statutes banning price advertising for alcoholic beverages bol-
ster the likelihood that Edge represents an anomaly, not a trend. In
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 2' the Court struck down a federal prohibi-
tion on the disclosure of alcohol content of beer on labels or in adver-
tising.129 The government had defended the statute as necessary to
avert "strength wars" among competing beer companies. 131 Carefully
reviewing this justification in light of inconsistencies in the govern-
ment's broader regulatory scheme,1 3 1 the Court was prepared to con-
clude that the ban did not even meet Central Hudson's third
requirement that a regulation of commercial speech directly advance
its stated purpose. 11 2 In any event, however, the restriction failed Cen-
tral Hudson's final test because it was "not sufficiently tailored to [the
Government's] goal."1 33 The availability of less restrictive options,
126. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (stating that "of all forms of
communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment
protection"); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969) ("[I]t is idle to posit an
unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every indi-
vidual to speak, write, or publish.").
127. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) ("[The Court has] recog-
nized Congress' power to offer States the choice of regulating [private] activity according
to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation. This arrange-
ment ... has been termed 'a program of cooperative federalism,' ....." (quoting Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981) (citations omit-
ted))); Hodel, 452 U.S. at 264, 288-89, 304 (describing the Federal Surface Mining Act as a
program of cooperative federalism").
128. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
129. Id. at 478, 491.
130. Id, at 479.
131. For example, disclosure of alcohol content was permitted on labels for distilled
spirits and required for wines with more than 14% alcohol. Id. at 488.
132. Id. at 486-88.
133. Id. at 490.
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such as directly limiting the alcohol content of beer, indicated that
the labeling ban was "more extensive than necessary. 134
In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,1"5 the Court unanimously
struck down a broader state ban on price advertising for alcoholic bev-
erages, albeit not with one voice. 136 In rejecting as a justification
Rhode Island's interest in restraining alcohol consumption, Justice
Stevens's plurality manifesto on behalf of commercial speech con-
demned this "wholesale suppression of truthful, nonmisleading infor-
mation"' 7 as a violation of a protectively construed version of the
Central Hudson test.'38 Justice Thomas went even further, calling for
abolition of the Central Hudson test and substitution of per se invalidity
in the case of such paternalistic restrictions.' 39 On the other hand,
Justice O'Connor, writing for four justices, found Rhode Island's fit
unreasonable under a more cautious reading of Central Hudson than
the rigorous version advanced by Justice Stevens.' 40
The splintered opinions in 44 Liquormart should not obscure the
fact that this decision heralded a more protective attitude toward com-
mercial speech. An attempt to direct consumers' behavior by depriv-
ing them of accurate information failed even Justice O'Connor's
milder application of Central Hudson because in this instance the state
could promote its goal by "less burdensome alternatives." 14 1 More-
over, Posadas was drained of its precedential authority: The Stevens
plurality dismissed the entirety of Posadas's main logic,' 42 and Justice
O'Connor's opinion acknowledged that rulings since Posadas had
abandoned that decision's deferential scrutiny. 143
D. Commentary
In extending a substantial measure of protection to commercial
speech, the Court has staked a middle ground between unalloyed First
134. Id. at 491.
135. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
136. Id. at 489.
137. Id. at 505 (Stevens, J., concurring).
138. Id. (posing the issue in terms of whether the "advertising ban will significantly [ad-
vance the state's interest in] reduc[ing] alcohol consumption").
139. Id. at 518, 526-28 (Thomas, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 529 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that "the restriction on speech must
be reasonably, though it need not be perfectly, targeted to address the harm intended to
be regulated"). Justice Scalia somewhat cryptically stated his "discomfort with the Central
Hudson test" without committing himself to either its abandonment or retention. Id. at
517-18 (Scalia, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 529 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
142. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 509-11.
143. Id. at 531-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Amendment scrutiny and ordinary deference to state regulations.
Commentators have approved or criticized this stance according to
how they perceive commercial speech as contributing to the various
functions of free speech generally.144 The Court's approach has been
denounced both for providing inadequate and for bestowing exces-
sive protection, as well as applauded (or at least acknowledged) as
having generally steered a sensible course.
1. The Case Against Protection.--Numerous commentators have
sounded variations of Justice Rehnquist's original protest in Virginia
Pharmacy that "a seller hawking his wares" is more the fare of commer-
cial regulation than the concern of the First Amendment.1 45 As a
principal theme, commentators assert that commercial speech is re-
mote from the First Amendment's paramount goal of promoting ex-
pression regarding self-government. 146 Lillian R. BeVier, for example,
has argued against the First Amendment protection accorded the
commercial advertising in Virginia Pharmacy because of its irrelevance
to political speech.147
A second major objection derives from the view that the central
purpose of freedom of speech is to further the liberty and self-realiza-
tion of the speaker. This thesis has been most prominently associated
with C. Edwin Baker.14 8 Applying this principle, Baker has declared
144. An oft-cited summary of the values promoted by free speech establishes these cate-
gories: (1) assuring individual self-fulfillment, (2) advancing knowledge and discovering
truth, (3) providing for participation in decisionmaking by all members of society, and (4)
achieving a more adaptable and hence a more stable community. THOMAS I. EMERSON,
THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970); see also supra notes 20, 23, 24-26, 29-30
and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment values in the context of Virginia Phar-
macy). See generally Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. Rxv. 119, 130-54
(1989) (delineating and discussing both the consequentialist and the nonconsequentialist
justifications for freedom of speech).
145. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 781 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
146. For a classic expression of the view that the overriding purpose of free speech is to
foster self-governance, and that the level of First Amendment protection should reflect this
principle, see MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 23, at 22-27; see also Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles
and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 InD. L.J. 1, 27-28 (1971) (arguing that expression
other than political speech should be excluded from the ambit of First Amendment pro-
tection); cf Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 Am. B. FOUND.
RES.J. 521, 554-65 (arguing that the purpose of the First Amendment is to check the abuse
of governmental power).
147. Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Sub-
stance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299, 352-55 (1978).
148. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the First Amend-
ment, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 293, 337, 341-43 (1982) [hereinafter Baker, Process of Change] (ad-
vocating that the First Amendment "should protect the wide variety of uses of speech that
are self-expressive or creative" and that such freedom facilitates progressive change); C.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
that "a complete denial of first amendment protection for commercial
speech is not only consistent with, but is required by, first amendment
theory." 1
49
In perhaps the best-known piece of this genre, Thomas Jackson
and John Jeffries incorporated the arguments from self-government
and self-fulfillment into a sharp attack on the Court's decision to
bring commercial speech under the aegis of the First Amendment. 150
In their view, regulation of ordinary business advertising like that in
Virginia Pharmacy simply has "nothing to do"'151 with freedom of ex-
pression properly understood, so that this decision is simply "inexplic-
able under traditional first amendment principles.""5 2 Like Justice
Rehnquist, 53 they construed the result as judicial imposition of a
plausible but constitutionally proscribed policy preference;' 54 "eco-
nomic due process is resurrected, clothed in the ill-fitting garb of the
first amendment."'
' 55
In addition to these specific doctrinal critiques, Vincent Blasi has
raised a broader teleological reservation with respect to according
First Amendment status to commercial speech.' 56 From the "patho-
logical perspective" urged by Professor Blasi, free speech issues should
be resolved with a view toward "equip [ping] the first amendment to
do maximum service in those historical periods when intolerance of
unorthodox ideas is most prevalent and when governments are most
able and most likely to stifle dissent systematically.' 1 57 This perspec-
tive suggests that diminished public respect for the First Amendment
provoked by interference with established commercial speech regula-
Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish 's The Value
of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 646, 652 (1982) [hereinafter Baker, Realizing Self-Realiza-
tion] (arguing that in light of the values of "self-realization" and "individual liberty" embod-
ied in the First Amendment, consideration of the "source" of particular speech is
"constitutionally relevant").
149. C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theoy of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REv.
1, 3 (1976).
150. Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Pro-
cess and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1 (1979).
151. Id. at 38.
152. Id. at 25.
153. SeeVirginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 783-85 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
154. Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 150, at 25-41.
155. Id. at 30.
156. Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REv.
449 (1985).
157. Id. at 449-50.
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tion outweighs whatever benefits might accrue to free speech values
from judicial oversight. 158
Finally, at least implicitly informing many of these arguments is
skepticism toward the intrinsic worth of commercial speech generally.
Some observers are quite explicit on this point. For example, Ronald
K.L. Collins and David M. Skover, while reserving the question of ex-
actly how First Amendment jurisprudence might be reshaped, 5 ' de-
cry the hollowness and irrationality of much advertising. 6 ' Others
have deconstructed the insidious means by which advertising is said to
prey on consumers' subconscious faculties. 6 ' On a larger scale, some
apprehend global danger from the runaway consumption and growth
spurred by mass advertising.' 6
2
2. Calls for Elevation.-An equally vociferous chorus of critics has
faulted the Court for not extending its protection of commercial
speech even further. In particular, many have disputed the very no-
tion of a separate compartment of commercial expression receiving
only qualified First Amendment protection. In their view, commercial
speech "should be placed on par with noncommercial speech" in First
Amendment jurisprudence. 163 The argument for abolition of the
commercial speech doctrine is based mainly on the contention that
commercial expression, in its nature and its promotion of First
Amendment values, cannot be categorically distinguished from non-
commercial speech.' 64
These proposals typically challenge Virginia Pharmacy's premise of
commercial speech's greater "objectivity and hardiness" as "common-
sense differences" between commercial and noncommercial
speech.' 65 Noting the subjective character of much contemporary ad-
158. See id. at 488-89.
159. Ronald KL. Collins & David M. Skover, The Psychology of First Amendment Scholarship:
A Reply, 71 TEX. L. REv. 819, 821, 829 (1993).
160. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce and Communication, 71 TEX. L.
REv. 697, 736-39 (1993).
161. See, e.g., R. Moon, Lifestyle Advertising and Classical Freedom of Expression Doctrine, 36
McGiLL L.J. 76, 109-12 (1991) (arguing that certain types of advertisements have little pro-
positional content, but instead invest products with feelings or meanings that can then be
transferred to the consumer by buying or using the product).
162. See, e.g., Sut Jhally, Commercial Culture, Collective Values, and the Future, 71 TEX. L.
REv. 805, 809 (1993) (arguing that advertising spurs consumption based on "an abstract
and false conception of human behavior... that happiness and satisfaction can flow from
the marketplace of goods" rather than from social activity).
163. The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Leading Cases, 110 HARv. L. REv. 135, 216 (1996).
164. Id. at 223-26.
165. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976).
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vertising, critics have challenged the proposition that commercial
speech is intrinsically any more objective and hence verifiable than
noncommercial speech.1 66 Even where relatively objective standards
for assessing falsity exist, authentication may prove just as formidable
an obstacle for commercial speech as for other types of expression,
such as political speech.167 Moreover, it has been argued that the pu-
tative objectivity of commercial speech militates against, not in favor
of, diminished protection; recipients should determine truth them-
selves rather than rely on government interference with expression.168
The accuracy and relevance of commercial speech's supposed
hardiness have been similarly questioned. The profit motive that pur-
portedly shields commercial speech from regulation's chilling effect,
it is pointed out, can also be discerned in other forms of expression
that receive undiluted First Amendment protection, such as book
publishing and news reporting. 69 In addition, the quest for profits is
not necessarily more powerful than other forces, such as religious fer-
vor or political resolve, that motivate speech in the teeth of state re-
166. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV.
627, 635 (1990) (arguing that commercial speech is no more verifiable than noncommer-
cial speech in light of contemporary advertising); Redish, supra note 120, at 633 (question-
ing whether "the truth of commercial claims is more easily verifiable than the truth of
political assertions"); cf Leo Bogart, Freedom to Know or Freedom to Say?, 71 TEX. L. REv. 815,
816 (1993) (stating that it is impossible to separate the "information functions" of advertis-
ing from its "image-building aspects"); Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First
Amendment: A Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REv. 777, 800
(1993) (arguing that the inextricable mix of factual and fantasy components of commer-
cial messages makes it "extremely difficult to regulate speech on the basis of the character-
istics of any one communicative strain").
167. See Donald E. Lively, The Supreme Court and Commercial Speech: New Words with an Old
Message, 72 MINN. L. REV. 289, 297 (1987) (noting that both commercial advertisements
and political campaign promises can be misleading and difficult to verify).
168. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 166, at 636-37 (arguing that, even if commercial
speech were objective, then listeners could verify it for themselves without the need for
government protection).
169. See id. at 637; Redish, supra note 120, at 633; see also Richard M. Schmidt, Jr. &
Robert Clifton Burns, Proof or Consequences: False Advertising and the Doctrine of Commercial
Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1273, 1273-74 (1988) (arguing that "uncertainties in the federal
regulation of advertising chill legitimate commercial speech and that even some false and
misleading speech should be protected to provide breathing room for legitimate commer-
cial speech"). See generally Jeffrey P. Singdahlsen, Note, The Risk of Chill: A Cost of the Stan-
dards Governing the Regulation of False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 77 VA.
L. REv. 339, 370-93 (1991) (concluding that the two explanations for the judicial lack of
concern for the possible chilling effect of governmental regulation on commercial
speech-the benefits of truthful advertising and the unique resilience of such speech-are
insufficient and create inefficient uncertainty for advertisers).
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strictions. 7 ° In any event, it is argued, hardiness in and of itself does
not constitute sufficient grounds for lesser protection. 7
The denigration of commercial speech as an inferior class of ex-
pression has also fared poorly in the hands of critics. In his path-
breaking article five years prior to Virginia Pharmacy, Martin Redish
undertook to demonstrate how commercial speech promotes a variety
of First Amendment interests. 172 Others have since elaborated on
Redish's thesis that commercial speech furthers core First Amend-
ment values as much as other expression traditionally given greater
protection. 73  Moreover, approval of restrictions on commercial
speech based on advertising's lesser value goes against the grain of
First Amendment jurisprudence, which restrains courts from making
such judgments. 174
3. Intermediate Positions.-Of course, other voices can be heard
toward the middle of the spectrum between full First Amendment
protection for commercial speech and none. Rejecting unitary theo-
170. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 166, at 637 (noting that speech backed by reli-
gious feeling or artistic impulses can persist in extraordinarily hostile climates); The
Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARv. L. REv. 56, 150 (1976) (noting that the criterion of
durability may apply to some types of noncommercial speech, such as an author's resolve
to publish the civil rights advertisement in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan).
171. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 166, at 637 ("Profit is clearly not a factor very useful
for classifying speech.").
172. Redish, supra note 19, at 443-48 (likening commercial speech to political speech,
and arguing that the former aids in the "private self-governing function" by imparting in-
formation that allows individuals to make their own decisions).
173. See, e.g., R.H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6 (1977) (argu-
ing, in the context of advertising as well as generally, that "regulation will often be inimical
to the interests of the community as a whole"); Charles Gardner Geyh, The Regulation of
Speech Incident to the Sale or Promotion of Goods and Services: A Multifactor Approach, 52 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 1, 71 (1990) (proposing a multifactor approach to protecting commercial speech
in light of the fact that "[s] peech incident to the sale or promotion of goods and services
implicates a range of values underlying the first amendment"); cf. Burt Neuborne, A Ra-
tionale for Protecting and Regulating Commercial Speech, 46 BRooK. L. REv. 437, 440 (1980)
(arguing that, while commercial speech deserves less protection, "rationales for both pro-
tecting and regulating commercial speech may be found in existing first amendment the-
ory"); Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Expression: An Essay on Theory and Doctrine, 78 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1137, 1172-75 (1983) (arguing that, while commercial speech does not further First
Amendment values to the same extent as other types of speech, it should receive the same
degree of protection because of the practical difficulty of defining such speech).
174. See Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. REv.
372, 374 (1979) (noting that an "obvious tension exists between present commercial
speech doctrine and the principle of content neutrality"); Smolla, supra note 166, at 792-93
("[M]odern First Amendment doctrine does not require speech to demonstrate any re-
deeming social value as a predicate to its protection.").
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ies of First Amendment purpose,175 such as self-governance17 and
self-realization, 7 7 these observers express more sympathy for the
Court's halting development of commercial speech doctrine if not in-
variable approval of its results. 178 They view the Court's case-by-case
approach not as unprincipled groping, but as pragmatic development
of doctrine in the tradition of the common law. 1 7
9
Two scholars who have devoted sustained attention to this theme
are Frederick Schauer and Steven Shiffrin. In contrast to those who
would erase the line between commercial and noncommercial speech,
Schauer regards the carving out of a distinctive First Amendment sub-
category enjoying limited protection as "well-conceived."' 80 As the
Court began to work out the contours of the commercial speech doc-
trine, Schauer found "little reason to suggest that the effort is mis-
175. See Edward J. Eberle, Practical Reason: The Commercial Speech Paradigm, 42 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 411, 414-18 (1992) (rejecting a "Grand Theory" of the First Amendment as
containing a core of foundational values in favor of a "Middle Ground," which supports the
many values furthered by protection of commercial speech); Weinberg, supra note 52, at
736-39, 744 (arguing that the First Amendment has four purposes-political self-govern-
ment, self-expression, discovery of truth, development through perception-and that com-
mercial speech promotes all but the second of these).
176. See, e.g., Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212, 1225-39 (1983) (setting forth,
and criticizing, views by commentators who argue that the principal value of the First
Amendment is to protect effective self-government).
177. See Baker, supra note 149, at 3 ("[G]iven the existing form of social and economic
relationships in the United States, a complete denial of first amendment protection for
commercial speech is not only consistent with, but is required by, first amendment theory."
(footnote omitted)); see also Shiffrin, supra note 176, at 1239-51 (explaining and criticizing
Baker's theory that the First Amendment protects self-expression, but that commercial
speech, being motivated by profit, is excluded from such protection).
178. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 904 (2d ed. 1988)
(criticizing Posadas but indicating that the balancing test that evolved in the wake of Vir-
ginia Pharmacy "provided tolerable guideposts in a confounding corner of first amendment
jurisprudence"); Daniel Hays Lowenstein, "Too Much Puff': Persuasion, Paternalism, and
Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1205, 1248 (1988) (advocating a common law ap-
proach toward commercial speech, and approving the result that advertising which
"serve[s] the consumer's interest in making informed purchasing decisions has been pro-
tected"); Christopher D. Stone, Theorizing Commercial Speech, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. REV.,
Winter 1988, at 95, 111 (discussing the difficulty of distinguishing commercial speech, but
arguing nonetheless that "the Court seems right to ally with commonsense in refusing to
jettison all commercial/noncommercial distinctions and leave us with one unitary standard
of review").
179. See Ronald A. Cass, Commercial Speech, Constitutionalism, Collective Choice, 56 U. CIN. L.
REv. 1317, 1382 (1988) (concluding that the Court's approach to this category of speech
seems especially attractive when the proposed alternatives are considered); Schauer, supra
note 8, at 1202 (suggesting that the common law development of First Amendment doc-
trine, out of necessity, "cannot design the edifice in advance").
180. Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND.
L. REv. 265, 290 (1981).
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guided." 8 In an influential182 article in 1983, Shiffrin discussed the
Court's treatment of commercial speech as an example of the salutary
"[e] clectic [a] pproach" that the Court had taken toward First Amend-
ment methodology.183 Shiffrin found promise in the Court's balanc-
ing of "the impact of challenged regulations on first amendment
values against the seriousness of the evil that the state seeks to mitigate
or prevent, the extent to which the regulation advances the state's
interest, and the extent to which the interest might have been fur-
thered by less intrusive means.
1 8 4
II. ATrEmPTS AT DEFINITION
The Court's efforts to define the contours of the commercial
speech category do not break down into neat rules or stages. How-
ever, certain themes and decisions have been sufficiently definite to
form a discernible if not altogether vivid picture of what expression
the Court is likely to regard as commercial speech. While this evolu-
tion has not been a model of consistency, it has not hindered the de-
velopment of rational commercial speech doctrine.
1 85
A. Judicial Ventures
One type of expression that obviously meets any fair conception
of commercial speech is that which does "'no more than propose a
commercial transaction.' 1 86 Applied to the straightforward context
in which the Court invoked this characterization in Virginia Pharmacy,
this sort of speech appears to bear what the Court regarded as the
hallmarks of commercial speech: objectivity and hardiness.1 7 On the
surface at least, speech of this nature-whatever protection it ulti-
mately deserves-probably struck the Virginia Pharmacy Court as stand-
ing in obvious contrast to "ideological communication" that "is
integrally related to the exposition of thought." '88 This description
181. Id. at 291.
182. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 178, at 896 (describing Shiffrin's piece as "a powerful
essay").
183. Shiffrin, supra note 176, at 1251.
184. Id at 1252.
185. See infta Parts III-IV.
186. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rela-
tions, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
187. Id. at 772 n.24. But see supra notes 166-171 and accompanying text (noting criticism
of the view that commercial speech is any more verifiable or durable than other forms of
speech).
188. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 779 (Stewart, J., concurring). Later decisions have
addressed this distinction. See, e.g., In rePrimus, 436 U.S. 412, 434 (1978) (comparing First
1999]
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also comported with the results of decisions prior to Virginia Pharmacy
that raised issues of protection in commercial contexts.' 89 To the ex-
tent that commercial speech doctrine provides only limited protec-
tion, confining its reach in this way reserves full protection for a
greater amount of expression.
While continuing to affirm simple proposals of commercial trans-
actions as falling within the "core notion of commercial speech," ' °
the Court has also suggested that the category encompasses a consid-
erably larger sphere of expression as well. For example, in treating
trade names as a form of commercial speech, the Friedman Court did
not require that the regulated expression itself constitute a specific
proposal to buy or sell as long as it could reasonably be linked to
one.191 Central Hudson tentatively codified this expanded concept of
commercial speech by equating it with expression "related solely to
the economic interests of the speaker and its audience. 1 92 The Court
apparently regarded this definition as the logical outgrowth of "'the
"commonsense" distinction between speech proposing a commercial
transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to govern-
Amendment protection for in-person solicitation of litigation pursued for no fee as a form
of "political expression or association" with the valid proscription of solicitation "for pecu-
niary gain" in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass', 436 U.S. 447 (1978)). See infra text accompa-
nying notes 261-264 for a discussion of In re Primus.
189. Compare Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 385 (upholding a prohibition of sex-designated
advertisements as "no more than a proposal of possible employment"), and Breard v. Alex-
andria, 341 U.S. 622, 641-45 (1951) (upholding a ban on door-to-door solicitation of peri-
odical subscriptions), overruled by Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632 & n.7 (1980), and Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52,
53 n.1 (1942) (upholding an ordinance forbidding distribution of "commercial and busi-
ness advertising" as applied to an advertisement for exhibition of a submarine for profit),
overruled by Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 425
U.S. 748 (1976), with Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975) (conferring protection
on an advertisement of out-of-state abortion services that did "more than simply propose a
commercial transaction" by "contain [ing] factual material of clear 'public interest'"), and
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (distinguishing as noncommer-
cial speech an advertisement soliciting funds for the civil rights movement that "communi-
cated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and
sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are mat-
ters of the highest public interest and concern").
190. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983); see also Posadas de
Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986) (describing advertis-
ing of casino gambling as "pure commercial speech").
191. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979) (describing various functions of a trade
name, and describing each use "as part of a proposal of a commercial transaction").




ment regulation, and other varieties of speech." 193 The formulation,
however, has been at best sporadically invoked in subsequent cases.
194
More clearly auguring future doctrine was the Central Hudson
Court's refusal to grant full First Amendment protection for advertis-
ing simply because it "links a product to a current public debate."
195
To avoid unnecessarily "blur[ring] . . . the line the Court has sought
to draw in commercial speech cases," the Court declared a distinction
between fully protected "direct comments on public issues" and state-
ments about public policy "made only in the context of commercial
transactions."' 96 The Court's approach to expression containing a
mixture of commercial and noncommercial elements was later re-
fined in two major decisions addressing the problem of classification:
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. and Board of Trustees of the State Uni-
versity of New York v. Fox.
Bolger is less notable for its invalidation of a federal statute ban-
ning the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives"'
than for the means by which it determined that the advertisement in
question constituted commercial speech. The drug company, Youngs,
had sought to mail, inter alia, various "informational pamphlets" that
promoted the use of prophylactics to prevent pregnancy and disease;
some pamphlets described specific Trojan-brand condoms manufac-
tured by Youngs, while others stated that Youngs had sponsored the
pamphlet as a public service. 98 Because the pamphlets contained dis-
cussions of "important public issues" such as venereal disease and fam-
ily planning,'99 the Court conceded that they transcended simple
193. Id at 562 (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-56).
194. Compare In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 204 n.17 (1982) (characterizing commercial
speech as speech limited to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience) with
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 493 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating
that "the borders of the commercial speech category are not nearly as clear as the Court
has assumed"), and City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 423 (1993)
(noting that previous decisions have not simply applied Central Hudson's "economic inter-
ests" approach). Interestingly, a narrower definition would have sufficed to reach the
speech at issue in Central Hudson itself; the Court construed the Public Service Commis-
sion's regulation as "restricted to all advertising 'clearly intended to promote sales.'" Cen-
tral Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 n.5 (citation omitted).
195. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 n.5.
196. Id.
197. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73-74 (1983) (finding that the
"marginal degree" by which the prohibition advanced the government's interest in helping
parents to discuss birth control with their children did not justify the intrusion on the
interests of adults willing to receive such material).
198. Id. at 62 n.4.
199. Id. at 68.
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proposals of commercial transactions.2"' Still, the Court classified the
pamphlets as commercial speech because of the following factors: (1)
the pamphlets were acknowledged to be advertisements, (2) they re-
ferred to a specific product of the advertiser, and (3) Youngs had an
economic motivation for mailing the pamphlets. 20 ' While none of
these features was dispositive (or conversely, required 2 2) to regarding
the pamphlets as commercial speech, 20 3 "[t]he combination of all
these characteristics" placed the pamphlet into this category. 20 4
Echoing Central Hudson, the Bolger Court had noted that a com-
pany has the option of addressing public issues directly if it wishes to
avail itself of plenary First Amendment protection.20 5 In Fox, the
Court formalized this focus on whether the noncommercial portion of
hybrid expression could be effectively ventilated elsewhere. The
"Tupperware parties" banished from the university in this case206 con-
sisted of more than a sales pitch for the company's products. 20 7 In
addition, those gatherings included discussion of other topics, such as
financial and domestic responsibility. 208 The Court observed, how-
ever, that this admittedly noncommercial expression was not essential
to the central purpose of the presentations: "No law of man or of
nature makes it impossible to sell housewares without teaching home
economics, or to teach home economics without selling
housewares. '" 20 9 Since the company's commercial solicitation was not
"'inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech,' 210
the Court reviewed the university's regulation under the standards for
commercial speech.2 11
200. Id. at 66.
201. Id. at 66-67.
202. See id. at 67 n.14 (disclaiming intention "to suggest that each of the characteristics
present in this case must necessarily be present in order for speech to be commercial").
203. Id. at 66-67.
204. Id. at 67.
205. Id. at 68; see Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 563 n.5 (1980); cf Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,
455 U.S. 489, 496 (1982) (upholding an ordinance licensing and regulating the sale of
items displayed near "'literature encouraging illegal use of cannabis or illegal drugs'"
where the ordinance did "not prohibit or otherwise regulate the sale of literature itself"
(quoting the ordinance)).
206. Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989). In Fox, the
Court considered the validity of a university rule prohibiting commercial enterprises from
operating in campus facilities. Id. at 480.
207. Id. at 472, 474.
208. Id. at 474.
209. Id
210. Id. (quoting Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988)).
For a discussion of Riley, see infra notes 254, 257-259 and accompanying text.
211. Fox, 492 U.S. at 475.
[VOL. 58:55
1999] COMMERCIAL SPEECH
While the Court periodically has incanted Virginia Pharmacy's
"commonsense" distinction between "speech that 'does no more than
propose a commercial transaction' . . . and other varieties,' 21 2 the
Court in Discovery Network conceded "the difficulty of drawing bright
lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct cate-
gory. '2 13 The Court, however, did not explore the specific implica-
tions of this generalization for the issue in that case. Instead of
resolving whether all of the "commercial handbills" restricted by Cin-
cinnati's ordinance amounted to "'core' commercial speech," the




The Court's admission that the line between commercial and
noncommercial speech "will not always be easy to draw"2 15 has not
212. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)); see Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 482
(1995) (utilizing the "commonsense" distinction to hold unconstitutional a federal ban
prohibiting beer labels from displaying alcohol content); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (holding that under the "common-sense" approach, the
.pure and simple" advertising at issue clearly fell within the commercial speech category);
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-63 (1980)
(recognizing that the protection available for commercial speech depends upon the
speech itself and the governmental interests served by its regulation); Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978) (noting that the Virginia Pharmacy Court maintained
the "common-sense" distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech even
while extending First Amendment protection to the former); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v.
Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 98 (1977) (reaffirming the "commonsense" differ-
ences between commercial and noncommercial speech); see also Florida Bar v. Went For It,
Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) ("[The Court has] always been careful to distinguish com-
mercial speech from speech at the First Amendment's core.").
213. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993); see Zauderer,
471 U.S. at 637 (noting that the "precise bounds" of the category of commercial speech
may be "subject to doubt").
214. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 423-24. The opinion's other ambiguous contribution
to the definition of commercial speech was its description of Fox as "characterizing the
proposal of a commercial transaction as 'the test for identifying commercial speech.'" Id. at
423 (emphasis added) (quoting Fox, 492 U.S. at 473-74). Any suggestion that Fox confined
commercial speech to proposals of commercial transactions is undercut by Fox itself, be-
cause the Court treated the marketing activity in that case as commercial speech despite
the "noncommercial aspects of these presentations." Fox, 492 U.S. at 474. Also, the Discov-
ery Network Court's recitation of this test as one of several approaches indicated the absence
of a single test for identifying commercial speech. See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 420-23.
215. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 n.32 (1978); see Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 536 (1981) (plurality opinion) (Brennan,J., concurring) (stating that
the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech "[
i
un individual cases...
is anything but clear").
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mollified critics of the Court's efforts to do so. Of course, those who
believe that the distinction "makes no sense" '2 1 6 would regard any at-
tempt at compartmentalization of speech in this way as misguided.
However, even numerous commentators who consider the distinction
worth preserving have lamented what they regard as the erratic man-
ner in which the Court has drawn it. Thus, while some observers have
indicated appreciation of the Court's piecemeal determination of the
boundaries of commercial speech,2" 7 it is common for the Court's ap-
216. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 166, at 628; see Alan Howard, The Constitutionality of
Deceptive Speech Regulations: Replacing the Commercial Speech Doctrine with a Tort-Based Rela-
tional Framework, 41 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1093, 1096 (1991) (proposing that commercial
speech doctrine be replaced by a broader "relational framework" that "distinguishes
speech that primarily implicates speaker values, such as self-expression, from speech that
primarily implicates listener values, such as the listener's interest in obtaining information
that will aid him or her in making decisions");Jeffrey M. Shaman, Revitalizing the Clear-and-
Present-Danger Test: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the First Amendment, 22 VILL. L. REv.
60, 63 (1976-1977) ("[T]he categorization technique is fundamentally untenable. It is
based upon the fiction that certain types of speech are not speech .... "); ScottJoachim,
Note, Seeing Beyond the Smoke and Mirrors: A Proposal for the Abandonment of the Commercial
Speech Doctrine and an Analysis of Recent Tobacco Advertising Regulations, 19 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 517, 541-50 (1997) (proposing eradication of the "illusory" distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech).
In recent years, doubts about the tenability of the distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech have been expressed within the Court as well. See 44 Liquormart,
Inc., v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 520 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the
Court itself has at times stressed the "near impossibility of severing 'commercial' speech
from speech necessary to democratic decisionmaking"); Coors, 514 U.S. at 494 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (asserting the "artificiality of a rigid commercial/noncommercial
distinction").
Unsurprisingly, those who favor relatively little First Amendment protection for com-
mercial speech tend not to be much daunted by the difficulty of recognizing it. See, e.g.,
Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 150, at 2 & n.4 (asserting that there is "a clean distinction
between the market for ideas and the market for goods and services," and that it is not
difficult to perceive the "general contours" of commercial speech). But see Collins &
Skover, supra note 160, at 716-22 (expressing concern over the commercialization of puta-
tively noncommercial modes of speech).
217. See TRIBE, supra note 178, at 896 (noting that "principled accommodation of the
conflicting values at stake may indeed be the most appropriate course in the commercial
speech area, and [that] the Supreme Court... [has] generally stayed that course in recent
years"); Samuel A. DiLullo, The Present Status of Commercial Speech: Looking for a Clear Defini-
tion, 90 DICK. L. REv. 705, 730 (1986) (noting that a "case-by-case analysis may provide the
only practical approach"); Schauer, supra note 8, at 1184-85 (noting that it is understanda-
ble that the Court has "conspicuously avoided saying just what [commercial speech] is");
Allan Tananbaum, Note, "New and Improved": Procedural Safeguards for Distinguishing Com-
mercial from Noncommercial Speech, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1821, 1838 (1988) (rejecting a
mechanical test for identifying commercial speech in favor of "the accretion of case-spe-
cific factors"); see also R. George Wright, Freedom and Culture: Why We Should Not Buy Com-
mercial Speech, 72 DENV. U. L. REv. 137, 157 (1994) (noting that, while a single definition of
commercial speech may be impossible, there is "reason for believing that ambiguities in




proach to be dismissed as "vague,"2 18 "cumbersome,' '2 19 "unintel-
ligible,' 22' and "random and haphazard.
22 1
This asserted lack of clarity22 2 and consistency in identifying com-
mercial speech has produced repeated criticism of the uncertainty
with which particular expression will be classified.22' The resulting
inability of speakers to predict the category to which their expression
will be assigned is thought to chill a significant amount of protected
expression.224 Conversely, unsuspecting speakers might be ensnared
in the net of a malleable conception of commercial speech.225 These
218. Todd F. Simon, Defining Commercial Speech: A Focus on Process Rather than Content, 20
NEW ENG. L. REV. 215, 215 (1984-1985).
219. Steven L. Snyder, Note, Movies and Product Placement: Is Hollywood Turning Films into
Commercial Speech?, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 301, 318 (referring to the Central Hudson test).
220. Martin H. Redish, Product Health Claims and the First Amendment: Scientific Expression
and the Twilight Zone of Commercial Speech, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1433, 1449 (1990) (referring to
the Court's concession that corporations' direct comments on public issues receive full
First Amendment protection).
221. David F. McGowan, Comment, A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 CAL. L.
REv. 359, 397 (1990); see Geyh, supra note 173, at 48 (criticizing "the Court's several ran-
dom stabs at a definition of commercial speech"); Howard, supra note 216, at 1119 ("[T]he
court's inability to fashion a coherent definition of commercial speech undermines its use-
fulness."); Bradley Paul Nelson, Note, Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Baldrige: International
Boycotts and the Politics of Commercial Speech, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 367, 375 (arguing that "the
Supreme Court has failed to formulate a satisfactory commercial speech definition").
222. See Shiffrin, supra note 176, at 1222 ("It is unclear whether the Court's locution
focuses on the message, the motivations of speaker and audience, or on some other aspect
or combination.").
223. See Howell A. Burkhalter, Comment, Advertorial Advertising and the Commercial Speech
Doctrine, 25 Wrm FOREsT L. REV. 861, 867 (1990) (noting the "conflict fostered by the
Court's ambiguous standard" in cases of mixed speech); McGowan, supra note 221, at 394
(stating that the Court's approach has generated "uncertainty"); The Supreme Court, 1992
Term-Leading Cases, 107 HARv. L. REV. 144, 234 (1993) (noting that "the Central Hudson
test has become less of a constitutional fortification and more of a doctrinal maze").
224. See Howard, supra note 216, at 1119 (suggesting that "[s]peakers . . . might be
inclined to steer well clear of an unpredictable definitional boundary"); Burkhalter, supra
note 223, at 867 ("The ambiguous 'commonsense' standard prevents commercial speakers
from knowing whether their speech will be protected by the Court and discourages the
distribution of important commercial information."); see also MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER
ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.11, at 4-155 (1984) (noting that the "chilling effect" of an over-
broad regulation may be of greater impact on commercial speech than on protected
speech); cf Comment, Standard of Review for Regulations of Commercial Speech: Metromedia,
Inc. v. City of San Diego, 66 MINN. L. REv. 903, 919 (1982) (arguing that an "adequate
definition of commercial speech" is needed so that restrictive ordinances will not "signifi-
cantly chill noncommercial expression"); Thomas W. Merrill, Comment, First Amendment
Protection for Commercial Advertising- The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 205,
224 (1976) (asserting that the financial incentives of a business to secure its right to adver-
tise varies with the resources of the business and the expected return of the
advertisement).
225. See Lively, supra note 167, at 295 ("The Court's ability to devalue expression it may
conveniently characterize as commercial is disquieting."); Tarsney, supra note 9, at 573
("[Tihe Supreme Court's commercial speech jurisprudence is best described as a
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fears are compounded where administrative agencies have substantial
responsibility for regulating commercial speech. 226
The lack of guidance said to flow from Bolger's multifactor ap-
proach to mixed speech has been particularly called into question.
Considered anywhere from "perplexing"227 to "unworkable,"22' the
Bolger test has attracted scant endorsement among commentators. To
harsher critics, the immediate "misclassification ' 221 of Youngs's pam-
phlets epitomizes the broader "imprecision and confusion" 23 ° sewn by
the Court's enumeration of relevant but nonbinding factors.
The perception of the Court's having repeatedly stumbled in at-
tempting to mark the outlines of commercial speech has inspired a
wide array of alternatives to supply the deficiencies in these defini-
tional efforts. A few take a highly expansive view-sweeping in, for
example, "any speech by a 'commercial entity"' 23 1 or even "any expres-
sion concerned with buying or selling."232 Others, seeking to narrow
the reach of commercial speech doctrine, would confine diminished
protection to expression related to the contractual aspects of commer-
cial speech.2 3 Under some proposals, commercial speech cannot be
reduced to a single unifying principle, but rather must yield to a more
nuanced approach based on smaller, discrete categories of commer-
minefield where unsuspecting litigants attempting to apply the Court's precedents find
themselves victimized ....").
226. See Redish, supra note 220, at 1459-60 (arguing for de novo judicial review of an
agency's determination that an advertiser's claim is false); Tananbaum, supra note 217, at
184243 (arguing that administrative agencies may be politically motivated in determining
the category of speech).
227. TRIBE, supra note 178, at 897.
228. Margaret Whelan, Note, Common Sense and Commercial Speech, 48 U. Pr-r. L. REv.
1121, 1139 (1987).
229. Janet S. Hankin, Note, 14 U. BALT. L. REv. 367, 377 (1985).
230. Karl R. Swartz, Note, 32 U. KN. L. REv. 679, 696 (1984); see Simon, supra note 218,
at 237 (criticizing "the Court's attempted test and the definitional factors on which it rests
... [as] both too broad and too narrow").
231. Richard M. Alderman, Commercial Entities' Noncommercial Speech: A Contradiction in
Terms, 1982 UTAH L. REv. 731, 744. Alderman defines "commercial entity" as "any business
entity whose existence is based on profit, excluding entities whose business is communica-
tion or entertainment, or that exist primarily for religious, charitable or civic purposes."
Id. at 744-45.
232. Kenton F. Machina, Freedom of Expression in Commerce, 3 LAW & PHIL. 375, 377 (1984)
(emphasis omitted).
233. See Farber, supra note 174, at 387 ("So long as a regulation relates to the contrac-
tual function of the utterance, the regulation should not be subjected to the intensive
scrutiny required when a regulation directly implicates the first amendment function of
language."); cf Whelan, supra note 228, at 1145 (suggesting that an advertising statement




cial communication. 23 Most commonly, candidates for a functional
definition of commercial speech center around the role of expression
in promoting commercial interests. Some remain close to the core
notion of advertising,235 while others suggest somewhat broader no-
tions of promotion.
23 6
III. THE FALLACIES OF CHARGING DEFINITIONAL FAILURE
The superficial impression of the Court's floundering from case
to case to patch together a dangerously vague and inconsistent defini-
tion of commercial speech does not hold up under scrutiny. Viewed
as a whole, the Court's pronouncements on the nature of commercial
speech possess as much clarity and coherence as can reasonably be
expected in modern First Amendment jurisprudence. While the
Court in some cases has arguably granted inadequate protection to
commercially related expression, this failure cannot generally be at-
tributed to the imprecision or illogic of its commercial speech defini-
tion.2 3 7 In fact, the Court's avoidance of mechanical tests and rigid
categorization has promoted recognition of reasoned distinctions
234. See, e.g., Richard L. Barnes, A Call for a Value-Based Test of Commercial Speech, 63
WASH. U. L.Q. 649, 682-84 (1985) (categorizing speech into sixteen permutations accord-
ing to combinations of four possible purposes and four possible subjects that a message
might have); Dennis William Bishop, Note, Building a House on a Weak Foundation: Eden-
field v. Fane and the Current State of the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 1143, 1165
(1995) ("[T]here are multiple types of commercial speech, each deserving of a differing
level of protection.").
235. See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 221, at 401 (proposing as a definition of commercial
speech " ' speech that does no more than propose the sale of a specific, named good or
service'"); Merrill, supra note 224, at 236 (proposing as a definition of commercial speech
"(1) speech that refers to a specific brand name product or service, (2) made by a speaker
with a financial interest in the sale. . ., (3) that does not advertise an activity itself pro-
tected by the first amendment"); Nelson, supra note 221, at 392 (limiting the commercial
speech doctrine to its "relatively simple and well accepted [place] in the commercial adver-
tising context"); Kirk P. Watson, Comment, Regulating Commercial Speech: A Conceptual
Framework for Analysis, 32 BAYLOR L. REv. 235, 235 (1980) (defining commercial speech as
.advertising and soliciting of products or services for the purpose of inducing a prospective
customer to participate in a commercial transaction"); see alsoJackson &Jeffries, supra note
150, at 1 (regarding the "reasonably settled" meaning of commercial speech as "business
advertising that does no more than solicit a commercial transaction or state information
relevant thereto").
236. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 218, at 244 ("[C]ommercial speech is . . . calculated
expression in the form of advertising or promotional material which is designed by the
speaker to affect consumer purchases on the basis of information or impressions contained
therein resulting in action which is harmful to individual consumers or to society as a
whole."); Nadir N. Tawil, Comment, Commercial Speech: A Proposed Definition, 27 How. L.J.
1015, 1027 (1984) ("Commercial speech is an expression designed primarily to promote a
commercial product, service, or a business interest.").
237. See supra text accompanying notes 75-77 and 121-125 (discussing Posadas and Edge
Broadcasting as two instances where the Court's validation of regulations restricting gam-
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among expression in various commercial settings. Moreover, given
the Court's recent solicitude for commercial speech, the notion that
classifying speech as commercial relegates it to a First Amendment
backwater has become increasingly antiquated. Upon closer inspec-
tion, the dire consequences sometimes hypothesized for misclassifica-
tion 238 appear more as speculative musings than likely applications of
current doctrine. In some cases, criticism that characterization of ex-
pression as commercial speech has resulted in diminished protection
is misplaced because an entirely different doctrine supplies the rele-
vant ground for decision. 23 ' Finally, while replacement of the com-
mercial speech doctrine (and therefore definition) itself with a more
generalized test may seem an alluring prospect, such standards are by
no means guaranteed to provide more certainty or even protection
than the doctrine that they would supplant.
A. Discerning a Rational Construct
While one might disagree with the scope or intensity of judicial
review under the commercial speech doctrine, the general reach of
that doctrine should not be considered nebulous or unprincipled. At
the level of doctrine, the Court has established a comprehensible
spectrum of expression with reference to commercial activities. At
one end is speech that is directly incidental to a commercial activity
that the government has chosen legitimately-from a constitutional
standpoint-to regulate. Here, the expressive element is subordinate
to the underlying commercial conduct, and government may restrict
both as the ordinary fare of economic or social legislation. 240 While a
vendor's announcement of the street price of heroin or the sale of
banned foreign fruit might qualify as commercial speech, no one seri-
ously doubts that these lie on its unprotected periphery. 241
Next comes expression falling within the "core notion" of com-
mercial speech: "speech which does 'no more than propose a com-
bling advertisements possibly expressed support for state restrictions on the "vice" of gam-
bling, rather than the incoherence of the commercial speech doctrine).
238. See Shiffrin, supra note 176, at 1252 (arguing that, while the classification of speech
varies on the context, such variation is necessary in light of complex social reality); supra
text accompanying note 225 (discussing the claim that the commercial speech doctrine is a
malleable conception).
239. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
240. For an overview of government's greater power to regulate economic activity than
speech, see Steven G. Gey, The Case Against Postmodern Censorship Theory, 145 U. PA. L. REv.
193, 267-80 (1996).
241. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566




mercial transaction."'24 2 This includes, of course, advertisements
unambiguously promoting specific products or services. Less obvious
in its classification is broader promotional expression such as trade
names,2 43 "image advertising," '244 and other commercially animated
speech outside of straightforward advertising or solicitation. While
the nature of such speech may be subject to conflicting characteriza-
tion, it appears to be judged by the extent of its resemblance to the
distinctive attributes of "core" commercial speech.2"5
Perhaps most problematic is hybrid expression: speech with con-
spicuously commercial and noncommercial aspects. As discussed be-
low, the Court in effect has developed several discrete subcategories
into which such speech may fall. 24 6 Rather than simplistically lumping
together all instances in which a commercial entity speaks or solicita-
tion occurs, the Court has sought to determine whether the content
of a communication contains an essential, inextricable dimension of
fully protected expression. 2"7 Again, while particular designations
may be open to question, the outlines of this approach are fairly evi-
dent; the Court's treatment of mixed speech has not been murky,
haphazard, or arbitrary.24 s
Indeed, while the level of protection accorded commercial
speech has fluctuated over the decades, the touchstone of severability
in characterizing expression has appeared with striking persistence.
Chrestensen itself actually involved a two-sided handbill; the flipside of
Chrestensen's announcement of his submarine exhibition displayed a
242. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rela-
tions, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
243. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (discussing trade names in the context
of Friedman v. Rogers).
244. See infra Part III.D.1.
245. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983) (holding that the
questionable pamphlets' combination of characteristics, such as being a piece of advertis-
ing, referring to a specific product, and its distribution being economically motivated "pro-
vide[ ] strong support for the . . . conclusion that the informational pamphlets are
properly characterized as commercial speech"); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10-11
(1979) (discussing the use of a trade name as a form of commercial speech because it
serves to identify the attributes of the product or service for sale; is used as part of a sale;
does not provide any "newsworthy fact" or information; and has a "strictly business"
purpose).
246. See infra text accompanying notes 251-282 (discussing the Court's treatment of
mixed speech).
247. See Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988)
(declaring that expression does not maintain a "commercial character when it is inextrica-
bly intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech").
248. See infra notes 254-282 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's treatment of
speech involving charitable solicitation and expression by corporations).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
(presumably protected) protest against the city's refusal to allow him
to moor the submarine at a city pier.249 Although Chrestensen hoped
that this commentary on public policy would immunize the entire
handbill, the Court dismissed the protest as a "civic appeal" cynically
"append[ed]" to an unequivocally commercial advertisement. 250 As
noted earlier, the theme of withholding full-blown First Amendment
status from mixed speech whose noncommercial component could be
detached from its commercial communication was fleshed out in Cen-
tral Hudson, Bolger, and Fox.25 1 While it might be argued that this stan-
dard imposes a crabbed conception of protected speech,252 it is
neither unpredictable nor irrational. Of course, the validity of partic-
ular regulations of mixed speech may not always be clear; however,
the uncertainty is more likely to flow from doubts about the Court's
level of protection than about the necessity of accompanying certain
commercial messages with noncommercial baggage. Moreover, the
Court's concern about attempts to shield otherwise regulable com-
mercial expression by superimposing public policy discussion 253 is not
an implausible one.
The Court's ability to distinguish between mixed expression in
which the commercial element predominates, and that to which fully
protected speech is integral, is illustrated in a series of cases involving
charitable solicitation. Viewing the solicitation of charitable contribu-
tions as "fully protected speech, 25 4 the Court has struck down a vari-
ety of restrictions: a prohibition on door-to-door or on-street
solicitation by organizations that did not apply at least seventy-five per-
cent of their receipts to "charitable purposes" as defined by the ordi-
nance, 25 5 a limit of twenty-five percent of the money collected for
charities (after the deduction of certain costs) by professional fund-
raisers, 256 and a requirement that fundraisers disclose to potential do-
249. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 53 (1942), overruled by Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
250. Id at 55.
251. See supra notes 195-211 and accompanying text.
252. But see infra notes 293-301 and accompanying text (discussing examples in which
the Court overturned regulation of commercial speech).
253. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983) (refusing to allow
advertisers to "immunize false or misleading product information from government regu-
lation simply by including references to public issues").
254. Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988); see id. at
803 (Scalia, J., concurring) (agreeing with the holding that "solicitation of money by chari-
ties [is as] fully protected as the dissemination of ideas").
255. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 622, 639
(1980).
1 256. Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 950-51, 969-70 (1984).
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nors the percentage of charitable contributions collected during the
previous twelve months that were actually turned over to charity.257
While the Court recognized that charitable solicitation "in the ab-
stract" might be regarded as commercial speech, these overtures shed
their "commercial character" because they were "inextricably inter-
twined" with fully protected speech.258  Accordingly, the Court re-
viewed restrictions on such solicitation in light of "the nature of the
speech taken as a whole. 259
Another illustration of the Court's refusal automatically to classify
solicitation as commercial speech is the difference in outcomes be-
tween Ohralik and In re Primus. While Ohralik's repeated approaches
to an accident victim and her parents to induce their consent to a
contingent-fee arrangement 26 ° undoubtedly qualified as commercial
speech, the Primus Court declined to extend this principle to all solici-
tation of legal representation.261 Primus, a cooperating lawyer with
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), had been disciplined by
the state for informing a woman who had been sterilized as a condi-
tion of receiving public medical assistance that the ACLU was willing
to provide free legal representation in a suit against the performing
doctor.26 2 To the Court, the ACLU's employment of litigation as "'a
form of political expression' and 'political association '263 was pivotal
in removing Primus's communication from the realm of commercial
speech. The pursuit of legal representation is not an undifferentiated
commercial whole; Primus's attempt to "express personal political be-
liefs and to advance the civil-liberties objectives of the ACLU" could
not be identified with Ohralik's quest for "financial gain."
264
257. Riley, 487 U.S. at 795-801. Riley also invalidated provisions barring "unreasonable"
fees as determined by statute, id. at 787-95, and imposing on professional fundraisers a
licensing requirement that allowed for indefinite delay in granting the license, id. at 801-
02.
258. Id at 796.
259. Id. That the noncommercial aspect of a charitable solicitation is not always "inex-
tricable" from its commercial dimension is demonstrated by International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 685 (1992) (upholding a prohibition against charita-
ble solicitation in an airport as reasonable). SeeJohn Dziedzic, Comment, Krishna v. Lee
Extricates the Inextricable: An Argument for Regulating the Solicitation in Charitable Solicitations,
17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 665, 680 (1994) (noting that the Court's treatment of face-to-
face encounters involving financial exchange as subject to regulation, and those involving
the dissemination of information as not, shows that "the commercial transaction is not
inextricably intertwined with the protected speech of a charitable solicitation").
260. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 449-53 (1978).
261. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 422 (1978).
262. Id. at 414-21.
263. Id. at 428 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429, 431 (1963)).
264. Id. at 422.
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The Court's treatment of various expression by corporations has
been similarly discriminating. The Court has avoided the facile as-
sumption that the commercial character of the entity from which cor-
porate speech emanates renders that speech intrinsically commercial.
Instead, the Court has carefully examined the content and context of
corporate expression to determine whether it merits full First Amend-
ment protection.
The contrasting classifications of the expression at issue in Central
Hudson and Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Public Service Commis-
sion2 65 illustrate the Court's capacity to apply the distinctions de-
scribed earlier in the setting of corporate speech. In Central Hudson,
the Court rejected the suggestion that some of the utility's advertising
of energy-saving devices was entitled to fuller First Amendment pro-
tection than commercial speech because of the advertisement's impli-
cations for national conservation policy.266 Because "many, if not
most, products may be tied to public concerns with the environment,
energy, economic policy, or individual health and safety," the Court
refused to grant full First Amendment protection to "any advertising
that links a product to a current public debate." 267 In this way, Central
Hudson anticipated the theme of severability developed in later
decisions.
In Consolidated Edison, on the other hand, the Court recognized
that the commercial impetus behind the utility's expression did not
detract from its essentially political character. Consolidated Edison
had included with a monthly bill an insert proclaiming the benefits
and disparaging the risks of nuclear power.26" The Commission
sought to bar Consolidated Edison from sending future inserts expres-
sing the utility's "'opinions or viewpoints on controversial issues of
public policy."' 269 However, acting on the principle that utilities "en-
joy the full panoply of First Amendment protections for their direct
comments on public issues,"27 ° the Court would not tolerate a restric-
tion that "strikes at the heart of the freedom to speak."27 '
265. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
266. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 n.5
(1980).
267. Id.
268. Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 532.
269. Id. at 533 (citation omitted).
270. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 n.5 (referring to the concurrent ruling in Consoli-
dated Edison).
271. Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 535.
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Similarly, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,2 72 the obvious
financial self-interest behind a corporation's message did not deter
the Court from locating that message "at the heart of the First Amend-
ment's protection. "273 The bank had sought to spend money to publi-
cize its opposition to a proposed state constitutional amendment
authorizing enactment of a graduated personal income tax.274 The
bank's campaign ran afoul of a state statute forbidding certain types of
corporations from expending funds "'for the purpose of... influenc-
ing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters,
other than one materially affecting any of the property, business or
assets of the corporation.' 275 In striking down the statute, the Court
emphasized the importance that the First Amendment attached to
speech concerning governmental affairs; the "inherent worth" of that
speech did "not depend upon the identity of its source, whether cor-
poration, association, union, or individual." 276 Whether Bellotti's ulti-
mate view of the merits is persuasive or not,277 its analysis mitigates the
danger that the Court will casually equate commercial motivation with
commercial speech.
A final affirmation that corporate speech will be classified by its
content rather than its origin can be found injustice Powell's plurality
opinion in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Cali-
fornia.278 Pacific Gas had included with its monthly bills a newsletter
that contained items ranging from political editorials to objective in-
formation about utility services and bills.2 79 In order to provide Pa-
cific's customers with diverse perspectives, the commission sought to
compel the utility also to include the newsletter of a public interest
group.280 Treating the requirement in terms of the compulsion to
speak, the plurality subjected the commission's order to stringent
scrutiny281 and struck down this form of "compelled access."
28 2
272. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
273. Id. at 776.
274. Id. at 769.
275. Id at 768 (ellipsis in original). Questions pertaining to individual taxation were
expressly excluded from the latter category. Id at 768 n.2.
276. h at 777.
277. See i&. at 809 (White, J., dissenting) (finding the prohibition justified as a means of
preventing corporate wealth gained "as a result of special advantages extended by the
State" from being used to "acquire an unfair advantage in the political process").
278. 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (plurality opinion).
279. Id at 5.
280. Id. at 5-7.
281. See id at 16-17 (requiring the government to show a "compelling interest" for this
content-based grant of access to private property").
282. See id. at 9, 20 (observing that states cannot "advance some points of view by bur-
dening the expression of others").
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B. The Unimportance of Imperfection
It is unnecessary to endorse all of the Court's commercial speech
decisions to conclude that imprecision in its definition of commercial
speech, however understood, has done little harm to commercial
speech. The great majority of the Court's decisions have involved
communication that qualifies as commercial speech by virtually any
definition. Where the Court has dubiously characterized ambiguous
expression, little demonstrable harm has resulted from the possible
misclassification. Conversely, in those decisions that have been sin-
gled out for harshest criticism, the Court's arguably inadequate pro-
tection is not attributable to an overbroad conception of the scope of
commercial speech. Similarly, major issues that have occupied the
lower courts by and large do not hinge on problems of classifica-
tion.2 8 In addition, the spectre of creeping expansion of the lesser-
protected commercial speech category-"reverse dilution"Z84-does
not appear to have materialized.
1. The Prevalence of Easy Calls.-A strong indication that the diffi-
culty of defining commercial speech is generally more theoretical
than practical is the relative rarity with which the Court has had to
confront the problem. The clear-cut nature of most of the expression
that the Court has labeled commercial speech was evident from the
outset of the doctrine. In Virginia Pharmacy, the expression at issue
consisted of no more than the proposal that "'I will sell you the X
prescription drug at the Y price."285 Whatever level of First Amend-
ment protection one might think this message deserves, it is commercial
speech if the category has any meaning and content at all. Likewise,
while the prohibition of "For Sale" signs in Linmark had economic,
social, and political implications that could be expected to inspire de-
bate, 286 it seems obvious that the constitutional dimension of that de-
bate must take place within the framework of commercial speech
doctrine. 287 In the long line of cases about advertising by lawyers and
283. See infra Part III.B.2.
284. See Redish, supra note 220, at 1456-58 (dismissing the concern that characterizing
scientific claims made for products as "commercial speech" could lead to reduced protec-
tion for scientific claims as such).
285. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 761 (1976).
286. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 87-91 (1977)
(noting that the ban on "For Sale" signs was intended to stop declines in white ownership
of houses in integrated neighborhoods).




other professionals, as well, the crucial issue was not whether the ad-
vertising amounted to commercial speech, but rather what legal sig-
nificance to attach to that designation.2"' The characterization of
advertising of liquor prices,289 beer's alcohol content,29 ° casino gam-
bling,291  and contraceptive devices 292  appears similarly
straightforward.
Where classification has been murkier, the Court's disputable
treatment of expression as commercial speech has not inevitably led
to upholding the challenged restriction. For example, while the pre-
dominance of public health discussion in the prohibited pamphlets in
Bolger293 might have justified regarding them as fully protected
speech,294 their characterization as commercial speech did not pre-
vent the Court from holding that this "restriction of 'the free flow of
truthful information' constitutes a 'basic' constitutional defect regard-
less of the strength of the government's interest. "295
288. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995) (noting that solicita-
tion of personal injury or wrongful death clients through direct mail is "pure commercial
advertising"); Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512
U.S. 136, 142 (1994) (noting that the parties did not dispute that Ibanez's use of CPA and
CFP designations was commercial speech); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 765 (1993)
(noting that "it is clear that this type of [direct] personal solicitation [of clients] is com-
mercial expression"); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 472 (1988) (catego-
rizing "lawyer advertising" as commercial speech); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (describing a lawyer's newspaper solicitations as "adver-
tising pure and simple"); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1970) (characterizing the
attomey's expression as "truthful advertisement concerning the availability and terms of
routine legal services"). Although Justice Kennedy asserted that it would "oversimplify" to
consider Went For It's approaches to accident victims and their survivors "commercial
speech and nothing more," his dissent proceeded on the premise that the case was con-
trolled by "commercial speech rules." Went For It, 515 U.S. at 636 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
289. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (considering only
the question of the state's interest in banning alcohol price advertising as a way to promote
temperance).
290. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 481 (1995) (indicating that both
parties agreed that information on the beer labels at issue constituted commercial speech).
291. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986)
(noting that "this case involves the restriction of pure commercial speech").
292. See Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 700-02 (1977) (treating advertise-
ments of nonmedical contraceptive devices as a commercial speech issue).
293. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 62 n.4 (1983) (noting that the
pamphlets addressed the "use, manufacture, desirability, and availability" of condoms and
the advantages of condoms in helping to prevent venereal disease).
294. See id. at 81-83 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting the dual nature of the speech con-
tained in the pamphlets); Barnes, supra note 234, at 663 (arguing that the "pamphlets
cannot be characterized as mere proposals to enter into a commercial transaction").
295. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 75 (quoting Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro,
431 U.S. 85, 95-96 (1977)).
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In Peel, the petitioner made a plausible argument that the appear-
ance on his letterhead of his certification in civil trial advocacy, in and
of itself, did not warrant treatment as commercial speech. 296 How-
ever, even proceeding on the assumption that the ban on this expres-
sion should be governed by commercial speech doctrine,297 the
plurality ruled that the suppression foundered on the principle that
"disclosure of truthful, relevant information is more likely to make a
positive contribution to decisionmaking than is concealment of such
information." 298 Similarly, in Discovery Network, much of the material
excluded from Cincinnati's sidewalks could readily have been consid-
ered noncommercial speech. 299 Again, however, the Court's assump-
tion that all of the restricted expression constituted commercial
speech 30 was coupled with invalidation of that restriction.3" 1
On the other hand, where the Court's upholding of restrictions
may have been most vulnerable to charges of underprotectiveness, the
296. See Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 99 (1990)
(plurality opinion) (noting Peel's argument that "absent evidence of any use of the letter-
head to propose commercial transactions with potential clients," it should be treated as
noncommercial speech); Steven Helle, Attorney Advertising After Peel, 78 ILL. BJ. 542, 546-
47 (1990) (describing Peel as an "excellent example of the difficulty in definition").
297. Peel 496 U.S. at 99-100 (noting that the use of letterhead to advertise certification is
an issue that should be decided under the standards of commercial speech).
298. Id. at 108.
299. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 423 (1993) (noting
that the material at issue could not be described as "'core' commercial speech").
300. Id. at 424.
301. Id. It might be argued that the classification of the expressions in both Peel and
Discovery Network as commercial speech represented application of one of the "Ashwander
rules" according to which the Court seeks to avoid passing on constitutional questions. See
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring). That is, by assuming without deciding that the restricted expression constituted
commercial speech, the Court reached the same result of invalidation that characterization
as noncommercial speech would have produced, without having to confront the poten-
tially thorny problem of classification. Whether the Court in these two cases would have
ultimately deemed the expression commercial speech, no harm resulted from arguably
mistaken classification.
Where debatable classification as commercial speech might in fact affect the validity of
a restriction, another Ashwander rule may furnish an alternative ground for protection. In
SEC v. Lowe, 725 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 472 U.S. 181 (1985), the Second Circuit
upheld an SEC order forbidding Lowe from publishing certain newsletters. Id. at 902.
Rejecting the dissent's vigorous argument that the newsletters did not amount to commer-
cial speech, see id. at 904-07 (Brieant, J., dissenting), the court dismissed Lowe's First
Amendment challenge to the order, largely on the authority of Ohralik, Lowe, 725 F.2d at
898-902. On appeal, the Supreme Court overturned the order as not authorized by the
relevant statute without reaching the First Amendment question. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 188; see
Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 348 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (setting forth the rule of "'ascer-
tain [ing] whether a construction of the [challenged] statute is fairly possible by which the




principal complaint against the Court's analysis has been its alleged
misapplication of the commercial speech doctrine rather than its ap-
plication. A trio of widely attacked decisions involved communication
that would seem to fall within readily recognizable forms of commer-
cial speech. Posadas-which triggered a torrent of criticism 3 2 -was
generally condemned for its greater-includes-the-lesser reasoning1
°3
and its blunt paternalism, 0 4 rather than a sense that advertising of
casino gambling does not really amount to commercial speech. Like-
wise, it was the "informational protectionism ' 305 embodied in a ban
on broadcasting lottery advertising, not a contention that this quali-
fied as noncommercial speech, that rankled critics of Edge.
3 °6 And
while the lawyer solicitation of accident victims and their relatives in
Went For It arguably had noncommercial implications,30 7 the chief de-
fect ascribed to the Court's decision to sustain a ban on such solicita-
302. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 178, at 903 (predicting that adoption of the Posadas ap-
proach "would plainly upset the Court's carefully evolved balancing test, and lead to dilu-
tion of existing protections of speech"); Philip B. Kurland, Posadas de Puerto Rico v.
Tourism Company: "'Twas Strange, 'Twas Passing Strange; 'Twas Pitiful, 'Twas Wondrous Piti-
ful.," 1986 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 2 (faulting Posadas for its lack of "guidance for future decisions
... [and] lucid reasoning"); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expres-
sion, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 334, 359 (1991) (faulting Posadas because its reasoning "would
permit restrictions on speech in the wide range of cases in which the government could
prohibit the action that the speech encourages"); Steve Younger, Comment, Alcoholic Bever-
age Advertising on the Airwaves: Alternatives to a Ban or Counteradvertising, 34 UCLA L. REv.
1139, 1172 (1987) (criticizing the Court for "invest[ing] the government with overly broad
powers to ban advertising").
303. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 354 n.4 (1986)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I do not agree that a ban on casino advertising is 'less intrusive'
than an outright prohibition of such activity."); see TRIBE, supra note 178, at 903 (describing
this reasoning as "singularly inappropriate in the first amendment context"); Kurland,
supra note 302, at 10-15 (characterizing the greater-includes-the-lesser argument as a "per-
version of First Amendment law").
304. See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 358 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (disagreeing with the major-
ity's belief that Puerto Rico may constitutionally prevent its citizens from receiving
nondeceptive commercial speech concerning lawful activities because it fears the effect of
the information); Kurland, supra note 302, at 8-10 (noting that Puerto Rico wished to pro-
tect its own citizens from the very activity it advertised to tourists); Strauss, supra note 302,
at 353 (questioning the government's ability to persuade people not to do "harmful
things"); Younger, supra note 302, at 1166-73 (pointing out that even the majority thought
it was "highly suspect" that the ban was only directed at residents of Puerto Rico).
305. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 439 (1993) (Stevens,J, dissenting).
306. See, e.g., Tarsney, supra note 9, at 561-62 (noting the dissenting opinion's belief that
the government was using "ignorance" to manipulate the "consumer choices" of its
residents).
307. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 636 (1995) (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing) (warning against oversimplifying the considerations before the Court by ignoring
speech that may be "vital to the recipients' right to petition the courts for redress of
grievances").
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tion was its failure to comply with the Court's own test for the
regulation of commercial speech. 30 8
Even in a case such as Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 9 where
sticky issues concerning the distinction between commercial and non-
commercial speech might be anticipated, the Court's willingness to
uphold a problematic statute did not turn on an expansive conception
of commercial speech. Metromedia upheld portions of an ordinance
that generally prohibited commercial billboards outside of the prem-
ises of the billboard's sponsor.310 At the same time, the Court struck
down the ordinance's ban on most types of noncommercial advertis-
ing.31 1 While the decision enshrines a distinction between commer-
cial and noncommercial speech, the case did not call upon the Court
to elucidate this distinction. Indeed, Justice Brennan's objection to
sustaining the ban on commercial billboards was grounded not in the
Court's reliance on a particular definition of commercial speech, but
in the ban's procedural mechanism. Although Brennan noted the dif-
ficulty of distinguishing commercial from noncommercial speech,31 2
his ultimate complaint was that the ordinance left this determination
to city officials in the first instance. 3
It is true that there are a number of cases in which arguably insuf-
ficient protection might be linked to dubious classification as com-
mercial speech; the dissenters' reliance on other grounds, however,
suggests that if the Court stumbled in these cases it was not over a
faulty characterization of the speech involved. For example, even if
308. See id. at 635-42; Ronald D. Rotunda, Professionalism, Legal Advertising, and Free Speech
in the Wake of Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 49 ARK. L. REV. 703, 720-29 (1997) (criticizing
the Court's application of the Central Hudson test and the research on which the Court
relied).
309. 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality opinion).
310. Id. at 493-96, 507-12.
311. Id. at 512-21.
312. Id. at 536, 539 (Brennan, J., concurring).
313. Id at 536-40. Of course, a broad definition of commercial speech poses no threat
to commercial expression under a law that favors that type of expression, see Lehman v. City
of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (plurality opinion) (upholding city's refusal to
permit political advertising on city transit vehicles while allowing commercial advertising),
whatever other First Amendment problems such a law may raise, see id. at 317-18 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (describing the city's policy as content-based discrimination); cf. Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 121-32 (1973) (upholding the
FCC's refusal to compel broadcasters to sell time for editorial advertising); William E. Lee,
The Problems of "Reasonable Access" to Broadcasting for Noncommercial Expression: Content Dis-
crimination, Appellate Review, and Separation of Commercial and Noncommercial Expression, 34 U.
FLA. L. REv. 348, 349 (1982) (discussing the problems that accompany a policy to provide
candidates for federal office "reasonable access" to air time).
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Friedman was wrongly decided, 14 it does not follow that the Court's
premise that trade names in optometrical practice are a form of com-
mercial speech315 was also wrong. Justice Blackmun did not object to
this premise; his dissent was aimed at what he perceived as an unjusti-
fied departure from the principle of Virginia Pharmacy.316 Dissenting
again in Fox, Justice Blackmun neither endorsed nor disputed the
treatment of Tupperware parties as commercial speech. Instead, he
asserted the facial overbreadth of the university's regulation, and de-
scribed a variety of protected expressive activities that he believed the
regulation would reach.31 v
San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Commit-
tee318 has been held out as an example in which commercial speech
classification proved fatal to speech deserving of protection;3 1 9 even
here, however, Justice Brennan's dissent did not hinge on this conten-
tion. In this case, the Court upheld a statute granting the United
States Olympic Committee the right to prohibit certain uses of the
word "Olympic" as it applied to the promotion of an athletic competi-
tion called the Gay Olympic Games.3 20 Treating the statute as restrict-
ing only commercial speech, 21 the Court enforced the Olympic
Committee's "legitimate property right" in the exclusive use of the
word "Olympic" in the promotion of athletic events.322 Justice Bren-
nan's dissent focused principally on the statute's facial defects rather
than its application to the facts at hand.323 He attacked what he
viewed as the statute's overbreadth in suppressing a substantial
314. See Thomas B. Draper, Note, Reuniting Commercial Speech and Due Process Analysis:
The Standard for Deceptiveness in Friedman v. Rogers, 57 TEX. L. Rav. 1456, 1484-88 (1979)
(concluding that Friedman employed a faulty analysis but reached the right result).
315. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979).
316. Id at 28 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see Robert B. Reich, Preventing Deception in Com-
mercial Speech, 54 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 775, 802 (1979) (considering trade names as commercial
speech, and arguing that the result in Friedman was inconsistent with the Court's prior
decisions).
317. Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 487 (1989) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the regulation would prohibit "a wide range of speech
that receives the fullest protection of the First Amendment").
318. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
319. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 166, at 649 (characterizing the commercial
speech classification in San Francisco Arts as providing "a convenient avenue for denying
protection to speakers who may have had something. unpopular to say").
320. San Francisco Arts, 483 U.S. at 525, 548.
321. Id. at 535-41.
322. Id. at 541.
323. Id. at 560-73 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (discussing ways in which the statute is "over-
broad on its face"). Justice Brennan did state, however, that the statute's operation in this
case suppressed the unique formulation of a protected message: that homosexual men
and women belong in the mainstream of their communities. Id at 568-70.
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amount of noncommercial speech, 24 its lack of content neutrality, 325
and its inadequate tailoring to governmental interests even if con-
fined to commercial speech.126 The latter argument in particular sug-
gests that the Court's commercial speech doctrine more generally, not
the problem of misclassification, was the underlying cause of the re-
sult in the case.
2. The Lower Courts and Emerging Issues. -Since Virginia Pharmacy,
the lower courts have wrestled with application of the Court's com-
mercial speech doctrine, but generally have not had to anguish over
the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech.3 27
For example, a number of courts have addressed the problem of me-
dia liability for harm resulting from advertisements. These cases have
tended to turn on the media defendant's ability to foresee the damage
to which the advertisement led,128 or the extent to which the defend-
ant could be charged with endorsing a defective product,3 29 rather
than any question as to whether the advertisement constituted com-
mercial speech. Even an advertisement for a "hired gun,"33 however
324. Id. at 561-68.
325. Id. at 570-71.
326. Id. at 571-73.
327. Of course, the question does occasionally arise. See infra Parts III.D.5-6 (discussing
the difficulty of classifying product placements and products that carry health claims under
the commercial speech doctrine).
328. See, e.g., Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 880 F.2d 830, 836 (5th Cir.
1989) (noting that the magazine had "no realistic method for gauging the likelihood that a
particular ad will foster illegal activity"); Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, 749 F.
Supp. 1083, 1085 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (finding that the language of an advertisement was such
that the "publisher could recognize the offer of criminal activity as readily as its readers
obviously did"), affd, 968 F.2d 1110 (l1th Cir. 1992); Goldstein v. Garlick, 318 N.Y.S.2d
370, 376 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (stating that a newspaper is liable for a false advertisement only if
it publishes it "maliciously or with intent to harm another or acts with total reckless
abandon").
329. See, e.g., Pittman v. DowJones & Co., 662 F. Supp. 921, 922 (E.D. La. 1987) (stating
that there is no duty by a newspaper to investigate the accuracy of advertisements unless
the newspaper "undertakes to guarantee the soundness of the products advertised"), affd,
834 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1987); Walters v. Seventeen Magazine, 241 Cal. Rptr. 101, 103 (Ct.
App. 1987) (refusing "to create a new tort of negligently failing to investigate the safety of
an advertised product"); Yuhas v. Mudge, 322 A.2d 824, 825 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1974)
(holding that a magazine has no duty to test inherently dangerous products advertised in
its publication "unless it undertakes to guarantee, warrant or endorse the product").
330. See Eimann, 880 F.2d at 831 (discussing an advertisement seeking a "weapons spe-
cialist" for "high risk assignments"); Braun, 749 F. Supp. at 1084 (discussing an advertise-
ment for a "gun for hire"); Matthew G. Weber, Media Liability for Publication of Advertising:
When to Kill the Messenger, 68 DENV. U. L. REv. 57, 69 (1991) (noting that a negligence
analysis does not assume a publisher's knowledge of products and services in its advertise-
ments as does the commercial speech doctrine); Brian J. Cullen, Note, Putting a 'Chill' on
Contract Murder Braun v. Soldier of Fortune and Tort Liability for Negligent Publishing, 38
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unusual or sinister, does not appear to present definitional difficul-
ties. Likewise, there seems little likelihood that a court weighing First
Amendment protection will fail to distinguish between an advertise-
ment to raise funds for civil rights demonstrators331 and one to induce
the purchase of fireworks.332
Other issues that courts have confronted or that loom in poten-
tial litigation have also generally sidestepped the quagmire of hard
boundary questions. For example, issues have arisen from proposals
to restrict television advertising directed at children.333 While it is
possible to imagine questions about the classification of this type of
restriction, constitutional debate has centered around the fundamen-
tal propriety of such proposals, not obstacles to discerning the content
of their targets.334 Similarly, although restrictions on commercial tele-
phone solicitations and other presumably undesirable overtures could
conceivably raise questions about classification, they typically do
not.3
3 5
ViLE. L. REv. 625, 643 (1993) (discussing the "constitutionality of a new standard of care
for publishers"); Stephen T. Raptis, Note, Guns for Hire, Commercial Speech and Tort Liability:
Making a Case for Preserving First Amendment Free Speech Rights, 97 W. VA. L. REv. 215, 251-52
(1994) (criticizing the court in Braun for ignoring available precedent and creating an
"overrestrictive liability standard").
331. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (noting that the adver-
tisement at issue "communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, pro-
tested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose
existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern").
332. See Yuhas, 322 A.2d at 824 n.1 (noting an advertisement that read: "PYROTECH-
NIC Caseings [sic], stars, devices of all types"); Lisa F. Firenze, Publishers' Liability for Com-
mercial Advertisements: Testing the Limits of the First Amendment, 23 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs.
137, 157-58 (1990) (agreeing with the decision in Yuhas not to impose a duty on newspa-
pers to investigate advertisements because this would "impose open-ended liability on the
press").
333. See, e.g., Children's Advertising, Proposed Trade Regulation Rulemaking and Pub-
lic Hearing, 43 Fed. Reg. 17967 (1978) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R pt. 461) (proposed Apr.
27, 1978) (proposing, inter alia, a ban on televised advertising directed to children who are
too young to understand the advertising).
334. Compare Molly Pauker, The Case for FTC Regulation of Television Advertising Directed
Toward Children, 46 BROoK. L. REv. 513, 544-46 (1980) (asserting that such restrictions are
justified under the First Amendment as time, place, and manner regulations in further-
ance of substantial governmental interests) with Laurence Field, Comment, The New Com-
mercial Speech Doctrine and Broadcast Advertising, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 385, 444 (1979)
(arguing that a ban on children's advertising would probably be unconstitutional) and
Note, Can't Get Enough of that Sugar Crisp: The First Amendment Right to Advertise to Children,
54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 561, 564 (1979) (arguing that the proposed ban on children's advertising
violates the First Amendment). Cf Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Auth.,
134 F.3d 87, 101 (2d Cir. 1998) (invalidating a prohibition on a beer bottle label displaying
a frog making a vulgar gesture because the prohibition was not narrowly tailored to the
state's interest in protecting children from vulgar and profane advertising).
335. See, e.g., National Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Rockefeller, 870 F.2d 136, 141 (4th Cir.
1989) (noting the agreement of both parties that solicitation of prospective purchases of
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Restrictions on billboards produce an even stronger divergence
between theoretical and practical concerns. One might have ex-
pected that Metromedia's approval of San Diego's restrictions on com-
mercial billboards would spawn endless controversy over the
appropriate classification of individual signs.3" 6 However, while courts
have split on the sufficiency of cities' justifications for billboard regu-
lations,33 7 they apparently have not routinely had to grapple with bill-
boards of ambiguous character. Even where an ordinance's effort to
distinguish commercial and noncommercial signs was pointedly
found not to be a "model of clarity,"33 it did not founder on its fail-
ure to draw a brighter line. 39
funeral services is commercial speech); Curtis v. Thompson, 840 F.2d 1291, 1306 (7th Cir.
1988) (Ripple, J., dissenting) (dissenting from court's upholding of a ban on soliciting
sales of residential real estate, but agreeing that the expression at issue is commercial
speech); Pearson v. Edgar, 965 F. Supp. 1104, 1111 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (striking down an anti-
solicitation statute, but finding that the prohibited speech "clearly proposes a commercial
transaction" and reviewing the statute under commercial speech doctrine), affd in part and
vacated in part, No. 97-2667, 1998 WL 456252 (7th Cir. Aug. 7, 1998); Lysaght v. NewJersey,
837 F. Supp. 646, 651 (D.N.J. 1993) (striking down as facially invalid a statute requiring an
operator to obtain consent from the called party prior to delivery of a prerecorded com-
mercial advertisement). See generally Deborah L. Hamilton, Note, The First Amendment Sta-
tus of Commercial Speech: Why the FCC Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991 Are Unconstitutional, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2352, 2355 (1996) (recognizing
that pre-recorded voice messages qualify as commercial speech); Marilyn R. Kaplan, Com-
ment, Commercial Speech and the Right to Privacy: Constitutional Implications of Regulating Un-
solicited Telephone Calls, 15 COLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 277, 277, 295 (1980) (unequivocally
categorizing pre-recorded voice messages as commercial speech).
336. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 540 (1981) (plurality opin-
ion) (Brennan, J., concurring) (predicting that "those who seek to convey commercial
messages will engage in the most imaginative of exercises to place themselves within the
safe haven of noncommercial speech, while at the same time conveying their commercial
message").
337. Compare Southlake Property Assocs., Ltd. v. City of Morrow, 112 F.3d 1114, 1116
(11th Cir. 1997) (affirming that the goals of aesthetics and traffic safety are sufficient to
support a prohibition on commercial billboards), and Naegele Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City
of Durham, 844 F.2d 172, 173-74 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding that an interest in preserving
aesthetics is sufficient in itself to justify a billboard ban), and Georgia Outdoor Adver., Inc.
v. City of Waynesville, 833 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir. 1987) (same), with Desert Outdoor Adver.,
Inc. v. City of Moreno Valley, 103 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that the city failed
to show that a restriction on commercial billboards promotes asserted interests), cert. de-
nied, 118 S. Ct. 294 (1997), and National Adver. Co. v. Town of Babylon, 900 F.2d 551, 555-
57 (2d Cir. 1990) (same), and City of Rochester Hills v. Schultz, 568 N.W.2d 832, 835
(Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (per curiam) (finding that the city's ban on "home occupation"
signs did not directly serve its aesthetic interest).
338. National Adver. Co. v. City of Denver, 912 F.2d 405, 410 (10th Cir. 1990).
339. Id. at 409-10 (finding that the city could distinguish adequately between commer-
cial and noncommercial speech in light of "Supreme Court decisions [that] have provided
ample guidance"). Similarly, the Fourth Circuit, in Major Media of the Southeast, Inc. v. City
of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269, 1272-73 (4th Cir. 1986), sustained restrictions on commercial
billboards notwithstanding the ordinance's absence of a definition of commercial or non-
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Similar observations can be made about statutes forbidding ac-
cess to criminal justice records by those seeking to use the records for
commercial purposes. It is easy to fashion scenarios in which the
designation of both the user's actual purpose and classification of that
purpose might be subject to serious doubt. Again, however, while
courts have treated such statutes in various ways, they have typically
reviewed challenges in which the commercial nature of the proposed
use was either obvious,34° or irrelevant because of the statute's facial
invalidity. 341
For all the recent controversy over cigarette advertising,342 as
well, the topic appears to have aroused little debate over the commer-
cial character of the messages affected by current and proposed re-
strictions. While courts and First Amendment commentators have
variously approved and attacked such restrictions, they have generally
proceeded from the common premise that the issue will be resolved
within the commercial speech framework.14' A recent critique of pro-
commercial speech. The court explained: "Although an occasional marginal case might
arise raising the question of whether on the particular facts the definition of commercial
speech would be correct, such an infrequent possibility should not in itselfjustify a genera-
lized charge that the ordinance itself is vague . . . ." Id.
340. See, e.g., Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508, 1512 (10th Cir. 1994)
(rejecting a First Amendment claim made by lawyers and a substance abuse treatment
center seeking names and addresses of individuals facing prosecution for traffic violations
for the purpose of solicitation and advertising).
341. See, e.g., United Reporting Publ'g Corp. v. Lungren, 946 F. Supp. 822, 827-29 (S.D.
Cal. 1996) (finding a statute limiting only a commercial user's access to records of ar-
restees invalid on its face because the statute failed to "directly and materially" advance the
state's interest in minimizing costs and protecting citizens' privacy), affd, 146 F.3d 1133
(9th Cir. 1998); Speer v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1294, 1301 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (declaring a state
statute prohibiting the examination of arrest records for commercial purposes facially in-
valid because the statute primarily prevented solicitation rather than access to records).
342. See, e.g., Memos Highlight Importance of "Younger Adult Smokers," WASH. POST, Jan. 15,
1998, at A18 (indicating a 17-year campaign to market tobacco to youth smokers as young
as 14 years old); John Mintz & Saundra Torry, Internal R.J. Reynolds Documents Detail Cigarette
Marketing Aimed at Children, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1998, at Al (detailing documentation
illustrating a comprehensive marketing effort toward young smokers).
343. In a decision eight years prior to Virginia Pharmacy, the D.C. Court of Appeals up-
held an FCC requirement that radio and television stations carrying cigarette advertising
also devote a significant amount of time to presenting the case against smoking on the
assumption that the affected expression "barely qualifies as constitutionally protected
'speech.'" Banzhafv. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1968). There are more recent
endorsements of government authority to restrict tobacco advertising as regulable com-
mercial speech. See Penn Adver. of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,
862 F. Supp. 1402, 1405-14 (D. Md. 1994) (upholding an ordinance barring cigarette ad-
vertising on billboards in certain areas readily visible to minors), affid, 101 F.3d 332 (4th
Cir. 1996); Daniel Helberg, Comment, Butt Out: An Analysis of the FDA's Proposed Restrictions
on Cigarette Advertising Under the Commercial-Speech Doctrine, 29 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 1219, 1247-
54 (1996) (arguing that cigarette advertisers challenging tobacco regulation will find the
greatest support in the Central Hudson requirement that "restrictions on commercial
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posed legislation to settle litigation against the tobacco industry, for
example, was framed almost exclusively against the backdrop of the
Court's commercial speech decisions. 3 " Restrictions on advertising
for other potentially harmful activities such as consumption of alco-
holic beverages3 45 or casino gambling3 46 also appear self-evidently sub-
ject to commercial speech analysis.3 47
Perhaps the most prominent example of the unambiguous char-
acter of advertising with which courts ordinarily deal is litigation
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 348 This provision creates a
private cause of action for false advertising. 49 Since the principal pro-
scriptions of section 43(a) apply expressly to commercial expres-
speech be no more extensive than necessary"); Erica Swecker, Note, Joe Camel: Will "Old
Joe" Survive?, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1519, 1531, 1557 (1995) (arguing that the promotion
of Camel brand cigarettes through advertisements featuring the cartoon character Joe
Camel constitutes commercial speech that the government should not regulate).
For challenges to such restrictions based on commercial speech principles, see Redish,
supra note 34, at 598 (discussing First Amendment principles threatened by regulation of
tobacco advertising); Joachim, supra note 216, at 541 (predicting a "snowball effect of pa-
ternalism under the guise of protectionism").
344. See Gregory D. Bassuk, Note, Advertising Rights and Industry Fights: A Constitutional
Analysis of Tobacco Advertising Restrictions in a Federal Legislative Settlement of Tobacco Industry
Litigation, 85 GEo. L.J. 715, 721 (1997) (suggesting that proposed legislation to settle to-
bacco lawsuits is contrary to fundamental First Amendment principles and fails to meet the
test for regulation as set forth in the commercial speech doctrine).
345. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 63 F.3d 1305, 1318 (4th Cir. 1995) (up-
holding challenged ordinance prohibiting billboards advertising alcoholic beverages in
particular areas of the city), vacated, 517 U.S. 1206 (1996); Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718
F.2d 738, 750 (5th Cir. 1983) (upholding a state ban on liquor advertisements by in-state
media).
346. See, e.g., Valley Broad. Co. v. United States, 107 F.3d 1328, 1336 (9th Cir. 1997)
(finding that the government failed to justify a total ban on casino gambling advertisement
by broadcast media), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1050 (1998); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n
v. United States, 69 F.3d 1296, 1302 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that a federal statute banning
the broadcast of information concerning "lottery, gift prize, or similar scheme" is constitu-
tional), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 39 (1996); Players Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 988 F. Supp. 497,
507 (D.N.J. 1997) (finding that a federal ban on broadcast advertisement of casino gam-
bling was overly broad and thus violated the First Amendment).
347. See Matthew L. Miller, Note, The First Amendment and Legislative Bans of Liquor and
Cigarette Advertisements, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 632, 633 (1985) (arguing that bans on advertise-
ments of liquor and cigarettes violate the First Amendment rights of those who receive
commercial messages).
348. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
349. Section 43(a) (1) (B) provides liability for "false or misleading representation [s] of
fact ... in commercial advertising or promotion." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1) (B); see Alfred
Dunhill Ltd. v. Interstate Cigar Co., 499 F.2d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1974) (noting that section
43(a) is "limited to false advertising as that term is generally understood"); Skil Corp. v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 783 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (setting forth elements of a
cause of action under section 43(a)); Arlen W. Langvardt, Section 43(a), Commercial False-
hood, and the First Amendment: A Proposed Framework, 78 MINN. L. REv. 309, 315 (1993) (argu-
ing that section 43(a) has potential application "outside the registered mark setting");
[VOL. 58:55
1999] COMMERCIAL SPEECH-
sion,35° the Lanham Act might seem fertile ground for squabbling
over the character of the speech against which the statute is invoked.
Although such disputes occasionally do arise,3 ' plaintiffs generally
can "easily satisfy [their] burden of proving that the complained-of
representation was made in 'commercial advertising or promotion' by
pointing to paid advertisements by a commercial defendant on televi-
sion or radio, or in newspapers or magazines.""' Much more com-
monly, litigants argue over whether the unquestionably commercial
speech at issue contains any misrepresentation at all.353 To the extent
that First Amendment concerns enter this area, they tend to involve
the potential deterrent effect of uncertainty about which admittedly
commercial speech will ultimately be deemed false. 54
Other efforts by government to "insure that the flow of truthful
and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired '355 have simi-
larly raised substantive questions of policy and doctrine, not classifica-
tion. Some issues arise because the government's "[i]nterest in
[t]ruth"3 16 in the commercial realm is not always satisfied by simply
halting or penalizing affirmative misrepresentations. For example,
Singdahlsen, supra note 169, at 341 (asserting that section 43(a) is effectively a strict liabil-
ity tort because the plaintiff is not obligated to show negligence on the advertiser's part).
350. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1) (B) (prohibiting infringement of trademarks and
tradenames in the context of "commercial advertising or promotion").
351. See, e.g., Gordon & Breach Science Publishers S.A. v. American Inst. of Physics, 859
F. Supp. 1521, 1543 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (concluding after extended analysis that nonprofit
scientific societies' publication, which rated nonprofitjournals as superior in value, did not
constitute "commercial advertising or promotion" under the Lanham Act).
352. Id. at 1532.
353. Cf Langvardt, supra note 349, at 341 (noting that "[s]ection 43(a) now sweeps in
claims from a broad range of commercial falsehoods"); Singdahlsen, supra note 169, at
347-61 (arguing that the consumer's interpretation of an advertisement varies according to
the experience and knowledge she has about a particular product).
354. See Langvardt, supra note 349, at 388-90 (describing section 43(a) as an "indirect
regulation" that could have a "chilling effect" by rendering makers of commercial repre-
sentations liable for falsehoods); Schmidt & Bums, supra note 169, at 1273-74, 1289 (argu-
ing that uncertain regulations chill legitimate commercial speech and that some false and
misleading speech should be protected to provide breathing room); Singdahlsen, supra
note 169, at 347-58 (exploring explicit and implicit advertising claims, and concluding that
requiring advertisers to scientifically support their claims will have the adverse affect of
increasing advertising costs and exposing the advertiser to an evaluation of its proof); see
also Shiffrin, supra note 176, at 1269 (arguing for "some strategic protection for falsehoods"
in commercial defamation law). But see Nan Kalthoff McKenzie, Ambiguity, Commercial
Speech and the First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1295, 1310 (1988) (opposing a higher
standard of proof for implied misrepresentations).
355. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976).
356. Developments in the Law--Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1005, 1010 (1967)
(arguing that "there is a clear public interest in regulating the accuracy of representations
made by advertisers").
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the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has ordered "corrective adver-
tising" where an advertisement is not misleading in isolation, but ar-
guably becomes misleading in light of past advertising;35 7 whether
such compelled disclosure is warranted or not, it has undoubtedly oc-
curred in a commercial context.3 5 8 The same is true of FTC actions to
suppress advertising whose alleged deception takes place through vis-
ual rather than verbal means. 359 Attempts to restrain comparative ad-
vertising-advertisements asserting the superiority of the sponsor's
product over a competitor's-also appear not to implicate defini-
tional issues.3 6 ° In some instances of compelled disclosure, no decep-
tion in the ordinary sensb has occurred at all; instead, the government
believes that the required information will help consumers to make
more informed and reasoned decisions. 6 1
357. See, e.g., FTC v. Figgie Int'l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 601, 607 (9th Cir. 1993) (per
curiam) (discussing the district court's order that a manufacturer engage in "corrective
advertising" to remedy the manufacturer's misrepresentations); Southwest Sunsites, Inc. v.
FTC, 785 F.2d 1431, 1439 (9th Cir. 1986) (requiring land development companies to dis-
close to past and future buyers the financial risk and suitable use of land); Warner-Lambert
Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749, 770-71 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (requiring advertisements for mouthwash
to disclose that the product would not prevent or mitigate colds or sore throats in light of
previous advertising to that effect).
358. See generally Ronald A. Milzer, Note, Corrective Advertising and the Limits of Virginia
Pharmacy, 32 STAN. L. REV. 121, 137 (1979) (concluding that corrective advertising may
actually deter truthful advertising and that Virginia Pharmacy limited corrective advertising
orders to those that promote economic efficiency).
359. See, e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 395 (1965) (enforcing a FTC
cease-and-desist order barring the company from using a simulation of sandpaper to
demonstrate the softening ability of its shaving cream); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 741 F.2d
1146, 1158 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding an FTC order banning the company from making
misrepresentations about its analgesic products); Standard Oil Co. of Ca. v. FTC, 577 F.2d
653, 663 (9th Cir. 1978) (prohibiting television commercials for gasoline additive which
used a deceptive visual demonstration); Volvo N. Am. Corp., 115 F.T.C. 87, 90 (1992)
(prohibiting Volvo from airing deceptive monster truck commercials which led consumers
to believe that unaltered cars were used as part of a demonstration).
360. See generally Nancy S. Greiwe, Note, Antidilution Statutes: A New Attack on Comparative
Advertising, 61 B.U. L. REv. 220, 228 (1981) (discussing the application of antidilution laws
to comparative advertising in order to protect the selling power of a trademark from being
diminished in ads which name competitors).
361. See Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertis-
ing, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661, 664 (1977) (noting as examples of governmentally "required or
induced disclosure" information concerning light bulbs' durability, tar and nicotine con-
tent of cigarettes, automobiles' mileage per gallon, and care labeling of textile wearing
apparel). Another example of speech that, while not strictly false, has been subject to
regulation, is the use of individuals' names or likenesses in commercial advertisements
without their permission. While the Supreme Court has not addressed the constitutional-
ity of such causes of action, it seems evident that the commercial speech doctrine is the
appropriate framework for consideration. See Theodore F. Haas, Storehouse of Starlight: The
First Amendment Privilege to Use Names and Likenesses in Commercial Advertising, 19 U.C. DAvis
L. REv. 539, 551 (1986) (arguing that name and likeness claims implicate the commercial
speech doctrine more when they arise from a description of the product themselves be-
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Finally, while it is certainly not difficult to locate "fishy" lower
court decisions based on commercial speech doctrine, 62 these are
generally not attributable to misapprehension of the nature of the re-
stricted speech. Restrictions that courts have dubiously upheld in-
clude a ban on advertising concerning the availability of service from
a particular airport,3 63 a prohibition of commercial advertising on ve-
hicles or watercraft not engaged in the owner's usual business, 64 the
exclusion of "barkers" engaged in commercial advertising from cer-
tain areas of a city,365 a ban on leasing advertising space on shopping
carts to beer manufacturers, 366 broad prohibitions on advertisements
for alcoholic beverages, 367 and a ban on newspaper advertising of
brothels in a state where prostitution was legal in some counties.
3 68
Although the merits of each of these decisions can reasonably be con-
tested, the pertinence of commercial speech analysis cannot.
369
3. The Case Against "Reverse Dilution. "-In Ohralik, the Court ex-
pressed a fear that abolishing the distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech could compromise the protection afforded
core expression: "To require a parity of constitutional protection for
commercial and noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution,
simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment's guaran-
tee with respect to the latter kind of speech."37° Somewhat ironically,
some commentators who support robust protection of commercial
speech have also voiced concern about the corrosive effect that the
Court's treatment of commercial speech could have on noncommer-
cial expression. Under a process of "reverse dilution," the rationales
used to sustain regulation of commercial speech might seep into the
cause the claims concern the commercial transaction); cf Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578-79 (1977) (holding that the First Amendment does not re-
quire a state to protect an entertainer's right of publicity when a news show broadcasts his
entire act).
362. Simon, supra note 218, at 236.
363. Kansas v. United States, 16 F.3d 436, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
364. Supersign of Boca Raton, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 766 F.2d 1528, 1532 (11th
Cir. 1985).
365. Sciarrino v. City of Key West, 83 F.3d 364, 366 (l1th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 768 (1997).
366. Actmedia, Inc. v. Stroh, 830 F.2d 957, 968 (9th Cir. 1986).
367. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 63 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated, 517 U.S.
1206 (1996).
368. Princess Sea Indus., Inc. v. State, 635 P.2d 281, 287 (Nev. 1981).
369. See, e.g., Supersign, 766 F.2d at 1530 n.1 (stipulating that the ordinance at issue was a
regulation of commercial speech).
370. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
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Court's review of restrictions on noncommercial speech as well.37' In
particular, an insufficiently rigorous definition of commercial speech
is said to threaten the protection of other types through a "general
watering down of first amendment jurisprudence. '"372
However, the phenomenon of reverse dilution is suspect in the-
ory and unsupported in practice. Relatively lenient review of one type
of legislation is not usually regarded as a virus threatening to infect
more stringent scrutiny of another kind. Rational relationship review
for ordinary economic regulation3 73 has not undermined strict scru-
tiny for racial classifications, 374 nor has a balancing test for state bur-
dens on interstate commerce 375 eroded the Court's skeptical stance
toward discrimination against such commerce.376 Similarly, as dis-
cussed earlier, the existence of qualified protection for commercial
371. See Redish, supra note 220, at 1457-58 (criticizing the dilution fear-that equation
of commercial and noncommercial expression will reduce protection afforded tradition-
ally protected speech-as illogical).
372. Simon, supra note 218, at 232; see Kozinski & Banner, supra note 166, at 653 ("[Y]ou
can find a commercial aspect to almost any first amendment case. Today's protected ex-
pression may become tomorrow's commercial speech.").
373. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-79 (1980) (holding
that the rational-basis standard is appropriately applied when economic legislation is chal-
lenged on Equal Protection grounds); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303
(1976) (per curiam) (requiring that an economic regulation challenged on Equal Protec-
tion basis be only "rationally related to a legitimate state interest").
374. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (finding "all racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny"); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion) (finding strict scrutiny necessary in order to
prevent "illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal
important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool"); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
10 (1967) (stating that strict scrutiny is required in order to prevent "arbitrary and invidi-
ous discrimination").
375. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579
(1986) (requiring a balancing test which weighs the legitimacy of the state's interest in the
regulation and its benefits to the state against its detrimental effects in interstate com-
merce); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) ("Where the statute regulates
evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such com-
merce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1945) (measuring "the relative weights of the state and
national interests involved" in legislation in conjunction with the Commerce Clause).
376. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 346 (1996) (striking down a state tax be-
cause it "facially discriminates against interstate commerce" without justification); C & A
Carbone, Inc., v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994) ("Discrimination against
interstate commerce in favor of local business or investment is per se invalid, save in a nar-
row class of cases in which the municipality can demonstrate, under rigorous scrutiny, that
it has no other means to advance a legitimate local interest."); City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) ("[W]here simple economic protectionism is effected by
state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected.").
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speech has not resulted in indiscriminate application of commercial
speech standards to all expression with some commercial element.
3 77
Likewise, Metromedia did not lead to the Court's wholesale approval of
restrictions on signs,178 and Posadas's greater-includes-the-lesser rea-
soning-even when it presumably had currency-was not extended to
settings for which it was not intended. 79
More broadly, if the absence of a "precise working definition" of
commercial speech has produced an "apparent dilution of first
amendment protection in other areas of speech, ' 80 that dilution is
exceedingly difficult to detect. On the contrary, the Court's current
solicitude toward speech has been a striking feature of an era largely
characterized by retrenchment in the protection of individual rights
and liberties.3 8 1 The roll call of unpopular expression shielded by the
Court in recent years includes flag desecration,3
8 2 cross burning,38 3
377. See supra notes 254-282 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's treatment of
mixed speech).
378. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 48 (1994) (invalidating a broad ban on
residential signs).
379. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 762-64 (1988) (refus-
ing to extend the greater-includes-the-lesser reasoning to a case involving the licensing of
publishers); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420 (1988) (finding that the Posadas standard
did not apply to issues of political expression).
380. Simon, supra note 218, at 245.
381. A number of cases illustrate areas of contracted protection. See Planned
Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (discussing the accessibility of abor-
tions); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (discussing free exercise of reli-
gion); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (abortion); United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (excluding evidence under the Fourth Amendment);
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (explaining the Sixth Amendment exclusionary rule);
Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (discussing the scope of constitutional limita-
tions on private conduct under the state action doctrine); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507
(1976) (explaining the limitation on the First Amendment's applicability to picketing
union members); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (discussing procedural due
process); see also Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the "Legitimate Expectation of
Privacy, "34 VAND. L. REv. 1289, 1290 (1991) (discussing the importance of the Court's role
in protecting individual privacy interests from governmental intrusions resulting from law
enforcement activities); Carl McGowan, A Reply toJudicialization, 1986 Due L.J. 217, 221
(commenting on the limited effect of judicial involvement in administrative agency deci-
sions); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreward: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REv.
24, 32-34 (1992) (commenting on state interference with women's reproductive health in
light of Casey).
382. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 312 (1990) (invalidating the Flag Protec-
tion Act of 1989 as inconsistent with First Amendment rights); see Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 415 n.10 (1989) (distinguishing Texas's impermissible attempt to punish John-
son for burning a flag as a means of political protest from the validity of prohibiting certain
commercial uses of the flag).
383. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992) (reversing a conviction under an
ordinance that singled out, inter alia, cross burning as a punishable form of fighting
words).
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"indecent" communication on the Internet,384 and vicious lampoon-
ing of a nationally known minister.185 Although the Court has not
invariably acted as a bulwark of free speech, 8 6 it is hard to make the
case that the Court's sensitivity to expression has declined since the
inception of modern commercial speech doctrine. Indeed, some crit-
ical race theorists,38 7 radical feminists,388 and civic republicans389 have
complained that judicial elevation of free speech has slighted other
values-equality in particular-embodied in the Constitution.390  On
balance, then, Professor Shiffrin's expectation a decade-and-a-half ago
that "any damage wrought by the subordination of commercial adver-
tising [is not] likely to create any pressure to carve out pockets of non-
protection for political speech '39 1 appears vindicated.
C. The Meagre Threat from Misclassification
To the extent that the Court continues to regard commercial
speech as occupying a "subordinate position in the scale of First
384. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2344-48 (1997) (characterizing the Communica-
tions Decency Act of 1996 as an overbroad content-based restriction of speech).
385. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (overturning a verdict for
intentional infliction of emotional distress based on a comic advertisement portraying
Falwell as admitting to a drunken incestuous encounter with his mother in an outhouse).
386. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 195 (1992) (plurality opinion) (uphold-
ing a prohibition on soliciting votes and displaying campaign materials within one hun-
dred feet of an entrance to a polling place on election day); Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S.
138, 154 (1983) (upholding the dismissal of an assistant district attorney for distributing a
questionnaire soliciting views within his office concerning personnel policies and the dis-
trict attorney's performance); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 353 (1980) (upholding a
requirement that members of the Air Force obtain approval from their commanders
before circulating petitions on air force bases); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 738
(1978) (upholding a ban on broadcast of "'obscene, indecent, or profane language'" as
applied to a comic monologue about "Filthy Words") (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976)).
387. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, Crossburning and the Sound of Silence: Antisubordina-
tion Theory and the First Amendment, 37 VILL. L. REv. 787, 791 (1992) (reacting to R.A.V v. St.
Paul "as if another cross had just been set ablaze"); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist
Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MicH. L. REv. 2320, 2376 (1989) (criticizing First
Amendment tolerance of hate speech as "a choice to burden one group with a dispropor-
tionate share of the costs of speech promotion").
388. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WoRDS (1993) (discussing the various
forms of defamation, sexual and racial harassment, and inequality of speech resulting from
the Court's putatively gender-biased interpretation of the First Amendment).
389. See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 255, 257 (1992) (criticizing
the judicial trend "to root freedom of speech in a conception of popular sovereignty").
390. For a powerful response to these claims, see Gey, supra note 240, at 193 (lamenting
that "[t]he political and legal circles that only a decade ago could be counted upon to
defend First Amendment values are now increasingly willing to qualify their support for
free speech, if not to abandon the cause altogether").
391. Shiffrin, supra note 176, at 1282.
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Amendment values," '92 vigilance against misassignment to this secon-
dary sphere would seem understandable. In practice, however, the
Court has not sought to introduce the commercial speech framework
into commercial areas that have their own distinct constellation of is-
sues and considerations. By extension, the Court has also recognized
that within commercial expression lie discrete problems that must be
addressed in accordance with their peculiar features and problems.
Moreover, the Court's recent heightened protection of commercial
speech has diminished the danger of misclassification.
1. Maintenance of Commercial Boundaries.-The Court has dis-
played no intention to sweep all commerce-related expression under a
spreading tent of commercial speech doctrine. On the contrary, the
Court has apparently shared Professor Schauer's recognition of "a
universe of communication relating only to business activity, having
no explicit political or artistic or ideological content, and yet differing
substantially from the kind of widespread public hawking of wares rep-
resented by the Virginia Pharmacy archetype." 9 ' Indeed, Virginia Phar-
macy itself took pains to distinguish Virginia's ban on advertisement of
prescription drug prices from speech restrictions "in the special con-
text of labor disputes."394 Since then, the Court has continued to re-
solve labor issues, particularly those involving unions, without
reference to commercial speech analysis 395-perhaps tacitly endors-
ing the view that trying to pigeonhole speech in the union context
into a standard category of expression is a "witless exercise. "396
Nor has commercial speech doctrine threatened to swallow other
principles developed for reviewing regulation of speech in commer-
cial settings. For example, regulation of aspects of corporate govern-
392. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
393. Schauer, supra note 8, at 1183; see Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context,
78 HARv. L. REv. 1191, 1192 (1965) (noting the impossibility of "formulat[ing] a single
rule of first amendment protection for economic speech" in diverse commercial areas).
394. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 763 n.17 (1976).
395. See, e.g., Sure-tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 896-98 (1984) (finding that Sure-tan
had not suffered any "legally protected injury" caused by its illegal-alien employees that
would provide a First Amendment defense for its retaliatory employment practices); Inter-
national Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 225 (1982) (finding that
it "would create a large and indefinable exception" to the provisions of the NLRA if "polit-
ical" boycotts by labor unions were exempted from the statute's provisions on First Amend-
ment grounds); NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 616
(1980) (finding that while it would be improper to impose a broad ban on picketing by
union members, secondary picketing which "spreads labor discord by coercing a neutral
party to join the fray" does not enjoy First Amendment protection).
396. Shiffrin, supra note 176, at 1272.
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ance, such as proxy solicitation, may raise interesting First
Amendment questions, but it seems well understood that these are to
be addressed outside the commercial speech framework.397 Similarly,
the Court appears disinclined to import commercial speech doctrine
into its review of limitations on communication under securities regu-
lation."'o Antitrust law as well, while sometimes impinging on what
might be viewed as commercial speech, is also generally examined
under doctrines and standards peculiar to that area.3 9 9 Indeed, on at
least one occasion, the Court has indicated that all of the above types
of legislation implicate regulatory authority governed by standards dis-
tinct from those to which commercial speech is subject.4"'
397. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 440 (1976) (noting that the
SEC's proxy rules govern the use of "proxy statements that are false or misleading"); Mills
v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970) (discussing what constitutes a material
misstatement or omission in a proxy statement); see also Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Rib-
stein, Corporate Governance Speech and the First Amendment, 43 U. KAN. L. REv. 163, 170 (1994)(explaining that corporate governance speech is most appropriately recognized as "hybrid"
speech, rather than attempting to force it into either the commercial or political speech
matrix); Shiffrin, supra note 176, at 1231 (pointing out the variations in government regu-
lations designed to prevent use of misleading statements in union and corporate
elections).
398. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (discussing preliminary merger
discussions); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 661-64 (1983) (discussing insider trading); Her-
man & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 377 (1983) (discussing a claim of false and
misleading statements to purchasers of securities under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933); SEC v. Wall Street
Publ'g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("[S]ecurities regulation is a form of
regulation distinct from the more general category of commercial speech, and Ohralik sug-
gests that the First Amendment protections provided by the commercial speech doctrine
do not detract from the government's regulatory power over the securities market."); see also
Allen D. Boyer, Free Speech, Free Markets, and Foolish Consistency, 92 COLUM. L. Rev. 474, 481-
82 (1992) (reviewing NICHOLAS WOLFSON, CORPORATE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND THE
SEC (1990)) (explaining that securities regulation falls outside the scope of the commer-
cial speech doctrine because a false financial statement creates "immediate real-world risks,
particularly when it forms the basis of a representation upon which funds are exchanged"
while political, religious, or artistic statements pose more abstract risks); cf Burt Neuborne,
The First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 5, 17(1989) (noting that while religious, political, aesthetic and scientific commentary receive
First Amendment protection, "[s]peech involving topics with no discernable link to the
self-expressive development of the human personality receives no protection at all").
399. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435 (1978) (analyzing a
price fixing violation under the Sherman Act and traditional principles of criminal law).
See generally Stanley D. Robinson, Reconciling Antitrust and the First Amendment, 48 ANTITRUST
L.J. 1335, 1342 (1979) (discussing the application of the commercial speech doctrine's
protections of communications with consumers in relation to the limitations imposed by
antitrust regulations designed to prevent anti-competitive and monopolistic practices).
400. To support its holding in Ohralik under the commercial speech doctrine, the Court
noted: "Numerous examples could be cited of communications that are regulated without
offending the First Amendment, such as the exchange of information about securities,
corporate proxy statements, the exchange of price and production information among
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If anything, the Court appears to go out of its way to avoid classi-
fying expression in commercial contexts as commercial speech where
other treatment is plausible. For example, credit reports obviously
bear a close relationship to the proposal of commercial transactions.




least seven justices agreed that the reports themselves did not consti-
tute commercial speech.4 °2 Similarly, attempts to dissuade individuals
from engaging in certain commercial transactions might be regarded
as a negative form of commercial speech. The Court was confronted
with this possibility when a mall owner challenged a union's distribu-
tion of handbills to customers exhorting them to refrain from patron-
izing the mall's stores until the owner pledged that all mall
construction would be performed by contractors paying fair wages.
4
"'
While the Court ruled that the provision of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act invoked by the owner was inapplicable to the union's
message,4 °4 it also indicated its inclination to regard the handbill in
question as outside the realm of commercial speech if the constitu-
tional issue were forced.40 5
2. The Emergence of Subdistinctions.--Even where expression-
aptly or arguably incorrectly-is classified as commercial speech, it is a
fallacy to assume that the speech has been assigned to a black hole of
uniformly "subordinate" constitutional protection. The Court has dis-
played its understanding that various types of regulations present par-
ticular considerations, so that commercial speech defies treatment as
competitors, and employers' threats of retaliation for the labor activities of employees."
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (citations omitted). Quoting this
passage in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (plurality
opinion), after a discussion of the commercial speech doctrine, the plurality referred to
such regulations as examples drawn from "[oftherareas of the law." Id, at 758 n.5 (emphasis
added).
401. 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (plurality opinion).
402. See id. at 762 n.8 ("We also do not hold .. .that the [credit] report is subject to
reduced constitutional protection because it constitutes economic or commercial
speech."); id. at 792 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Credit reports are not commercial adver-
tisements for a good or service or a proposal to buy or sell such a product."); see also Scott
Shorr, Note, Personal Information Contracts: How to Protect Privacy Without Violating the First
Amendment, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1756, 1799-1800 (1995) (explaining that credit reports fail
to meet the traditional definition of commercial speech because "consumers and report
users, rather than credit bureaus and credit reports, propose commercial transactions[,]"
and "credit reports relate to the economic interests of report subjects, as well as to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience").
403. EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Golf Course Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568, 570 (1988).
404. Id. at 575.
405. Id. at 576.
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a "single class susceptible to unified regulation."4 °6 A perhaps ex-
treme manifestation of this insight was the pronouncement in Me-
tromedia that the case dealt with "the law of billboards."4 ° 7 Whatever
the merits of this decision, it at least sought to take into account
"[t]he uniqueness of each medium of expression. "48
A more fully developed branch of the commercial speech doc-
trine arises from the lawyer advertising cases, which form their own
mini-jurisprudence. The distinct analytical niche occupied by these
decisions stems from the Court's recognition of the special tension at
work in judicial supervision of advertising restrictions in this area. On
the one hand, the Court has repeatedly noted that a combination of
factors renders lawyer advertising peculiarly susceptible to deception,
thus justifying regulation inappropriate for typical product advertis-
ing.40 9 On the other hand, the Court-at least implicitly skeptical of
the motives that may animate restrictions on attorney advertising41-
has swept aside restrictions that do not demonstrably further the
state's interest in guarding against abuses endemic to such advertis-
ing."' Whether invalidating or occasionally upholding restrictions on
406. Stone, supra note 178, at 113.
407. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (plurality
opinion).
408. Id. at 501 n.8.
409. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 202-03 (1982) ("The public's comparative lack of
knowledge, the limited ability of the professions to police themselves, and the absence of
any standardization in the 'product' renders advertising for professional services especially
susceptible to abuses that the States have a legitimate interest in controlling."); Bates v.
State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) ("[B]ecause the public lacks sophistication concerning
legal services, misstatements that might be overlooked or deemed unimportant in other
advertising may be found quite inappropriate in legal advertising."); see also Shapero v.
Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 487 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (attributing error
in the Court's attorney advertising cases to "a defective analogy between professional serv-
ices and standardized consumer products and a correspondingly inappropriate skepticism
about the States' justifications for their regulations"); supra note 113 (discussing Justice
O'Connor's repeated objections to the course of protection that commenced in Bates). See
generally John M. Blim, Comment, Free Speech and Health Claims Under the Nutrition Labeling
and Education Act of 1990: Applying a Rehabilitated Central Hudson Test for Commercial Speech,
88 Nw. U. L. REv. 733, 763 (1994) (noting the potential for misleading implied assertions
in advertising of legal services).
410. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 379 ("It is at least somewhat incongruous for the opponents of
advertising to extol the virtues and altruism of the legal profession at one point, and, at
another, to assert that its members will seize the opportunity to mislead and distort."); cf
K.N. Llewellyn, The Bar's Troubles, and Poultices-and Cures?, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 104,
109-17 (1938) (explaining that prohibitions on solicitation and advertising operate to the
advantage of established lawyers and diminish access to legal services by those in need).
411. See, e.g., Bates, 433 U.S. at 368-79 (rejecting as justifications for a ban on advertising
of routine legal services the damage to professionalism, the intrinsically misleading nature
of attorney advertising, the instigation of unnecessary litigation, increases in the cost of
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lawyer advertising, the Court looks largely to precedents and princi-
ples within this particular genre of commercial speech.412
Even where such sub-boundaries have not been demarcated, the
Court's review of commercial speech regulation has been a far cry
from the crude "two-level" theory4 13 of expression. The Court has rec-
ognized that classification of regulated expression as commercial
speech does not exempt courts from "'the task of assessing the First
Amendment interest at stake and weighing it against the public inter-
est allegedly served by the regulation."'414 In 44 Liquormart, the plural-
ity went so far as to chastise the state for
concluding that all commercial speech regulations are sub-
ject to a similar form of constitutional review simply because
they target a similar category of expression. The mere fact
that messages propose commercial transactions does not in
and of itself dictate the constitutional analysis that should ap-
ply to decisions to suppress them.
41 5
Although a majority of the Court did not embrace this sentiment, it
does reflect broader opposition to a simplistic and mechanical opera-
tion of the commercial speech doctrine. Most importantly, as already
noted,4 16 the Court has generally distinguished carefully between re-
strictions grounded in pure paternalism and those in which other con-
siderations come into play.
417
practicing law, decline in the quality of service provided, and the difficulties of policing
misleading or deceptive advertising by lawyers).
412. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 624-35 (1995) (upholding Flor-
ida's 30-day restriction on direct mail client solicitation of injury victims under the Central
Hudson test); Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 100 (1990)
(plurality opinion) (quoting In re RM.J for the standards applicable to lawyer advertising);
see also Kozinski & Banner, supra note 166, at 630 (noting that lawyer advertising has "devel-
oped into its own distinct area of common law").
413. See The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Leading Cases, 104 HaRv. L. REv. 129, 242 (1990)
(explaining that "[s]peech is classified either as 'high value,' enjoying the 'strict scrutiny'
extended to 'core' political speech, or as so utterly worthless that it enjoys no first amend-
ment protection at all and is subject to a mere 'minimum due process standard"').
414. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 502 (1981) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 91 (1977)); see id,
at 503 (noting that the Court is obligated to conduct "a particularized inquiry into the
nature of the conflicting interests at stake . . . beginning with a precise appraisal of the
ordinance as it affects communication").
415. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (plurality opinion).
416. See supra notes 108-113, 126-127 and accompanying text.
417. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The Implications of
44 Liquormart, 1996 Sup. CT. Rv. 123, 128 ("[Wlhat is crucial is not whether we are in the
world of commercial speech, but what aspects of commercial speech-its message or its
harms-government seeks to regulate.").
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3. The Potent Scrutiny of Commercial Speech Restrictions.-The most
obvious yet easily overlooked factor in mitigating concern over a lack
of thorough precision in the Court's classification scheme is the rela-
tively privileged status that commercial speech now enjoys. The trend
of this decade's decisions41s signals a "remarkable revival" of the pro-
tection of commercial speech in the wake of the ominous implications
of Posadas.'19 In addition to these results, pronouncements emanat-
ing from the Court register an intent to subject restrictions on com-
mercial speech to searching scrutiny.4 2 ° Thus, earlier concerns that
an insufficiently rigorous definition of commercial speech would ex-
pose expression so classified to a porous "mid-level standard"42 ' now
appear virtually antiquated.
While commercial speech doctrine will presumably continue to
entail some modification of ordinary standards,422 these later cases
418. See supra Part I.C.
419. Sullivan, supra note 417, at 123.
420. Even a persistent advocate of greater protection for commercial speech has ac-
knowledged that recent Court decisions, especially Discovery Network, have shown appropri-
ate concern for the value of commercial speech. See Redish, supra note 34, at 637("[U]nder Discovery Network government may not justify its regulation of commercial
speech on the basis of non-unique rationales that would be constitutionally unacceptable
as justifications for the regulation of noncommercial expression, simply on the assumption
that commercial speech is somehow less valuable than other subjects or forms of
expression.").
421. Simon, supra note 218, at 217.
422. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,496-97 (1982) (finding that "the overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial
speech"); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 571
n.13 (1980) ("We have observed that commercial speech is such a sturdy brand of expres-
sion that traditional prior restraint doctrine may not apply to it."); Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 n.20 (1978) ("Commercial speech is not as likely to be de-
terred as noncommercial speech, and therefore does not require the added protection
afforded by the overbreadth approach."); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977)("[T] he justification for the application of the overbreadth analysis applies weakly, if at all,
in the ordinary commercial context."); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976) (noting that the hardiness and
objectivity of commercial speech "may make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate state-
ments for fear of silencing the speaker"); see also ThomasJ. Meeks, Note, Commercial Speech:
Foreclosing on the Overbreadth Doctrine, 30 U. FLA. L. REv. 479, 485 (1978) (explaining that
because advertising is motivated by economic competition, the Court will not extend the
overbreadth doctrine to commercial speech). But see Board of Trustees of the State Univ.
of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 481-82 (1989) (allowing a party seeking to engage in pro-
scribed commercial speech to challenge a restriction on grounds of its alleged application
to protected noncommercial speech). In addition, Justice Stevens, who is a strong advo-
cate of commercial speech, has in effect conceded the validity of compromising commer-
cial speakers' right not to speak by indicating his approval of compelled disclosures. See
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 492 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting
that, in the commercial context, the government may "require[ ] affirmative disclosures
that the speaker might not make voluntarily").
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make clear that, on the whole, commercial speech occupies a rather
lofty plane. In contrast, for example, both to obscenity, which has
been banished altogether from the realm of expression, 42' and to lim-
ited public forums, from which expressive activity can be excluded
subject to exceedingly relaxed review,42 4 attempts to suppress truthful,
nonmisleading commercial speech now typically encounter skepticism
and hostility. The theme that sounds through most recent decisions is
the Court's unwillingness to accept justifications for such restrictions
that are not amply supported by concrete, credible evidence. While
only a plurality in 44 Liquormart expressly endorsed the "rigorous re-
view" advocated by Justice Stevens, 425 that description fairly character-
izes the majority's approach in this and other cases. For example, in
striking down the prohibition on personal solicitation by accountants
in Edenfield, the Court refused to indulge "mere speculation or conjec-
ture" in support of the ban.426 The Discovery Network Court cited Cin-
cinnati's failure to mount a record showing the need for a selective
ban on commercial newsracks.427 Similarly, in Ibanez, the Court re-
fused to "allow rote invocation of the words 'potentially misleading' to
supplant the [government's] burden to 'demonstrate that the harms
it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a
material degree. '42' To the extent that the Central Hudson test per-
sists as the Court's formal standard, it is a more muscular version than
the one that prevailed in the previous decade. For example, the bur-
423. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54 (1973) ("This Court has consist-
ently held that obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment as a limitation
on the state police power by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (noting that "obscene material is unprotected by the First
Amendment").
424. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726-27 (1990) (plurality opinion)
("[R]egulation of speech activity where the Government has not dedicated its property to
First Amendment activity is examined only for reasonableness."); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (noting that "[p]ublic property which is not
by tradition or designation a forum for public communication is governed by different
standards"); see also G. Sidney Buchanan, The Case of the Vanishing Public Forum, 1991 U. ILL.
L. REv. 949, 967 (commenting on the scope and implications of United States v. Kokinda);
David J. Goldstone, The Public Forum Doctrine in the Age of the Information Superhighway (Where
Are the Public Forums on the Information Superhighway?), 46 HASTiNGS L.J. 335, 363 (1995)
(noting that "the Court has developed a systematic bias towards finding a forum to be
nonpublic" when analyzing the permissibility of state regulation of expressive
communication).
425. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (plurality opinion).
426. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993).
427. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993) (finding "no
justification for that particular regulation other than the city's naked assertion that com-
mercial speech has 'low value'").
428. Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S.
136, 146 (1994) (quoting Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771).
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den on government to show substantial alleviation of a "real" harm
purports to be a gloss on Central Hudson's requirement that a regula-
tion of commercial speech "'directly advance[ ] the governmental in-
terest asserted.' ' 42 9
Three other developments help to refute the notion that classifi-
cation as commercial speech dooms expression to precarious protec-
tion. First, the Court has minimized the gap between commercial and
noncommercial speech. In Discovery Network, the Court faulted the
city for "seriously underestimat[ing] the value of commercial
speech,"43° while in Edenfield, the Court affirmed the value of com-
mercial speech for its promotion of "societal interests in broad access
to complete and accurate commercial information.""4 1 Second, treat-
ment as commercial speech is now understood to confer privilege on
otherwise unprotected activity. For example, when the Court recently
upheld a marketing order requiring agricultural producers to help
fund generic advertising of their products, the dissenters argued that
the order should be reviewed and struck down under commercial
speech standards.4 3 2
Finally, justices have sought either to distance themselves from
decisions less protective of commercial speech or to rationalize those
decisions as consistent with the prevalent hard scrutiny. The pervasive
repudiation of Posadas in 44 Liquormart433 is obviously the most con-
spicuous example of this phenomenon. In addition, the Court in Ed-
enfield went to some length to confine Ohralik's reach to a specific set
of circumstances.434 Moreover, not only should the Court's assent to
429. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 486 (1995) (quoting Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
430. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 419.
431. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 766; cf Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1995) (con-
struing tests for time, place, and manner regulations of noncommercial speech and com-
mercial speech as "essentially identical").
432. See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130, 2149 (1997) (Souter,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the compelled advertising schemes at issue were not "purely
economic conduct" but instead "commercial speech" subject to the Central Hudson test on
the ground that "laws requiring an individual to engage in or pay for expensive activities
are reviewed under the same standard that applies to laws prohibiting one from engaging
in or paying for such activities"); id. at 2156 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[lit is incongruous
to suggest that forcing fruit-growers to contribute to a collective advertising campaign does
not even involve speech, while at the same time effectively conceding that forbidding a
fruit-grower from making those same contributions voluntarily would violate the First
Amendment.").
433. See supra notes 142-143 and accompanying text.
434. See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 773-77 (noting that Ohralik did not support the notion that
all bans on personal solicitations by professionals would be deemed constitutional, only
those posing the same risks inherent in personal solicitation by lawyers).
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the restrictions in Edge and Went For It be viewed as special cases,435 but
some justices have indicated a willingness to narrow43 6 or even over-
turn43 7 these decisions.
D. The Parade of Phantom Horribles
A spectre frequently invoked against the Court's imprecise pa-
rameters for commercial speech, or against any discrete category of
commercial speech at all, is that of inappropriate exposure of certain
types of advertising to the inferior safeguards of commercial speech
doctrine. These include "mood" or "image" advertisements, "issue"
advertisements, factual assertions with public affairs overtones in criti-
cism of a commercial practice, promotion of a product through the
vehicle of protected expression, and claims about a disputed factual
issue that are apparently designed to further a commercial aim. To a
considerable extent, the Court's willingness to grant substantial pro-
tection to and draw sensible distinctions from commercial speech, as
discussed earlier,43 should generally alleviate concern that commer-
cial speech doctrine will serve as an instrument for running rough-
shod over deserving expression. In addition, however, the
theoretically interesting threats to the specific kinds of advertising de-
scribed above for the most part dissolve upon realistic inspection.
While some hard cases and debatable decisions remain, this problem
is not peculiar or fatal to commercial speech doctrine.
1. Nonfactual Advertising.-It is commonplace to observe that
much if not most contemporary advertising does not consist of verifi-
able representations about a specific product or service. Many adver-
tisements simply make a vague or transparently hyperbolic claim
about whatever the sponsor seeks to sell: "When you say Budweiser,
you've said it all." As a variation, an advertisement might offer a con-
densed drama in which the sponsor's product is prominently fea-
tured, but which does not expressly convey any of the product's
objective or purported attributes.439 In other instances an advertise-
435. See supra notes 108-113, 126-127 and accompanying text.
436. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 509 (1996) (plurality opin-
ion) (distinguishing the narrowly tailored statute upheld in Edge from the overly broad
statute overturned in the case at bar).
437. See id. at 526 n.7 (Thomas, J., concurring) (questioning the viability of the holding
in Edge).
438. See supra Parts III.A, III.C.
439. For example: Three women are working in an office when one woman notices the
time. The women race to the window to watch with obvious appreciation a construction
worker who has just taken a break. The construction worker is shirtless and is drinking a
Diet Coke to cool off.
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ment does not refer to any individual product or service at all, but
rather seeks to project a favorable impression of the sponsoring cor-
poration; this is generically known as "corporate image advertis-
ing."440 In particular, "'direct image advertising"' is that branch
which "treats the company as a product and attempts to differentiate
the image of the sponsor from those of its competitors. "441
That this type of advertising, like much political and public affairs
advertising, is not susceptible to objective proof or refutation appears
to agitate some critics of the Court's scheme for classifying commer-
cial speech, 44 2 but it is hard to see why. These advertisements may
pose intriguing questions of epistemology, but there seems little evi-
dence that they have been chilled or otherwise adversely affected by
the regulatory latitude afforded government under commercial
speech doctrine. While the propositions that "America is turning
7-Up" and that Burger King sells tastier hamburgers than McDonalds
may elude scientific determination,443 presumably the television com-
mercials containing these claims have not been the target of official
censorship. And even if the FCC were to descend on sponsors or
broadcasters of these sorts of boasts, it is difficult to construct a ration-
ale that would sustain this suppression under current commercial
speech doctrine.4 4 4 Similarly, whether a television commercial about
440. See C.C. Laura Lin, Note, Corporate Image Advertising and the First Amendment, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 459, 461 (1988) (defining such advertising as that which "'describes the cor-
poration itself, its activities or its views, but does not explicitly describe any products or
services sold by the corporation'" (quoting an FTC Memorandum)). While the pamphlets
in Bolger have been mentioned as an example of corporate image advertising, see Whelan,
supra note 228, at 1136, the Court indicated that the pamphlets' reference to a specific
product removed them from this category. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463
U.S. 60, 67 n.14 (1983) (declining to express an opinion as to whether commercial speech
requires reference to a particular product or service).
441. Lin, supra note 440, at 461; see Burkhalter, supra note 223, at 870 (describing "ad-
vertorials" as advertising that "attempts to advance the corporation's reputation or goals
* [through] ads which do not focus on specific products, but '[aim] to "tell" rather than
'sell""' (second alteration in original) (quotation omitted)).
442. See Lin, supra note 440, at 477-79 (arguing that the current method of classifying
commercial speech permits potentially false and/or misleading image advertising on
which consumers will rely).
443. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 166, at 635 (noting that such statements about a
product's popularity, taste, or effectiveness are subjective and not verifiable).
444. The same is true of the dairy industry's print advertising campaign in which various
appealing sweets are shown over the stark caption "Got Milk?" Whatever the uncertainty
over the precise characterization of these advertisements, they are hardly endangered by
the prospect of governmental suppression. SeeJoachim, supra note 216, at 542-43 (explain-
ing that the lack of an "express invitation to purchase the produce" makes it difficult to
categorize advertisements such as the "Got Milk?" advertising campaign as commercial
speech). The list of advertisements whose "message" is less susceptible to articulation and
confirmation than "cucumbers cost sixty-nine cents," but which nevertheless flourish in
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an apartment dweller's frantic quest for a Diet Pepsi to accommodate
an attractive neighbor constitutes commercial speech44 5 seems beside
the point in the absence of a realistic threat to forbid such stories.
Likewise with corporate image advertising: It is difficult to imagine a
company's being deterred from airing an advertisement conveying its
warm and caring nature by the prospect that an employee's alleged
failure to live up to this portrayal will provoke a successful action, pub-
lic or private, for misrepresentation.
2. Corporate Commentary.-Another source of concern is the pu-
tatively ambiguous position of issue or advocacy advertising, i.e., ad-
vertising expressing the views of a corporation or other business on a
matter of public concern.4 46 It has been remarked that this type of
advertising does not fall neatly under the heading of either commer-
cial or noncommercial speech.44 v The question of classification may
be especially problematic where the commentary is offered "on behalf
of entities with an economic interest in one side of the debate. "448
Anxiety over the protection of this type of expression, however, is
even more misplaced than for image advertising. First, the Court has
given scant indication that it would regard issue advertising as com-
mercial speech. Indeed, implicit in both Bolger449 and Fox4 5° was the
premise that the severable noncommercial elements of the mixed
speech at issue would be fully protected if removed from the setting of
commercial solicitation. Bellotti4 5 1 provides even more encourage-
virtually every medium, can be easily and endlessly extended. See Kozinski & Banner, supra
note 166, at 635; Smolla, supra note 166, at 802 (characterizing the lines in the Gatorade
commercial "Like Mike [i.e., basketball superstar Michael Jordan]! If I could be like
Mike!" as innocuous "invitations to fantasy").
445. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 166, at 639-41 (noting that while product display
and visual persuasion clearly indicate that it is an advertisement for Diet Pepsi, the com-
mercial may also be considered a short film independent of any commercial purpose).
446. See Robert B. Holt, Jr., Comment, Corporate Advocacy Advertising: When Business'
Right to Speak Threatens the Administration ofJustice, 1979 DET. C.L. REV. 623, 623-27 (recog-
nizing that in addition to serving as a direct marketing tool, advocacy advertising enhances
the corporate image, promotes corporate responsibility, and boosts profits).
447. See Burkhalter, supra note 223, at 870 ("Because the information is often expressed
as the opinion of the advertiser and because tangible commercial benefit flowing from the
ads is difficult to demonstrate, advertorials cannot be readily classified as commercial or
noncommercial speech."); Mark David Lurie, Note, Issue Advertising, Commercial Expressions,
and Freedom of Speech: A Proposed Framework for First Amendment Adjudication, 28 B.C. L. REV.
981, 983 (1987) (arguing that "issue advertising constitutes a unique category of speech...
shar[ing] certain features of both core first amendment speech and commercial speech").
448. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 166, at 644.
449. See supra notes 197-205 and accompanying text.
450. See supra notes 206-211 and accompanying text.
451. See supra notes 272-277 and accompanying text.
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ment. In this case, the Court considered banks' publicizing their op-
position to a state income tax as a part of the freedom to discuss "'all
issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the
members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period." 452 In
addition, the Court stated that Massachusetts could not base its toler-
ance of corporate speech on whether the public issue addressed by
the corporation materially affected its property or business.4"'
Moreover, even in the event that a genuine issue advertisement
was treated as commercial speech, this characterization would still fur-
nish little ground for censorship. After all, the government would still
presumably have to demonstrate that the advertising contained false
or misleading statements. As in defamation, the burden of showing
factual misrepresentation remains regardless of the characterization
of the speech as commercial.454 Thus, where a company offers its
viewpoint on a matter of public concern, it would be rare for the gov-
ernment to try to squelch the company's message, much less succeed
in doing so. The longstanding "advertorializing" of Mobil Corpora-
tion in the New York Times455 attests to the vitality of this form of
expression.
Conversely, a frequently cited example of the difficulty of classify-
ing this type of speech illustrates that the problem tends to be more
philosophical than practical. A few years ago the Philip Morris Com-
pany conducted an advertising campaign observing the bicentennial
of the Bill of Rights and "encourag[ing] viewers to become ac-
452. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (quoting Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)).
453. Id. at 784 (finding that the "materially affecting" requirement "amounts to an im-
permissible legislative prohibition of speech based on the identity of the interests that
spokesmen may represent in public debate over controversial issues and a requirement
that the speaker have a sufficiently great interest in the subject to justify communication").
The opinion implied that, if anything, a corporation's greater stake in the outcome of a
controversy increased the presumption of First Amendment protection. Id. at 793. The
Court apparently assumed that the corporate speech already protected by Massachusetts-
expression "materially affecting" the business of the corporation-was entitled to full-scale
First Amendment recognition. See id. at 776 ("The speech proposed by [the banks] is at
the heart of the First Amendment's protection.").
454. In Milkovich v. LorainJournal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990), the Court refused to recognize
a distinction in defamation between protected statements denominated as "opinion" and
actionable statements of "fact." Id. at 17-21. Instead, the Court held that a constitutionally
permissible defamation action may lie where the expression at issue could reasonably be
taken to convey, including by implication, an assertion of objective fact. Id. at 18-19.
455. See, e.g., Mobil Corp., Climate Change: A Degree of Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,
1997, at A31 (calling for delegates at an international conference to resist recommenda-
tions that could economically burden companies); Mobil Corp., It's Time to Pass the Trade




quainted with its provisions." '456 Because these ostensible commenta-
ries on a topic at the heart of our system of self-government also
carried heavy overtones of promotion of Philip Morris and its prod-
ucts, the advertisements in the abstract might arguably be viewed as
either political or commercial in nature.45 7 However, it would take an
exceedingly strained reading even of Bolger to assign Philip Morris's
campaign to the commercial speech category; the appearance of the
Philip Morris logo at the end of each advertisement4 5 does not re-
motely resemble the hawking of a specific product that the Court rea-
sonably discerned (but nonetheless protected) in the "informational"
pamphlets in Bolger.45 Moreover, even if a court might carelessly
characterize the company's paean to the Bill of Rights as commercial
speech, it is again hard to construct a scenario in which the Court
would sustain an attempt to restrict such advertising. Perhaps this is
why the government apparently did not try.460
3. Criticism of Commercial Practices.-Another area in which ques-
tions have been raised about the definition and protection of com-
mercial speech is a business's criticism of a competitor's practice that
implicates an issue of public concern. In this type of advertising, a
company would promote its own product by denigrating ethical un-
derpinnings of another company's product or practices. For example,
a company might urge consumers to purchase its product over that of
456. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 166, at 645.
457. See id. at 645-66 (arguing that the product identification resulting from Philip Mor-
ris's sponsorship of the Bill of Rights anniversary is no different from consumer recogni-
tion associated with the Marlboro Man); Burkhalter, supra note 223, at 872-73
(characterizing the advertisements as attempts by Philip Morris "to protect its commercial
interests by promoting the 'right' to smoke as a political debate beyond the reasonable
scope of regulation by state agencies"); Joachim, supra note 216, at 544 (explaining how
Philip Morris's Bill of Rights advertisement circumvented the ban on televised cigarette
advertisements).
458. See Philip Morris Companies Inc., The Story of a Government That Almost Didn't Hap-
pen, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 3, 1989, at A36 (displaying Philip Morris logo directly under the Bill
of Rights).
459. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 n.13 (1983) (pointing out
that the name brand "Trojan" was prominently displayed in the informational pamphlets
promoting safe sex).
460. See Sarah Booth Conroy, Fired Up Over Philip Morris: Consumer Group Blasts 'Bill of
Rights'Ad Campaign, WASH. PosT, Nov. 10, 1989, at DI (reporting that research discloses no
governmental effort to interfere with the campaign other than a request by the chairman
of the House Government Operations Committee to the General Accounting Office to
investigate whether the National Archives, with whose cooperation Philip Morris con-
ducted the campaign, had the authority to allow a private company to use its name, and
whether its facilities should be rented to a private company).
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a competitor because the product was prepared in an offensive man-
ner461 or the competitor does business with an abhorrent regime.462
That the explorations of this question just cited took place
through hypothetical illustrations suggests, once again, that those con-
cerned with the proper classification of such advertising are wrestling
with issues that are primarily theoretical rather than practical and
legal ones. Assuming the truth of the factual statements in these sce-
narios, the advertisers would appear to have little cause for anxiety
regardless of how the accusations of their competitors' moral short-
comings are categorized. Research does not disclose statutes that pe-
nalize truthful disparagement of an economic rival.463 Moreover, it is
difficult to conceive of any rationale for such a statute, much less one
that would pass the Court's revitalized commercial speech doctrine.
Admittedly, these hypothetical statements would be actionable if
they turned out to be false, but this would not be a function of a
court's decision to designate them as commercial speech. A false
statement that harms another's reputation is the very essence of defa-
mation,464 and the potential for libel or slander is not heightened by a
461. SeeJoachim, supra note 216, at 543 (discussing a hypothetical advertising campaign
by chicken producers publicizing their humane chicken-raising practices in implicit con-
trast to their competitors' methods).
462. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 166, at 645 (discussing a hypothetical advertise-
ment by a seller telling consumers to buy its product because its competitor "support[s]
apartheid").
463. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, for example, applies only to false advertising. See
supra notes 348-354 and accompanying text; see also Paul T. Hayden, A Goodly Apple Rotten at
the Heart: Commercial Disparagement in Comparative Advertising as Common-Law Tortious Unfair
Competition, 76 IOWA L. REv. 67, 92 (1990) (noting that the Court "clearly has approved
state regulation of such speech [at issue in commercial disparagement cases] when it is
misleading or deceptive"); Arlen W. Langvardt, Free Speech versus Economic Harm: Accommo-
dating Defamation, Commercial Speech, and Unfair Competition Considerations in the Law of Injuri-
ous Falsehood, 62 TEMPLE L. REV. 903, 938-46 (1989) (discussing First Amendment
protection of commercial speech in the context of injurious falsehood law). Moreover,
punishment for truthful, non-misleading disparagement would raise serious constitutional
questions. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 513
(1984) (applying the New York Times requirement of actual malice to a claim of product
disparagement, because otherwise "any individual using a malapropism might be liable
simply because an intelligent speaker would have to know that the term was inaccurate in
context, even though he did not realize his folly at the time"); Lisa Magee Arent, A Matter
of "'Governing' Importance" Providing Business Defamation and Product Disparagement Defend-
ants Full First Amendment Protection, 67 IND. L.J. 441, 445 (1992) (arguing that "statements
that have been traditionally classified as business defamation and product disparagement"
should receive the highest level of First Amendment protection in order to promote "the
free flow of criticism of products, businesses, and business figures").
464. SeeDAN B. DOBBS ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 773
(5th ed. Supp. 1988) (defining defamation as "that which tends to injure 'reputation' in
the popular sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which the
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commercial setting.465 In some cases a dispute might arise as to
whether a statement in fact conveyed a false assertion through impli-
cation;46 6 again, however, resolution of this issue would be governed
by defamation law and doctrine.467
4. Camouflaged Promotion.-A more subtle form of promotion
thought vulnerable if classified as commercial speech is a favorable, or
at least prominent, appearance of a product or company in the setting
of otherwise fully protected expression. To take a notable (and argua-
bly insidious) example, a newscast might give extended and laudatory
coverage to the activities of a sponsor468 or a corporate parent. An
even broader conception of commercial speech might encompass a
news or feature story whose description of a commercial enterprise
might stimulate the economic interest of some of its intended
audience.469
The prospect of restrictions on these kinds of expression as com-
mercial speech operates yet again in the realm of improbable specula-
tion. For example, the Disney Company's acquisition of the American
Broadcasting Company may have aroused apprehensions of favorable
or inordinate coverage of Disney's activities by ABC News,47 ° but it
plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against
him").
465. See Fred T. Magaziner, Note, Corporate Defamation and Product Disparagement: Narrow-
ing the Analogy to Personal Defamation, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 963, 978 (1975) (arguing that in
the interest of protecting free speech, only those defamatory statements that cause signifi-
cant harm should be punished in commercial settings).
466. For example, an issue might develop as to whether the assertion that a business
competitor "support[s] apartheid" would be reasonably understood as no more than an
accurate reference to the competitor's selling its product to a nation organized on
apartheid principles. See supra note 462.
467. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990) (refusing "to create a
wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled 'opinion[ ]' .. .
[because] expressions of 'opinion' may often imply an assertion of objective fact"); see also
Kathryn Dix Sowle, A Matter of Opinion: Milkovich Four Years Later, 3 WM. & MARY: BiLL RTS.
J. 467, 530 (1994) (suggesting that "the common law test of falsity applies to all communi-
cations, regardless of their form").
468. See generally James C. Mitchell, The Devil in Disguise: Hybrid News-Commercials and First
Amendment Protection for Broadcast Journalists, 14 Lov . A. ENT. L.J. 229, 230 (1994) (warn-
ing of the dangers and increasing liability inherent in mixing commercial promotion or
corporate sponsorship with traditional news reports).
469. See Marc S. Charisse, Brothels in the Marketplace of Ideas: Defining Commercial Speech, 12
COMM. & THE LAw, Sept. 1990, at 3, 15 (examining, and discarding, the criterion of context
as a means to define commercial speech).
470. See Monica Collins, TV Shrinks as it Grows: Mergers and Acquisitions Put Limits on
Originality, BOSTON HERALD, July 18, 1996, available in 1996 WL 5341783 (commenting that
in the age of media mergers, "Disney has been the most egregious offender-using its
sitcoms ('Roseanne') and news programs ('Good Morning America' and 'Prime Time
Live') to further its agenda"); see also Frank Rich, Media Amok, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1996,
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does not appear to have provoked serious efforts to regulate ABC's
broadcasts to prevent such bias. Nor would even the most expansive
reading of either Central Hudson or the Court's tolerance of content-
neutral regulation of the electronic media47' offer much encourage-
ment that these efforts would prevail. And however intriguing the
connection between a Cosmopolitan article on a Las Vegas brothel and
the economic interests of the magazine's readers,472 it would be far-
fetched to expect the government to seize on this connection to try-
much less successfully-to curtail the content of such a piece.
5. Product Placements.-A closer case (and more plausible possi-
bility) is presented by potential restrictions on product placement:
the practice in which manufacturers, for either a fee or by donating
their products to the studios, arrange to have the products appear in
films.47 3 Here, serious efforts have actually been mounted to impose
restrictions.4 7 4 Moreover, while a strong argument exists that a prod-
uct placement shares the fully protected character of the film into
which it is interwoven,475 the prior transaction by which the place-
ment is arranged may enjoy a less certain status. 476
The lack of an unequivocal a priori resolution of restrictions on
product placement under current commercial speech doctrine, how-
ever, does not discredit that entire framework. First, at this point the
threat to commercial speech still appears to be only hypothetical.
More importantly, it is not at all clear that an economic transaction
§ 1, at 19 ("If a parent corporation can use its influence to inject self-serving infomercials
into news broadcasts, can't it also use its influence to keep news that might harm the
corporation (or its political patrons) off the air?").
471. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
472. See Charisse, supra note 469, at 14.
473. See William Benjamin Lackey, Comment, Can Lois Lane Smoke Marlboros? An Exami-
nation of the Constitutionality of Regulating Product Placement in Movies, 1993 U. CHi. LEGAL F.
275, 275 (arguing that product placement "has created the impression that Hollywood is
more interested in producing feature length advertisements than in making films").
474. See Kenneth R. Clark, Group Goes After Brand-Name Film Props, CHI. TIuB., June 10,
1991, available in 1991 WL 9385677 (explaining how one group petitioned the FTC either
to ban product placement in the film industry, or in the alternative to require a disclaimer
informing moviegoers that the film they are watching contains paid advertising); Film "Ads"
for Smoking Under Fire--Lawmaker Would Ban Pay-for-Scene Practice, ORANGE CouNTrY REGISTER,
Mar. 3, 1989, at A26, available in 1989 WL 6192006 (describing the Protect Our Children
from Cigarettes Act of 1989 which would ban tobacco related product placement).
475. See Snyder, supra note 219, at 324 ("A film containing product placement is not
speech related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and the audience, and is
therefore not commercial speech under the Central Hudson test."). But see Lackey, supra
note 473, at 276 (contending that product placement constitutes commercial speech).
476. See Snyder, supra note 219, at 335 (reserving judgment as to the status of product
placement before a film is made).
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integrally related to a creative work would be classified as commercial
speech or, even if it were, that it would survive the Court's commercial
speech standards. An agreement to include a particular product in a
film is not intrinsically false or misleading, and the special circum-
stances that furnished grounds for upholding restrictions on
nondeceptive speech in Edge477 and Went For it478 are not present
here. Conversely, if the Court were ever confronted with this issue
and were inclined to sustain a prohibition on this transaction, it would
not have to rely on commercial speech designation to do so. For ex-
ample, the Court might treat a ban on product placement for consid-
eration as an economic regulation, leaving a filmmaker free to
include the product of her choice without compensation. Indeed, if
the Court thought the rationale for restricting product placement suf-
ficiently compelling, even classification as noncommercial speech
would not necessarily save it; after all, where concern over the unto-
ward influence of money has arisen, the Court has tolerated some re-
strictions even on contributions as central to the First Amendment as
political campaigning.479 Thus, a ban on product placement could
raise snarly issues, but these would not be resolved-nor product
placement immunized-simply by revising or eradicating the concep-
tion of what constitutes commercial speech.
6. Commercial Speech and Science.-Some of the most troubling
questions about the decisive effect of commercial speech classification
concern sellers' health claims about particular products. Where a
claim involves a matter of scientific debate, regulation of a company's
or association's advertisement as commercial speech may, it is feared,
curb legitimate debate on a public issue.4 ' Two of the most widely
noted instances of this perceived danger, National Commission on Egg
Nutrition v. FTC"'1 and a restriction on cigarette advertising by RJ.
Reynolds,4 82 arose from actions brought by the Federal Trade Com-
477. See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text.
478. See supra notes 108-112 and accompanying text.
479. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,143 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding certain limita-
tions on contributions to political campaigns).
480. See Redish, supra note 220, at 1452-53 ("[T]o characterize everything a manufac-
turer says about the scientific properties of its product as commercial speech effectively
revokes a corporation's 'full panoply of protections available to its direct comment on
[that] public issue[ "' (second and third alteration in original) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983))).
481. 570 F.2d 157, 159 (7th Cir. 1977) (upholding an FTC order prohibiting a trade
group from continuing to run certain advertisements designed to refute the public health
claims linking egg consumption to high cholesterol and increased risk of heart disease).
482. See In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 111 F.T.C. 539 (1988):
19991
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
mission (FTC) .483 While the dispositions of these suits raise valid is-
sues, they do not demonstrate the general failure of commercial
speech definition.
The National Commission on Egg Nutrition (NCEN) was a trade
association within the egg industry formed to counter the decline in
egg consumption, which NCEN attributed to the propagation of the
notion that eggs are unhealthy.48 4 Accordingly, NCEN sponsored a
series of advertisements promoting the nutritional value of eggs.4 85
Some of these advertisements asserted that "'there is no scientific evi-
dence that eating eggs increases the risk of.. . heart [and circulatory]
disease .... ,'486 The Seventh Circuit found that these advertisements
amounted to commercial speech, which it determined to include
"false claims as to the harmlessness of the advertiser's product asserted
for the purpose of persuading members of the reading public to buy
the product." '4 8 7 The court enforced the FTC's order forbidding
NCEN from continuing the advertisements without disclosing that the
association was presenting one side of a controversy among experts. 488
The Reynolds litigation was directed at an advertisement entitled
"Of Cigarettes and Science."4 8 9 In essence, the advertisement repre-
sented that a government study known as "MR FIT" undermined pop-
ular beliefs about the link between cigarette smoking and health
risks.49 ° In an interlocutory order, the Commission ruled that the ad-
vertisement qualified as commercial speech under the factors dis-
[I] t is possible to determine whether a specific advertisement that includes infor-
mation connected to public issues nonetheless addresses the concerns of a pur-
chaser of the advertiser's product or service. To conclude otherwise would allow
sellers of certain products to avoid the proscription against false and misleading
advertising merely by linking their product to a public issue.
Id. at 546.
483. Cf David G. Adams, IDA Regulation of Communications on Pharmaceutical Products, 24
SETON HALL L. REv. 1399, 1416 (1994) (suggesting that a broad assertion of authority by
the Food and Drug Administration to regulate information about therapeutic products
may ultimately generate issues similar to those in FTC litigation).
484. See Egg Nutrition, 570 F.2d at 159 ("Despite its official-sounding title, NCEN was
formed by members of the egg industry, to counter-act what the FTC described as 'anti-
cholesterol attacks on eggs which had resulted in steadily declining per capita egg
consumption."').
485. Id.
486. Id. (alteration and ellipsis in original).
487. Id. at 163.
488. Id. at 164.
489. In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 111 F.T.C. 539, 539 (1988).
490. Id. at 539-40 (alleging that the Reynolds advertisement misled the public by falsely
asserting that the government study contained "credible scientific evidence" refuting pub-
lic health warnings of smoking-related health hazards, such as coronary heart disease).
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cussed in Bolger and therefore was subject to FTC jurisdiction.4 91
Ultimately, the FTC dismissed its complaint in return for Reynolds's
agreement to withdraw all advertising that portrayed the "MR FIT"
study as rebutting theories about smoking's adverse effects on
health.4
9 2
The classification and curtailment of the advertisements in these
two cases are certainly open to question, but this simply demonstrates
that businesses' dubious health claims are a field ripe for gray areas
and debatable resolutions. While it is plausible to argue that Egg Nu-
trition "effectively excluded one sector of society from participating in
the public debate" about the impact of eggs on heart disease,
4 9 it is
also tempting to applaud the Seventh Circuit's refusal to "be hesitant
to prevent an advertiser from misleading consumers under the veil of
important public debate."'"' Similarly, while Reynolds's advertise-
ment can be viewed as a "direct comment on a matter of public con-
cern,"49 5 this comment took the form of purchased advertising
designed to promote the commercial sale of the speaker's products.
4 9 6
Although the case against commercial speech classification is probably
stronger in Reynolds than in Egg Nutrition, the former case can be built
on the Court's commercial speech jurisprudence rather than discard-
ing it.49 7 Barring abolition of the commercial speech category alto-
gether, inevitably there will be times when the line between protected
editorial and commercial advertising in claims about the danger or
innocuousness of an advertiser's product will be hard to discern.
491. Id, at 547-48.
492. In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 113 F.T.C. 344, 348-49 (1990).
493. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 166, at 643 (referring to the exclusion of the
NCEN).
494. Barry S. Roberts, Toward a General Theory of Commercial Speech and the First Amend-
ment, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 115, 146 (1979); see also Farber, supra note 174, at 390 (noting that
NCEN's advertisements were regulable as commercial speech because of their effect on
later contract of sale); Frederick F. Schauer, Language, Truth, and the First Amendment: An
Essay in Memory of Hary Canter, 64 VA. L. REV. 263, 297 (1978) (discussing the difficulty
presented by Egg Nutrition in the context of a broader meditation on the relationship be-
tween choice of language and factual truth).
495. In re R.J. Reynolds, 111 F.T.C., at 564 (Oliver, C.C., dissenting); see also Howard,
supra note 216, at 1143-47 (highlighting the political nature of the speech deemed by the
majority as commercial).
496. See In re RJ. Reynolds, 111 F.T.C., at 547; see also Thomas H. Nienow, Comment, In
re Reynolds Tobacco Co., Inc.: The "Common Sense"Distinction Between Commercial and Non-
commercial Speech, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 869, 871, 887 (1987) (pointing out that the
advertisement generally advanced the fiscal goals of the advertiser).




7. Other Contexts.-A review of other lower court decisions en-
tailing a choice of characterization does not reveal a tendency to tram-
ple on expression under the banner of commercial speech
classification. On the contrary, it is not difficult to find courts that
reject colorable assertions of commercial speech status: e.g., a "Future
Millionaires" home video course,49 fortune-telling for a fee,499 alleg-
edly false advertisements by the insurance industry aimed at re-
straining civil lawsuits and jury awards,"°° and a buyer's disparaging
comments about a seller's office equipment.5"' Conversely, one can
locate relatively straightforward determinations of regulated commer-
cial speech, such as group sales demonstrations in a university's dor-
mitory rooms. 50 2 In addition, courts have been able reasonably to
parse commercial from noncommercial speech where the state has
sought to regulate a speaker who has arguably engaged in both.503
498. State ex rel. Corbin v. Tolleson, 773 P.2d 490, 495, 500 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989). The
state had sought an injunction against sale of Tolleson's video on the grounds of consumerfraud and racketeering. The court denied the injunction at the summary judgment stage
because the state had failed to demonstrate that the commercial portions of the video were
not "inextricably intertwined" with its non-commercial aspects. Id. at 495, 500.
499. Spiritual Psychic Science Church of Truth, Inc. v. City of Azusa, 201 Cal. Rptr. 852,
864-65 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting that a religious figure's charge of a fee did not convert
fortune-telling, a protected form of speech, into commercial speech), vacated, 703 P.2d
1119 (Cal. 1985).
500. New York Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Insurance Info. Inst., 554 N.Y.S.2d
590, 592 (App. Div. 1990) (characterizing the advertisements as noncommercial speech
"due the full protection of the First Amendment").
501. J.Q. Office Equip. of Omaha, Inc. v. Sullivan, 432 N.W.2d 211, 214 (Neb. 1988)(characterizing the comments as noncommercial speech that "falls under the full protec-
tion of the first amendment and the prohibition against prior restraints").
502. American Future Sys., Inc. v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 752 F.2d 854, 862 (3d Cir.
1984) (holding that where speech "is essentially an advertisement of AFS's wares, it specifi-
cally refers to AFS's products, and AFS's motivation for engaging in the speech is purely
economic ... the speech in question is commercial as a matter of law"); see also Association
of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. Lungren, 44 F.3d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1994) (characterizing the
messages regulated by a statute that required truthful claims about a product's impact on
the environment as commercial speech); In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. MDL 1014, 1997 WL 186325 *16 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1997) (categorizing as commercial
speech seminars for instruction in the use of a device, inserted in some patients after sur-
gery, that included an allegedly deceptive "sales pitch" for the device).
503. For example, in Texans Against Censorship, Inc. v. State Bar, 888 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D.
Tex. 1995), afrd, 100 F.3d 953 (5th Cir. 1996), the court distinguished between two parts
of an attorney's newsletter. The court considered the portions about consumer and public
safety issues to be protected noncommercial speech, and the portion that contained a pas-
sage beginning "TELL YOUR FRIENDS ABOUT US" and inviting the reader to "give our
toll free number to someone who might need our services" as commercial speech. It at1345-46. The court analyzed the newsletters as "commercial communications," however,
because it found that these portions were not "inextricably intertwined." Id. at 1346. Com-
pare Leoni v. State Bar, 704 P.2d 183, 185-86 (Cal. 1985) (in bank) (characterizing as com-
mercial speech an attorney's allegedly deceptive letter-writing campaign aimed at
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Inevitably, of course, some controversial determinations of com-
mercial speech will occur; but consideration of two that have attracted
attention-Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Baldrige"°4 and Fargo Women's
Health Organization, Inc. v. Larson 50-suggests that these decisions
tend to be neither frequent nor obviously wrong. Briggs involved an
effort by the United States to thwart American companies' abetment
of an Arab trade boycott of Israel.5"' To police the boycott, some
Arab countries sent questionnaires to companies that they suspected
of violating the boycott, asking them about, inter alia, their relation-
ship with Israeli firms. 50 7 Failure to return the questionnaires typically
resulted in blacklisting by the participating Arab nations.
5 °8 Briggs &
Stratton wished to answer the questionnaires to avoid this possibility;
Commerce Department regulations, however, prohibited a re-
sponse.5 °9 In sustaining the regulations, the Seventh Circuit ruled
that the proposed answers to the boycott questions constituted com-
mercial speech because they were intended only to advance the pur-
pose of continuing commercial dealings with the Arab world.
51°
Briggs's characterization of the forbidden questionnaire re-
sponses has been subject to critical scrutiny. in particular, the court's
focus on the economic motivation behind the company's desire to
provide responses has been called into question.5 11 This misplaced
reliance-if it was a mistake-resulted from overlooking or misapply-
ing Supreme Court pronouncements, 51 2 not flaws in commercial
speech jurisprudence itself. Moreover, this was hardly an open-and-
shut case; the "inherently political and social aspects"
' 51 3 of the boycott
questionnaire did not necessarily eclipse the proposed responses'
individuals in pending creditor lawsuits and providing information on both debtors' legal
rights and availability of attorney's services) withJacoby v. State Bar, 562 P.2d 1326, 1338
(Cal. 1977) (viewing attorneys' cooperation with news media's coverage of the opening of
their clinic as "discussion of an important issue rather than solicitation").
504. 728 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1984).
505. 381 N.W.2d 176 (N.D. 1986).




510. Id. at 917-18.
511. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 166, at 645 (presenting hypothetical scenarios in
which responding to similar questionnaires "could well be the manifestation of a sincere
political or religious belief'); Nelson, supra note 221, at 378 (arguing that the communica-
tion did more than merely promote products because it also concerned the relationship
between Briggs and "other companies and governments").
512. See Nelson, supra note 221, at 378-81 (criticizing Briggs as inconsistent with several
Supreme Court commercial speech decisions).
513. Id. at 381.
1999]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
close connections to commercial transactions, much less confer a First
Amendment right to return a completed questionnaire. Just as a city's
policy against gender discrimination may legitimately include a ban
on job advertisements that promote such discrimination514-even if
the advertisements were the "manifestation of a sincere political or
religious belief'515 in the unsuitability of men or women for certain
positions-so a national policy against the Arab trade boycott mightjustify restrictions on communications that abet this politically in-
spired commercial boycott. In short, Briggs was not an easy case, and
any framework that did not automatically concede the company's con-
stitutional right to supply the Arab countries with the information that
they were seeking would have called for a thoughtful inquiry and sen-
sitive judgment.
Similarly, Fargo, also cited as an illustration of the Court's prob-
lematic classification scheme,516 demonstrates instead that some cases
simply present a delicate balance of rights and interests. The court
upheld an injunctive order prohibiting the defendants, who can be
collectively referred to as the "Women's Help Clinic," from "'falsely
and deceptively advertising that they provide elective abortions and
financial assistance for such services."' 517 The Help Clinic, a medical
clinic that offered pregnancy tests, had sponsored advertisements
prominently referring to "ABORTION" and the availability of "finan-
cial assistance," but omitting mention that the Clinic provided anti-
abortion counseling services and did not perform abortions.51
Rejecting the absence of fees for the Clinic's services and the
Clinic's aim of advocating a pro-life position as grounds for extending
full protection,51 9 the court treated the Help Clinic's advertisements
as commercial speech.52° Both this characterization of the advertise-
ments and the result in Fargo are highly defensible. If these advertise-
514. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 379-
81 (1973).
515. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 166, at 645 (offering such belief as a possible expla-
nation for responding to the boycott questionnaire in Briggs).
516. See Terry Kirk, Note, Alternative Approaches to the Distinction Between Commercial and
Noncommercial Speech: Fargo Women's Health Organization v. Larson, 36 DEPAUL L. REV.583, 605-06 (1987) (offering three alternative approaches to the "arbitrary classification of
speech as commercial or noncommercial").
517. Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc. v. Larson, 381 N.W.2d 176, 178 (N.D. 1986)
(quoting the order).
518. Id. at 177, 179. In addition, the plaintiff, a medical clinic which operated in the
same city as the Help Clinic and performed abortions, alleged that the Help Clinic had
adopted a name designed to produce confusion of the two clinics. Id. at 177.
519. Id. at 180-81.
520. Id. at 182.
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ments do not represent quintessential commercial speech, neither
would it make sense to pigeonhole them as pure social or political
discourse either. The commercial speech designation captures as well
as any category the nature of the state interest here: precluding the
harm caused by "commercial messages that do not accurately inform
the public about lawful activity or are more likely to deceive the public
than to inform it.'"521 Whatever the drawbacks of categorization in
general5 22 and one's disagreement with the decision in Fargo, it is not
an indictment of current commercial speech classification that it
could be invoked to avert the possibility of individuals relying to their
detriment on the misleading advertisements in that case.
8. The Romantic Fallacy. -Finally, transcending and often under-
lying the previous specific objections to commercial speech classifica-
tion is resistance to the very idea of commercial speech. In modern
broadcasting, it seems, virtually any ostensibly commercial advertise-
ment carries deeper overtones. From this perspective,
a series of Taster's Choice coffee television commercials do
not describe the taste or aroma of the product, they tell the
story of a budding romance. Commercial speech may also
employ religious and cultural symbols to make commenta-
ries that are no less trenchant than political speech. A series
of Benetton advertisements in magazines features provoca-
tive images, such as a white hand and a black hand hand-
cuffed together and a young man dying of AIDS in his
father's arms. There is no Benetton clothing pictured ...
only a small Benetton logo at the bottom of the page.523
Similarly, organized resistance by libertarians and others to govern-
ment regulation of cigarettes can be thought to transmute a widely
seen advertisement with the word "Marlboro" from commercial
speech to a phase of a "political crusade.
524
The problem with this line of reasoning is not that it is illogical
but that it proves too much. It converts the unexceptionable observa-
tion that at least some noncommercial message can be teased out of
521. Id.
522. See infra notes 575-596 and accompanying text (arguing that the categories created
by the Court offer a meaningful and prudent framework for analyzing commercial
speech).
523. The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 223, at 232 (footnotes
omitted).
524. Joachim, supra note 216, at 544.
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all commercial speech 525 into an instrument for prying lofty but con-
trived commentary out of any advertisement. A television advertise-
ment consisting of three frogs croaking the name of the sponsor's
beer could be construed as an Aristophanic satire,526 while a good-
natured basketball sharpshooting competition between Michael Jor-
dan and Larry Bird for a McDonald's Big Mac hamburger could repre-
sent a hopeful meditation on the state of racial relations in American
society.527 While those musings over the fundamental content of tele-
vision's twenty-and thirty-second oeuvres might stimulate the imagina-
tion of philosophers, they do little to advance First Amendment
analysis. If, in the examples offered earlier, the "story of a budding
romance" had portrayed Taster's Choice coffee as possessing nonexis-
tent therapeutic qualities, or if one of Benetton's "provocative images"
had falsely implied that demonstrable victims of racism or disease
would receive a discount on the company's clothing, then the artistic
merits or social implications of the advertisements should not immu-
nize these misrepresentations from restriction as commercial speech.
Conversely, as discussed previously,5 28 if the advertisements cannot be
shown to mislead consumers in harmful ways, then they are not
threatened by abstract classification as commercial speech.
E. Alternative Controlling Frameworks
Even where legitimate issues of proper characterization of regu-
lated expression may be raised, the case should not necessarily turn
on classification. In some instances, another First Amendment ques-
tion is more central to the case and should determine the outcome.
Two areas in the commercial context where dwelling on classification
can be a misplaced exercise are charges of defamation and assertion
of a right not to speak.529
525. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 9, at 1067 (noting "the expression of ideas and
values such as materialism or capitalism" is inherent in every speech designated as
commercial).
526. See ARISTOPHANES, FROGS 69-76 (Kenneth Dover ed., Clarendon Press 1993)(describing the political criticism expressed in Aristophanes' comedy).
527. At the time of this writing, Jordan, who is black, and Bird, who is white, are two of
the most celebrated players in the history of professional basketball.
528. See supra Part III.D (arguing that the extension of the commercial speech doctrine
to certain types of advertising is not contrary to the goals of the doctrine).
529. There are, of course, other examples in which a case involving regulated expres-
sion should be decided by a doctrine other than that of commercial speech. In some cases,
commercial and noncommercial speech may even be comparably susceptible to restriction.
See, e.g., Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1995) (construing tests for time, place,
and manner regulations of noncommercial speech and commercial speech as "essentially
identical"); Marcus v.Jewish Nat'l Fund (Keren Kayemeth Leisrael), Inc., 557 N.Y.S.2d 886,
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1. Supersession by Defamation Doctrine: A Cautionary Example.-As
suggested earlier, 530 a plaintiff's allegation that the defendant made
defamatory statements can render the question of whether the state-
ments were part of commercial or noncommercial expression in effect
irrelevant. Defamation cases typically hinge on issues of the defend-
ant's status and intent independent of the commercial speech frame-
work.531 A conspicuous example of failure to grasp this analysis,
however, appeared in the Third Circuit's opinion in U.S. Healthcare,
Inc. v. Blue Cross.532 In this case, two health care organizations accused
each other of misrepresenting the relative quality of the organiza-
tions' services in the course of an advertising war.5 3 While several
causes of action were brought, the central portion of the opinion was
devoted to a First Amendment review of the defamation claims.
534
This review unnecessarily imported the difficulties of ascertaining
whether the advertisement at issue amounted to commercial speech
into the determination of the applicable standard for establishing def-
amation. As a threshold matter, the Supreme Court has placed a
heavy and often decisive premium on the designation of defamation
plaintiffs other than public officials as either public or private
figures.535 Yet, the Third Circuit, in its concededly "inverted analysis,"
reserved the question of status because it believed that under the cir-
cumstances presented resolution of that question "depends on whether
the speech at issue can properly be characterized as commercial
speech.'5 36 Although plausibly concluding that the derogatory adver-
889 (App. Div. 1990) (finding solicitation of charitable contributions, even if noncommer-
cial speech, not "exempt from having to comply with the strictures against false advertising
and other deceptive practices"); see also Timothy J. Moran, Format Restrictions on Televised
Political Advertising: Elevating Political Debate Without Suppressing Free Speech, 67 IND. L.J. 663,
689-90 (1992) (proposing issue-oriented format requirements for political advertisements
in order to promote meaningful discussions of issues).
530. See supra notes 464-467 and accompanying text.
531. See David Elder, Freedom of Expression and the Law of Defamation: The American Ap-
proach to Problems Raised by the Lingen Case, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 891, 892-914 (1986)
(summarizing developments in defamation doctrine from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964), through Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986));
Paul A. LeBel, Reforming the Tort of Defamation: An Accommodation of the Competing Interests
Within the Current Constitutional Framework, 66 NEB. L. REV. 249, 254-59 (1987) (tracking
recent interpretations of the New York Times' "actual malice" requirement and its frame-
work for the classification of defendants).
532. 898 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1990).
533. Id. at 917.
534. Id. at 927-39.
535. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-48 (1974) (requiring different
standards for public and private individuals); Marc A. Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why:
A Study of Defamation Litigation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 455, 471, 489, 498.
536. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 931 (emphasis added).
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tisements did constitute commercial speech,53 7 the court was mistaken
in asserting that this conclusion bore on the parties' status under defa-
mation doctrine. More specifically, the court misread Gertz in sug-
gesting that the commercial nature of the parties' speech transformed
them from public into private figures.538 Whatever reluctance the
Supreme Court has displayed toward designating defamation plaintiffs
as public figures, 53 9 Gertz and its progeny do not support the notion
that plaintiffs who would otherwise become public figures by having
"thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies
in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved '540 elude
that status when either the defendant's comments or their own5 41
qualify as commercial speech. Thus, the refusal in U.S. Healthcare to
apply the actual malice standard imposed on public figures5 42 did not
result from a dangerously malleable conception of commercial
speech, but rather from the inappropriate role assigned to commer-
cial speech classification in determining the plaintiffs status under
defamation law.543
537. I& at 933-37.
538. See id. at 938-39 (arguing that, notwithstanding "strong indicia" that parties were
limited purpose public figures under "traditional defamation analysis," Gertz's "express
analysis" is "not helpful in the context of a comparative advertising war").
539. In none of the four cases in which the Court issued an opinion assessing the plain-
tiffs status was the plaintiff deemed a public figure. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n,
443 U.S. 157, 167-69 (1979) (holding that the plaintiffs failure to appear before a lower
court in a contempt hearing before a grand jury and subsequent citation received because
of this failure were not determinative in assessing his status as a public figure); Hutchinson
v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 134-36 (1979) (holding that the plaintiff was not a public figure
despite his successful application for federal funds for research projects, the news stories
reporting the grants, and the reported responses that the plaintiff made to the alleged
libel); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454-56 (1976) (holding that the process of
divorce of wealthy individuals in a judicial proceeding does not necessarily render them
public figures); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52 (holding that an individual's participation as an
officer in civic and professional groups did not elevate him to the status of a public figure).
Like U.S. Healthcare, all of these cases involved defendants' assertions that the plaintiff was a
limited public figure. For an overview, see John B. McCrory & Robert C. Bernius, Constitu-
tional Privilege in Libel Law, in COMMUNICATIONS LAW 1995 731, 983-1034 (PLI Pats. Copy-
rights Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. G-420, 1995).
540. Gerz, 418 U.S. at 345.
541. See U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 939 (suggesting that neither party could be consid-
ered to have injected itself into a public controversy about health care because the impetus
for the advertisements at issue was commercial).
542. See id. at 938-39.
543. At least one court appears to have recognized the fallacy of U.S. Healthcare's reason-
ing. In National Life Insurance Co. v. Phillips Publishing, Inc., 793 F. Supp. 627, 649-50 (D.
Md. 1992), the court found the plaintiff insurance company to be a limited public figure.
Although ruling that the allegedly defamatory investment reports did not constitute com-
mercial speech, id at 643-45, the court went on to note that the level of fault that a defama-
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2. The Right Not To Speak.-One area in which casual classifica-
tion could in theory threaten protected expression is the right not to
speak. It is well-established that the First Amendment's guarantees
"include [ I] both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from
speaking at all."5 44 The latter right extends to general freedom from
compelled subsidization or other support for expressive activities with
which one prefers not to be associated.545 The Court has typically rec-
ognized the right to refrain from speaking where resistance to the
compelled expression stemmed from ideological objections.5 4 6 At the
same time, the power of government to compel some kinds of disclo-
sure about consumer products to keep consumers adequately in-
formed appears widely accepted. 47 Thus, it is at least conceivable
that political or other ideological expression could be foisted on an
unwilling speaker under the erroneous guise of commercial speech.
In practice, however, this danger does not seem to have material-
ized. The Court's considerable body ofjurisprudence in commercial
speech does not include a successful effort to mandate association
with a disagreeable view by pigeonholing ambiguous expression as
commercial speech. Indeed, the one case that probably came closest
to posing this danger, Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc.,548 saw
both sides in a 5-4 decision intimating or assuming that the right not
to speak deserves a substantial measure of protection even when that
tion plaintiff must show on the part of the defendant is not determined by whether the
statements at issue can be characterized as commercial speech. Id, at 645-48.
544. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
545. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233-36 (1977) (holding that, under
the First Amendment, a governmental employees union cannot compel a member to subsi-
dize ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining).
546. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515
U.S. 557, 566 (1995) (upholding under the First Amendment a veteran group's right to
exclude respondent organization from the group's St. Patrick's Day parade based on its
disagreement with the organization's message); Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-36 (holding that
government employees are entitled to withhold that portion of union fees used for expres-
sive political activities unrelated to collective bargaining); Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 (uphold-
ing right of Jehovah's Witness to cover state motto "Live Free or Die" on vehicle license
plates); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (invalidating law
requiring children in public schools to salute and pledge allegiance to the United States
flag).
547. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (plurality opin-
ion) (recognizing that a state may "regulate[ ] commercial messages to protect consumers
from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices"); Zauderer v. Office of Discipli-
nary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (holding that "an advertiser's rights are adequately
protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest
in preventing deception of consumers").
548. 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997).
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speech is commercial. 54" The Court upheld marketing orders
promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture that required producers
of certain California fruits to contribute to the costs of generic adver-
tising of those fruits. 55" Although the Ninth Circuit had ruled that the
orders failed the Central Hudson test,551 the Court held that the First
Amendment's protection of speech did not even pertain to this "ques-
tion of economic policy. ' 552 Instead, the Court treated the orders as a
"species of economic regulation" subject to the "strong presumption
of validity" to which legislative judgments are ordinarily entitled.553
Moreover, the Court indicated that if this type of order were to impli-
cate the First Amendment at all, the relevant analysis would be pro-
vided by the Court's decisions dealing with compelled speech.55 4 In
the Court's interpretation, those precedents embodied the principle
that "assessments to fund a lawful collective program may sometimes
be used to pay for speech over the objection of some members of the
group" where the expressive activities are germane to the program's
purpose.555
If the Court erred in this case, it was not in characterizing the
marketing orders as a regulation of commercial speech; it was in fail-
ing to regard the orders in that way. The principal dissent by Justice
Souter focused on the Court's "treating these compelled advertising
schemes as regulations of purely economic conduct instead of com-
mercial speech." 55 6 In Justice Souter's view, the compelled-speech
cases required that this compulsory support of commercial speech be
549. See id. at 2139 (recognizing the extensive protection offered under "compelled
speech case law" but refusing to extend such coverage to the regulation at issue); id. at
2144 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing the notion "that compelling cognizable speech
officially is just as suspect as suppressing it, and is typically subject to the same level of
scrutiny").
550. Wileman Bros., 117 S. Ct. at 2134, 2142.
551. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc. v. Espy, 58 F.3d 1367, 1378-80 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd,
117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997).
552. Wileman Bros., 117 S. Ct. at 2138.
553. Id. at 2142.
554. Id. at 2138-41 (discussing the issue in light of compelled speech cases and rejecting
the court of appeals's decision to apply the Central Hudson test).
555. Id. at 2140 (citing Lenhert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 529 (1991)) (assert-
ing that it is permissible to assess teachers for costs of union activities that concern teach-
ing, education, and related matters); see Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1990)
(upholding mandatory dues for members of an integrated bar to the extent that the funds
supported activities germane to the state's interest in the caliber of attorneys and quality of
legal services); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 217-32 (1977) (upholding
compulsory payment of union dues to support the union's collective bargaining activities).
556. Wileman Bros, 117 S. Ct. at 2149 (Souter, J., diisenting); see also id. at 2155 (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (describing the Court's refusal to treat the marketing orders as an issue
involving speech as "a complete repudiation of our precedent").
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judged by the Central Hudson standard for restrictions on such speech;
he found that the government had failed to show that the compelled
advertising programs directly advanced a substantial interest or were
narrowly tailored to the government's interests.557 Thus, a more ex-
pansive conception of commercial speech could have saved, not de-
feated, the First Amendment challenge in this case.558
F. The O'Brien Alternative
Some who regard the Court's commercial speech classification
scheme as rigid and artificial have proposed incorporating review of
expression with commercial elements into a more generalized stan-
dard.559 Specifically, they have looked to the test laid down by the
Court in United States v. O'Brien 6.5 " This test allows government regula-
tion to impinge on speech if the regulation
is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.
5 6 1
557. Id. at 2149-55 (Souter, J., dissenting); cf International Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Ames-
toy, 92 F.3d 67, 72-74 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that, even assuming that a state statute re-
quiring dairy manufacturers to label products from hormone-treated cows was a regulation
of commercial speech, this compelled disclosure violated the manufacturers' right not to
speak).
558. Of course, the majority might still have sustained the marketing orders even if it
had been inclined to view them as a regulation of commercial speech. This, however,
would have been a function of the majority's interpretation of the compelled-speech cases
rather than a rejection of a presumptive right not to support others' commercial speech.
The major precedents cited by the Court upheld, in part, compulsory subsidies of noncom-
mercial expressive activities. See supra note 555.
559. See Farber, supra note 174, at 386-96 (proposing a framework of contractual analysis
that would "provide a helpful guide in considering commercial speech problems"); Kozin-
ski & Banner, supra note 166, at 628-29 (asserting that "the commercial/noncommercial
distinction makes no sense" and advocating its elimination); Comment, supra note 224, at
923 (recommending that the Court "abandon[ ] the theory that commercial speech is less
valuable than political speech and that this difference justifies the stricter regulation of
commercial speech").
560. 391 U.S. 367 (1968); see Farber, supra note 174, at 387-88 (proposing to distinguish
between the informative and contractual aspects of advertisements, and to apply the
O'Brien test to the latter); Kozinski & Banner, supra note 166, at 651-52 (arguing that a
securities regulation statute, compelling disclosure of corporate information, would meet
the O'Brien test by providing an accurate flow of information to the market); Comment,
supra note 224, at 923-24 (arguing that regulation of deceptive advertising would pass the
O'Brien test for the validity of content-neutral regulations).
561. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
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Whatever its utility in other contexts, however, the O'Brien test would
not clarify the regulation of speech in commercial settings; it would
not necessarily extend more protection to this speech; ultimately, it
probably would not even eliminate the issues of classification.
1. O'Brien and Contractual Analysis.-The O'Brien standard was
originally formulated to address the problem of symbolic conduct:
i.e., instances in which "'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are com-
bined in the same course of conduct." '5 6 2 However, O'Brien sometimes
also has been invoked outside the realm of nonverbal expression. 563
In the area of speech connected with commercial transactions, the
O'Brien test has been recommended for review of the contractual as-
pect of regulation of advertising. 64 This aspect, which forms part of
the seller's commitment to the buyer, contrasts with the "informative"
function of advertising, the regulation of which would receive normal
First Amendment protection under this approach. 6 5 The approach is
said to "avoid[ ] the definitional problems inherent in the current
commercial speech doctrine. 5 6 6
2. O'Brien's Illusory Promise.-Whatever the utility of O'Brien's
analysis for reviewing regulation of commercially related expression, it
is not evident what would be gained by replacing the Court's estab-
lished commercial speech jurisprudence with this analysis. Anxiety
that the current lack of rigorous precision in identifying commercial
speech may chill protected expression should hardly be assuaged by
the indefinite terms of O'Brien, e.g., the requirement that the govern-
562. Id. at 376 (upholding a ban on destruction of draft registration certificates as ap-
plied to a defendant who burned his certificate as a protest against the Vietnam War); see
also Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567-72 (1991) (plurality opinion) (uphold-
ing under the O'Brien test the enforcement of a ban against nude dancing despite the ban's
incidental limitations on some expressive activity); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410
(1989) (overturning a conviction for flag burning as a suppression of free expression
outside the scope of the O'Brien test).
563. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (upholding a
requirement that cable systems carry full power local broadcast stations); United States v.
Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985) (sustaining a conviction for reentry onto military base
in violation of statutorily authorized letter from commanding officer forbidding the de-
fendant to reenter the base without officer's permission); see alsoJohn Hart Ely, Comment,
Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment
Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482, 1483 (1975) (concluding that the Court's analysis in
O'Brien "will be seen to argue rather strongly against the constitutionality of such [flag
desecration] laws").
564. Farber, supra note 174, at 386-89.
565. Id. at 387; see Comment, supra note 224, at 924-30 (discussing Farber's contractual
theory of commercial speech).
566. Comment, supra note 224, at 926.
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mental interest served by the regulation be "unrelated to the suppres-
sion of free expression. "567 Nor can encouragement regarding
O'Brien's clarity be derived from the results that the test has yielded; a
standard that produces 5-4 decisions568 is hardly self-executing. Even
proponents have acknowledged that the O'Brien cum contractual func-
tion framework (like alternative definitions of commercial speech5 69)
does not automatically resolve the more difficult issues raised when
regulation of commercial activity and restriction of speech inter-
sect.5 7 0 Such concessions are unavoidable, for O'Brien tells us no more
unequivocally than present doctrine how to deal with advertorials,
health claims, product placement, and other sometimes problematic
forms of corporate expression; the tensions that regulation of these
forms may raise would simply be shifted to another formal framework.
Besides failing to assure more predictable results, the O'Brien ap-
proach also would not necessarily prove more protective of speech.
With the conspicuous exception of the flag-burning cases, 571 O'Brien's
requirements have not operated as a notably potent instrument for
invalidating restrictions on expression.57 2 Moreover, a Court bent on
condoning regulation of what it now calls "commercial speech" could
take a similarly indulgent view of the same restrictions under the ru-
bric of the O'Brien test. Indeed, in upholding the prohibition on un-
authorized use of the word "Olympic" under the Central Hudson test,
the Court indicated that application of the O'Brien test would have
produced the same result.5 7 3 Similarly, when the Court in Fox sus-
567. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
568. E.g., Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 625; Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560,
567-68 (1991) (plurality opinion); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 313-14 (1990);
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403-06 (1989).
569. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 218, at 238, 245 n.174 (proposing to define commercial
speech in terms of the harm caused by the advertisement at issue, but conceding that the
lack of a narrow definition of harm is a "bothersome weakness"); Merrill, supra note 224, at
236 (conceding that the author's proposed definition of commercial speech is "not with-
out difficulties").
570. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 174, at 398 (noting that a "test based on information
content may also be difficult to apply with any degree of consistency and objectivity").
571. Eichman, 496 U.S. at 314 (striking down a federal statute prohibiting mutilation or
destruction of "any flag of the United States"); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420 (overturning John-
son's conviction for flag burning because he was "engaging in expressive conduct").
572. See Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARv. L. REV.
1175, 1201-08 (1996) (arguing that most challenged laws will survive the O'Brien test, so
that cases litigated under this test would not benefit free speech); Ely, supra note 563, at
1484-89 (arguing that the framework created in O'Brien is incomplete and is therefore
limited in its application); supra note 568 (citing cases decided under O'Brien).
573. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522,
537 n.16 (1987) (stating that the Central Hudson test and the test for a "time, place, or
manner restriction under O'Brien ... [are] substantially similar" as applied to the facts).
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tained a ban on commercial solicitation in university dormitory
rooms, it compared the level of scrutiny adopted in that decision to
the review conducted in O'Brien. 4
If, then, the O'Brien standard and prevailing commercial speech
doctrine roughly converge, the question becomes whether one ap-
proach offers a peculiar advantage. As with most essentially equitable
standards, the O'Brien test seems to afford greater latitude for individ-
ual analysis and doing justice in the particular case. The final section
of this Article contends, however, that the threshold classification of
some expression as commercial speech performs a useful analytical
sorting function. Like other First Amendment categories, the com-
mercial speech grouping spares courts endless reconstruction of es-
tablished principles and needless ad hoc balancing. As with other
categories, commercial speech doctrine retains its value and vitality
only so long as it is not permitted to ossify into a rigid abstract doc-
trine or to drift from its proper moorings.
IV. THE CATEGORY OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH: A FINAL OVERVIEW
The Court's ongoing delineation of a sphere of commercial
speech continues to navigate between criticism of its imprecision and
calls to abolish the concept altogether. In adhering to a discrete but
inexact notion of commercial speech, the Court in a sense remains
pragmatically perched between these two critiques. In the broader
sweep of First Amendment theory, the Court's version of commercial
speech represents a categorical approach that affords scope for the
individualized adjustments associated with balancing tests. 5
Whatever the Court's occasional missteps on the merits of particular
cases, this combination of coherence and flexibility offers a construc-
tive framework for dealing with an intrinsically untidy area.
No extravagant claim need be made to justify the existence of a
distinct doctrine of commercial speech. Rather, commercial speech
574. See Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 478 (1989); see
also Comment, supra note 224, at 927 n.120 (characterizing the O'Brien test as "similar to
the Central Hudson test for content-based regulations of commercial speech").
575. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943, 964 (1987) (providing a historical analysis of the evolution in the Court's use
of balancing tests, and crediting "the first explicit balancing opinion [to] a free speech
case, Schneiderv. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)"); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical
Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1615, 1617-27 (1987) (analyzing the theo-
ries of Professors Redish, Baker, and Bollinger in the context of a free speech framework);
PierreJ. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L. REv. 671,
733 (1983) (criticizing four existing categorical theories of freedom of speech and arguing
that the four parameters in First Amendment paradigm, "context, source, manner, and
effect" are ill-suited for a categorical approach).
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classification operates as shorthand recognition that the expression at
issue, while deserving of First Amendment solicitude, has commercial
elements that ordinarily trigger the Court's tolerance of government
regulation. While it is true that courts should "disregard mechanical
formulas"576 in assessing regulation of expression, identification of
commercial speech can serve as a helpful introductory signal that or-
dinary assumptions governing freedom of expression may not entirely
obtain. 77 As with other categories where some sort of intermediate
scrutiny has governed-e.g., time, place, and manner restrictions
57
-
commercial speech designation reflects a certain constellation of con-
siderations that neither automatically condemn nor sustain the chal-
lenged regulation. That a range of expression is initially designated
commercial speech no more renders courts unable to distinguish be-
tween a "literally false" claim about a product 79 and a prohibition on
a certified public accountant's holding himself out as such
580 than
time, place, and manner classification has impelled courts to equate a
city's restriction on the noise level at public concerts1
8 1 with a broad
ban on the distribution of leaflets in public streets.
58 2
Even though some cases do not present "a clean distinction be-
tween the market for ideas and the market for goods and services,
'
"583
the problem of characterization in these instances does not prove the
superiority of wholly ad hoc regimes. The body of doctrine that the
Court has built up under the heading of commercial speech is suffi-
576. Redish, supra note 19, at 473; see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S.
60, 82-83 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[I]t may be more fruitful to focus on the na-
ture of the challenged regulation rather than the proper label for the communication.").
577. See Schauer, supra note 180, at 290-91 (asserting that commercial speech "is regu-
lated for reasons both less suspect and less capable of abuse than those reasons used to
justify restrictions of speech on political, moral, and related issues, and its inclusion within
the first amendment is based on reasons quite distinct from those applicable to other
forms of communication") (footnotes omitted).
578. See Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L.
Rav. 615, 636-44 (1991) (analyzing the time, place, or manner doctrine from its origin in
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) through Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781 (1989)).
579. See Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 943 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing one
company's claim about the other's product).
580. See Miller v. Stuart, 117 F.3d 1376, 1382-84 (l1th Cir. 1997) (overturning a state
regulation prohibiting a certified public accountant employed by a non-CPA firm from
advertising his CPA status on grounds that the state failed to prove its regulation passed the
Central Hudson inquiry), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 852 (1998).
581. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 803 (upholding a city's sound-amplification guideline).
582. See Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939) (invalidating a
ban on the distribution of handbills).
583. Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 150, at 2 (asserting that the doctrine of commercial
speech rests on this distinction).
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ciently coherent, if imperfect, that a threshold determination of com-
mercial speech seems more efficient than compelling courts endlessly
to rehash de novo the considerations that entered into Virginia Phar-
macy and its progeny. If the Court had embarked on this line of cases
without promulgating a formal construct of commercial speech, it
seems likely that the results eventually would have crystallized into
more-or-less what we know as the commercial speech doctrine anyway.
As for ambiguous classification, First Amendment jurisprudence
abounds with concepts whose uncertain application in some cases is
generally not thought to compromise their utility as tools of analysis:
content neutrality,58 4 public figure, 58 5 overbreadth,58 6 and prior re-
straint58 7-to name but a few. Indeed, the aggregate of commercial
speech decisions arguably forms a more coherent body of doctrine
than any of these other frameworks for assessing First Amendment
rights. As this Article has sought to demonstrate, the Court's philoso-
phy of treating commercial speech as a distinct conceptual arena has
by no means proved "unworkable.5 88
On the other hand, efforts to fix the Court's approach by substi-
tuting a "categorical definition " 581 or a definition "presumptively ap-
plicable in all cases ' 590 do not ensure improvement over the Court's
handiwork either. To begin with, any such definition clashes with ju-
risprudential resistance to the very premise of effective all-encompass-
ing general propositions.59 1 In the specific context of commercial
584. See Williams, supra note 578, at 621 (analyzing the historical applications of the
content discrimination doctrine and arguing for a "broader interpretation of the content
discrimination principle").
585. See generally Nat Stern, Unresolved Antithesis of the Limited Public Figure Doctrine, 33Hous. L. REV. 1027, 1031-40 (1996) (providing a history and evaluation of the limited
public figure doctrine as applied by the judiciary).
586. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853,
858-77, 893-903 (1991) (offering a comprehensive review of the nebulous doctrine of over-breadth and developing a theory of its proper use); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REv. 844, 846 (1970) (analyzing the development of the overbreadth
doctrine and asserting that it "is a principled response to the systematic failure of other
methods of adjudication to protect first amendment rights adequately").
587. See generally Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66MINN. L. REv. 11, 15-49 (1981) (reviewing the theory of prior restraint since its inception
and analogizing the doctrine to licensing speech).
588. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985) (rejecting theprevious test for the validity of federal regulation of state governmental entities under the
Commerce Clause).
589. Simon, supra note 218, at 239.
590. McGowan, supra note 221, at 393.
591. For a piquant critique of one prominent metatheory, see Arthur Allen Leff, Eco-
nomic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv. 451, 462-81 (1974)(reviewing RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYsIs OF LAW (1973)) (criticizing Posner's
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speech, attempts to devise a comprehensive definition that conforms
to the rationale for freedom of speech are vitiated by the multifaceted
purposes of that guarantee.
5 92
The novel and variegated forms of expression that implicate legit-
imate regulatory interests thwart a single definition that captures every
possible contingency. For example, it is tempting to address the aim
of curbing inducement of commercial activity through deception by
adopting a stripped-down version of commercial speech that is con-
fined to simple proposals of commercial transactions. However, the
potential for deception lurks in communications other than such pro-
posals, and the government's interest should not be defeated because
the message at issue does not readily qualify as a commercial advertise-
ment or similar direct overture. The Bolger criteria,5" 3 in particular,
manifest a valid determination not to straitjacket analysis by a narrow,
rigid a priori conception of commercial speech.
Nor can multiple criteria or compartments be expected to resolve
unequivocally every possible question of commercial speech classifica-
tion. Experience with the explicit standards for obscenity
594 and the
proliferating permutations of defamation doctrine5 9 5 refute the no-
tion that greater detail inevitably produces more clarity and protec-
tion. Ultimately, the Court's articulation of the basic parameters of
commercial speech, coupled with a willingness to consider unantici-
pated candidates for such designation, may be the best that can be
expected at this stage. After all, the commercial speech doctrine is
still-historically speaking-relatively young. The continuing evolu-
tion of the doctrine "case-by-case via the common law method, with all
prominent metatheory of law and economics). The intrinsic deficiency of comprehensive
theories finds echoes in philosophical developments, perhaps most prominently in Isaiah
Berlin's skepticism toward "all embracing schemas, [and] universal unifying frameworks."
ISAIAH BERLIN, AGAINST THE CuRRENT: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS XXVI (1980).
592. See TRIBE, supra note 178, at 785 (discussing the differing fundamental approaches
to the definition of free speech); Geyh, supra note 173, at 12-13 (attempting to decipher
which First Amendment theories should be included in the commercial speech doctrine);
Schauer, supra note 8, at 1186 (proposing that First Amendment ought to "be the phrase
encompassing several different justifications not reducible to any single principle"); Shif-
frin, supra note 176, at 1212 (arguing that the development of commercial speech doctrine
has been slowed by commentators' misguided preoccupation with abstract theories).
593. See supra notes 86, 197-205 and accompanying text (analyzing the implications of
Bolger).
594. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (setting forth proper guidelines for
evaluating whether or not material is obscene); TRIBE, supra note 178, at 909-19 (offering a
discussion of the Court's standards on obscenity); James Lindgren, Defining Pornography,
141 U. PA. L. Rav. 1153 (1993) (surveying the differing methods of defining pornography).
595. See supra note 531.
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its potential for false starts, ambiguities, and uncertainties, '59 6 may
well produce further refinements of its scope. It seems preferable to
allow these insights to accumulate gradually than prematurely to
squeeze commercial speech into a conceptual Procrustean bed.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's inability to encase commercial speech
within unwavering definitional boundaries is not the product of inep-
titude, but rather the unavoidable incident of commercial speech's
position at the blurry crossroads of expressive and economic activity.
Whether viewed as "[s] peech-plus-conduct" 597 or some similar hybrid,
commercial speech "stubbornly declines to fit comfortably within our
general rules for free speech."5 9' Admittedly, the attempt to reconcile
heightened protection for free speech with legitimate deference to
economic regulation 59 9 has generated strain and untidiness in com-
mercial speech doctrine.6 °° On the other hand, the course of com-
mercial speech doctrine cannot fairly be described as random or
capricious. On the whole, the justifications for restrictions that the
Court has struck down have implicated reasons for ordinary skepti-
cism of suppression of speech under the First Amendment, while per-
missible regulation has resembled other, presumptively valid efforts to
bring rationality and fairness to the economic marketplace.6"1
Unsurprisingly, the Court's efforts to define the arena in which
this sometimes difficult balance is struck have disclosed a mix of self-
evident core and ambiguous periphery. While speech that does "no
more than propose a commercial transaction"60 2 is readily recognized,
not all other expression "linked inextricably to commercial activity"6 3
fits neatly within the commercial speech category. From the stand-
point of theoretical elegance, this zone of indeterminacy can be unset-
fling. However, this Article has attempted to show that the Court's
inexact scheme for identifying commercial speech has not resulted in
596. Shiffrin, supra note 176, at 1223.
597. Eberle, supra note 175, at 462.
598. Farber, supra note 174, at 372.
599. See TRIBE, supra note 178, at 903 ("The entire commercial speech doctrine, after all,
represents an accommodation between the right to speak and hear expression about goods
and services and the right of government to regulate the sales ofsuch goods and services.").
600. See supra Part II.B.
601. See supra Part II.A (reviewing the Court's rationale in cases where state regulations
have been either overturned or upheld).
602. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973).
603. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 n.9 (1979).
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significant harm, and has produced some good in lending coherence
to what would otherwise be a welter of loosely connected decisions.
A substantial portion of this Article has sought to respond to criti-
cism of the very idea of a separate realm of commercial speech. In a
sense, support or rejection of the commercial speech category rests on
belief or doubt that the generalizations upon which commercial
speech's qualified First Amendment status are built obtain in a suffi-
cient number of instances to justify distinctive treatment. Obviously,
this Article has accepted the premise that there are a sufficient
number of cases in which commercial speech is different enough to
justify a distinctive analytical framework. Whatever the imprecision
within and overlap between this and other categories, our jurispru-
dence rightly perceives that the latter do not involve the same balance
of regulatory prerogative and First Amendment solicitude. A Klan
leader's vague but heartfelt threat to consider vengeance against ra-
cial minorities6 °4 may be more alarming than a slight misstatement of
the nutritional content of retail cereal, but it is the latter that is sub-
ject to regulation and penalty. The shouts and condemnation hurled
by pro-life demonstrators at a patient of an abortion clinic
6 5 may be
more intimidating than an attorney's attempts to foist his services on a
reluctant client, but it is the attorney who suffers the more sweeping
degree of prohibition.6"6 And while it may be more profoundly false
and destructive for a presidential candidate to insinuate that his oppo-
nent favors the early release of convicted murderers60 7 or the aboli-
tion of Medicare 6 1 than for an advertisement to convey a somewhat
misleading impression of an automobile's fuel efficiency, only the car
company will be accountable to more than the marketplace of ideas.
604. See Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446 (1969) (per curiam) (striking down a
conviction under a state's criminal syndicalism statute for speech in which the defendant
declared that if government "'continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible
that there might have to be some revengeance taken'").
605. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 757 (1994) (upholding the
provision of an injunction establishing 36-foot "buffer zone" around abortion clinic's en-
trances and driveway and restricting noise within vicinity of the clinic, but invalidating
other provisions under the First Amendment).
606. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 467 (1978) (upholding a prohibi-
tion of in-person solicitation for lawyers); see also supra text accompanying notes 53-57 (dis-
cussing Ohralik).
607. See PAUL TAYLOR, SEE How THEY RUN: ELECTING THE PRESIDENT IN AN AGE OF
MEDIAOCRACY 191-93, 212-15 (1990) (describing a political television advertisement that
allegedly distorted presidential candidate Governor Michael Dukakis's policy on prison
furloughs).
608. See Dena Bunis, Campaign 96/Where 2 Camps Stand on Medicare, NEWSDAY, Oct. 18,
1996, at A47, available in 1996 WL 2540735 (reporting accusation that campaign of presi-
dential candidate Bill Clinton was distorting candidate Bob Dole's position on Medicare).
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These examples reflect relative confidence in mechanisms for de-
tecting and redressing the danger of certain expression in commercial
contexts. Thus, it is not a paradox-or at worst is a paradox en-
shrined by the longstanding exaltation of political speech-that ex-
pression capable of misleading consumers of commercial products is
viewed through a different lens than speech with comparable poten-
tial to mislead political "consumers." Even the varying consideration
of the same expression in different settings does not discredit the idea
of commercial speech; the principle that context matters is a familiar
one in First Amendment jurisprudence. Here, for example, the gov-
emnment's ability to regulate a representation of American origin is
surely greater in a commercial setting6 "9 than in an artistic610 one.
The principle holds even where the expression conveys identical in-
formation in commercial and noncommercial formats. The govern-
ment's latitude to regulate the statement that a particular beer
"contains 4.73% alcohol by volume"6 1t'-e.g., to insist on its accuracy
or visibility-may well depend on whether the statement appears on
the beer's label or in an editorial promoting temperance.
Of course, in the case from which this last example is drawn, the
statement's appearance on a bottle's label correctly reported the alco-
hol content of the beer contained in the bottle.612 And while Justice
Stevens chided the Coors majority for what he viewed as its facile char-
acterization of the label as commercial speech,61 3 the Court did unan-
imously invalidate the government's prohibition on the display of this
information. The pattern reflected by this result suggests that com-
mercial speech doctrine has not been relegated to its feared status as
the "stepchild of first amendment jurisprudence";614 on the contrary,
the modem doctrine has extended substantial protection where little
existed before. In venturing into what is still relatively novel territory,
the Court has not rigidly imposed finality on the province of expres-
sion to which this still-evolving doctrine will apply. However disap-
pointing as a matter of analytical purity, this epistemologically modest
609. See 16 C.F.R. § 250.7(a) (1) (1998) (regulating conditions for "Made in USA" label-
ing on household furniture); 16 C.F.R. § 303.27 (1998) (wool products); 16 C.F.R.
§ 3 03.33(a)(2) (1998) (textile fiber products).
610. See BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN, Born in the U.S.A., on BoRN IN THE U.S.A. (Columbia
Records, 1984) (using the refrain "Born in the U.S.A." to evoke reflection about life in
America).
611. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 494 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring).
612. Id. at 494 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring).
613. Id. at 494-95 (Stevens, J., concurring).
614. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 166, at 652. The authors offer this explanation:
"Liberals don't much like commercial speech because it's commercial; conservatives mis-
trust it because it's speech." Id.
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stance allows the constitutional common law of commercial speech to
unfold in a way that is sensitive to both the hazards of the marketplace
and the demands of free speech.
